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Reforms of North Carolina property law seem to require a rather
long period of gestation between conception by the legal writer and
delivery by the legislature. The Intestate Succession Act of 19601 did
not see the light of day until almost three decades after McCall and
t Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
1. Law of June 10, 1959, ch. 879, [1959] N.C. Sess. Laws 886 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 29-1 to -30 (1976)).
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Langston's seminal article advocating a new statute of descent. 2 Webster's work on marketable title during the mid sixties 3 did not bear fruit
in the form of the Real Property Marketable Title Act 4 until 1973.
Several writers have advocated abolition of the Rule in Shelley's Case,5
"the Don Quixote of the law, which, like the last Knight errant of

chivalry, has long survived every cause that gave it birth and now
wanders aimlessly through the reports, still vigorous, but equally useless
and dangerous."
Their advice, however, has yet to be heeded, an
inaction that leaves North Carolina in the dubious company of only
three or four other states. 7 Whatever the reasons for this curious lag
between advocacy and action, 8 it seems clear that the proponent of
change ought to make his record clearly and early.

It is now thirty-one years since Long modestly recommended repu2. McCall & Langston, A New Intestate Succession Statute for North Carolina,
11 N.C.L. REv. 266 (1932).
3. Webster, The Quest for Clear Land Titles-Whither Possibilities of Reverter
and Rights of Entry?, 42 N.C.L. REv. 807 (1964); Webster, The Quest for Clear Land
Titles-Making Land Title Searches Shorter and Surer in North Carolina Via Marketable Title Legislation, 44 N.C.L. REv. 89 (1965); Webster, A Relic North Carolina
Can Do Without-The Rule in Shelley's Case, 45 N.C.L. REv. 3 (1966); Webster, Toward Greater Marketability of Land Titles-Remedying the Defective Acknowledgment
Syndrome, 46 N.C.L. REv. 56 (1967); Webster, Doubt Reduction Through Conveyancing Reform-More Suggestions in the Quest for Clear Land Titles, 46 N.C.L. Rav.
284 (1968).
4. Law of April 23, 1973, ch. 255, [1973] N.C. Sess. Laws 240 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 47B-1 to -9 (1976)).
5. Proposals for Legislation in North Carolina: Real Property-The Rule in
Shelley's Case, 9 N.C.L. REv. 13, 51 (1930) (prepared by members of the faculty of
the University of North Carolina School of Law); Block, The Rule in Shelley's Case
in North Carolina, 20 N.C.L. REv. 49 (1941); Webster, A Relic North Carolina Can
Do Without-The Rule in Shelley's Case, 45 N.C.L. Rav. 3 (1966). But see Aycock,
Survey of North Carolina Case Law-Real Property, 44 N.C.L. Rav. 1027, 1036
(1966).
6. Stamper v. Stamper, 121 N.C. 251, 254, 28 S.E. 20, 22 (1897).
7. Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, and perhaps Arkansas. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 4.51, at 494 n.39 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952 & Supp. 1965) [hereinafter cited
as ALP]; 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, THE LAw oF FuTman INTERESyS § 1563, at 474-75

nn.53-58 (1956 & Supp. 1973) [hereinafter cited as SIMES & SMrrn]. For further discussion of the Arkansas rule see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. V. Gardner, 245 Ark. 746,
434 S.W.2d 266 (1968).
Indeed, in 1967 the legislature went out of its way to reaffirm the Rule. In establishing a rule that in construing conveyances the court shall give effect to the intention
of parties, the legislature added a proviso that this rule should not prevent application
of the Rule in Shelley's Case. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-1.1 (1976).
8. Reforms of obscure rules obviously lack political appeal; this is lawyer's law.
Also, there is little need for precipitate action, as many rules of property do not affect
many people in a given year. Cumulatively, however, archaic rules do tend to foster
litigation and, in any event, to thwart the intentions of parties, requiring that action
ultimately be taken.
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diation in North Carolina of the Rule in Wild's Case,9 albeit in the
context of an article entitled "Class Gifts in North Carolina."

Subse-

quent writers have noted the Rule, but only in the course of discussing
problems of draftsmanship; 10 none has critically evaluated it.11

It is

perhaps understandable, then, that no one has pressed for abolition of
the Rule.

While not as celebrated as its somewhat illegitimate kin

(Shelley's Case), the Rule in Wild's Case has plagued North Carolinians through more than a century of the reports, surfacing as recently as
1970.12 Consequently, it seems advisable to focus attention on Wild's
Case, critically evaluating its merit in the context of North Carolina law,
as a foundation for future legislative (or judicial!) action.' 3
9. Long, Class Gifts in North Carolina, 22 N.C.L. REv. 297, 299-302 (1944).
10. Bolich, Some Common Problems Incident to Drafting Dispositive Provisions
of Donative Instruments, 35 N.C.L. REv. 17, 25-26 (1956); Phillips, Some Suggestions
to Will Draftsmen: Complex Dispositive Plans in General, Class Gift Provisions in
Particular,40 N.C.L. REv. 23, 34 n.17 (1961).
11. The North Carolina Rule is also described in J. WEBSTER, REAL ESTATE LAw
IN NoRm CAROLINA § 44 (1971) and 2 N. WIcINS, WILLS AND ADMINISRATiON OF
ESTATES IN NoRTH CAROLINA § 286 (1964). Mordecai does not treat it. See S. MORDECAI, LAw LECTURES (2d ed. 1916). The Rule is discussed generally in 5 ALP, supra
note 7, H§ 22.16-.25 (substantially reprinting Casner, Construction of Gifts "To A and
His Children" (Herein the Rule in Wild's Case), 7 U. Cm. L. REv. 438 (1940));
3 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 355 (1967); -RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 283 (1940);
2 SIMMS & SMrrH, supra note 7, §§ 691-702; 4A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON
THE MODERN LAW oF REAL PROPERTY § 2008 (J. Grimes repl. 1961); 2 H. UNDERHLL,
A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF WILLS § 579-584 (1900); Brown, Problems of Construction Arising in the Law of Property-Particularlyin the Law of Future Interests, 79
U. PA. L. REv. 385, 393-400 (1931); Carey, Words of Limitation or Words of Purchase: Rule in Shelley's Case-Wild's Case-Miscellaneous, 34 ILL. L. REv. 379
(1939); Note, Real Property-Wills-udicialConstruction of "to A and His Children,"
75 W. VA. L. REv. 296 (1973).
12. Jernigan v. Lee, 9 N.C. App. 582, 176 S.E.2d 899 (1970), rev'd, 279 N.C.
341, 182 S.E.2d 351 (1971). See also Tremblay v. Aycock, 263 N.C. 626, 139 S.E.2d
898 (1965); Fratcher, A Modest Proposal for Trimming the Claws of Legal Future
Interests, 1972 DunE L.J. 517, 552; Webster, Doubt Reduction Through Conveyancing
Reform-More Suggestions in the Quest for Clear Land Titles, 46 N.C.L. RFv. 284,
295 (1968). The Restatement adopts the Rule in modified form. RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY

§ 283 (1940).

13. There is not a complete listing in the literature of North Carolina decisions
relevant to Wild's Case. The digests are hopeless. The best listing is in Long, supra
note 9, at 300 n.13, but he failed to uncover some early decisions and of course could
not list decisions made after he wrote. The list compiled by this author is as follows:
First Resolution:
Griffin v. Springer, 244 N.C. 95, 92 S.E.2d 682 (1956); Davis v. Brown, 241 N.C.
116, 84 S.E.2d 334 (1954); Sharpe v. Isley, 219 N.C. 753, 14 S.E.2d 814 (1941) (sem.
ble); Martin v. Knowles, 195 N.C. 427, 142 S.E. 313 (1928) (semble); Daniel v. Bass,
193 N.C. 294, 136 S.E. 733 (1927); Boyd v. Campbell, 192 N.C. 398, 135 S.E. 121
(1926); Ziegler v. Love, 185 N.C. 40, 115 S.E. 887 (1923); Masters v. Randolph, 183
N.C. 3, 110 S.E. 598 (1922); Cole v. Thornton, 180 N.C. 90, 104 S.E. 74 (1920);
Elkins v. Seigler, 154 N.C. 374, 70 S.E. 636 (1911); Silliman v. Whitaker, 119 N.C. 89,
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THE "RULE" IN WILD'S CASE

The Rule in Wild's Case deals with the meaning of a limitation in
the form "to A and his children." And yes, North Carolina, there really
was a Wild's Case, decided by the Court of King's Bench in 1599 and
dutifully reported by that great Elizabethan, Lord Coke himself.' 4
Yet the Rule in Wild's Case is not even a rule (in the sense of a rule of

property); it is a resolution (in the sense of a rule of construction). Nor
is it a single resolution; it is in fact two rules of construction. Both
Resolutions in Wild's Case were dicta, but they have had a surprisingly long life. One may speculate that the durability of the Rule in Wild's
Case owes much to the fame of its reporter, Lord Coke, just as the socalled Rule in Shelley's Case 15 owes its fame to the same reporter.'6 But,
25 S.E. 742 (1896); Doggett v. Moseley, 52 N.C. 450, 7 Jones 587 (1860) (dictum)
(semble); Jenkins v. Hall, 57 N.C. 321, 4 Jones Eq. 334 (1858).
Second Resolution:
Tremblay v. Aycock, 263 N.C. 626, 139 S.E.2d 898 (1965); Coffield v. Peele,
246 N.C. 661, 100 S.E.2d 45 (1957); Byrd v. Patterson, 229 N.C. 156, 48 S.E.2d 45
(1948); Sharpe v. Isley, 219 N.C. 753, 14 S.E.2d 814 (1941) (semble); Mayberry v.
Grimsley, 208 N.C. 64, 179 S.E. 7 (1935); Buckner v. Maynard, 198 N.C. 802, 153
S.E. 458 (1930); Tate v. Amos, 197 N.C. 159, 147 S.E. 809 (1929); Martin v. Knowles,
195 N.C. 427, 142 S.E. 313 (1928) (semble); Snowden v. Snowden, 187 N.C. 539,
122 S.E. 300 (1924); Benbury v. Butts, 184 N.C. 23, 113 S.E. 499 (1922); Cullens
v. Cullens, 161 N.C. 344, 77 S.E. 228 (1913); Tart v. Tart, 154 N.C. 502, 70 S.E.
929 (1911); Lewis v. Stancil, 154 N.C. 326, 70 S.E. 621 (1911); Whitehead v. Weaver,
153 N.C. 88, 68 S.E. 1059 (1910); Condor v. Secrest, 149 N.C. 201, 62 S.E. 921
(1908); Campbell v. Everhart, 139 N.C. 503, 52 S.E. 201 (1905); Darden v. Timberlake, 139 N.C. 181, 51 S.E. 895 (1905); Weeks v. McPhail, 128 N.C. 130, 38 S.E.
472 (1901); King v. Stokes, 125 N.C. 514, 34 S.E. 641 (1899); Wilson v. Wilson,
119 N.C. 588, 26 S.E. 155 (1896); Helms v. Austin, 116 N.C. 751, 21 S.E. 556 (1895);
Heath v. Heath, 114 N.C. 547, 19 S.E. 155 (1894); Hampton v. Wheeler, 99 N.C.
222, 6 S.E. 236 (1888); Hunt v. Satterwhite, 85 N.C. 73 (1881); Blair v. Osborne,
84 N.C. 417 (1881); Pollard v. Pollard, 83 N.C. 96 (1880); Pruden v. Paxton, 79
N.C. 446 (1878); Gay v. Baker, 58 N.C. 359, 5 Jones Eq. 344 (1860); Faribault v.
Taylor, 58 N.C. 234, 5 Jones Eq. 219 (1859); Coakley v. Daniel, 57 N.C. 96, 4 Jones
Eq. 90 (1858); Chesnut v. Meares, 56 N.C. 395, 3 Jones Eq. 416 (1857); Bridges
v. Wilkins, 56 N.C. 326, 3 Jones Eq. 342 (1857); Moore v. Leach, 50 N.C. 97, 5
Jones 88 (1857); Doe ex rel. Stowe v. Davis, 32 N.C. 310, 10 Ired. 431 (1849) (chooses
tenancy in common; Wild's Case not mentioned); Johnson v. Johnson, 38 N.C. 334,
3 Ired. Eq. 426 (1844) (finds individual gifts, not a class gift, because of the words
"to be equally divided between them and their heirs, share and share alike"; Wild's
Case not mentioned); Skinner v. Lamb, 25 N.C. 110, 3 Ired. 155 (1842) (chooses
a tenancy in common; Wild's Case not mentioned); Ponton v. McLemore, 22 N.C.
273, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 285 (1839) (chooses life estate-remainder; Wild's Case not
mentioned); Jernigan v. Lee, 9 N.C. App. 582, 176 S.E.2d 899 (1970), rev'd, 279 N.C.
341, 182 S.E.2d 351 (1971).
14. 77 Eng. Rep. 277 (K.B. 1599). Lord Coke's life and times are marvelously
described in Catherine Drinker Bowen's THE LION AND THE THRONE (1956).

15. 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B. 1581).
16. It does not appear, however, that Lord Coke was involved in Wild's Case as
counsel. See Wild's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 277 (K.B. 1599).
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as will be shown, that is scarcely a reason for continuing to adhere to the
Rule.
In the course of his report of Wild's Case, Lord Coke stated the
following rules:
[I]f A. devises his lands to B. and to his children or issues, and he
bath not any issue at the time of the devise, that the same is an
estate tail; for the intent of the devisor is manifest and certain that
his children or issues should take, and as immediate devisees they
cannot take, because they are not in rerum natura, and by way of
remainder they cannot take, for that was not his intent, for the gift
is immediate, therefore there such words shall be taken as words of
limitation, scil. as much as children or issues of his body; . . . but
if a man devises land to A. and to his children or issue, and they
then have issue of their bodies, there his express intent may take
effect, according to the rule of the common law, and no manifest
and certain intent appears in the will to the contrary. And therefore in such case, they shall have but a joint estate for life. 1'
17. Wild's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 277, 279-79 (K.B. 1599). Note that in its original
form the Rule was said to apply to devises to A and his "issue," where "issue" was
used in the sense of "children," as well as to devises to A and his children. Gifts
to A and his "issue" do not seem to have engendered Wild's Case litigation in North
Carolina, in contrast to some other states.
The construction of a devise or gift of property to "A and the children of B"
raises one large issue which in turn would seem to affect the resolution of two subissues.
The larger issue is whether the devise or gift is to one class consisting of A and the
children of B or to an individual, A, and a class, the children of B. The first of
the subissues is whether the devise to A lapses if he should die before the testator.
The second is whether A takes a share equal to the share taken by each child of B
(per capita) or whether he takes a half and the children of B a half of the property
(per stirpes).
One might think that the determination of the two subissues is necessarily controlled by the determination of the larger issue. If the language is construed to be
a devise to a single class, then (1) the devise to A would not lapse, but would go
to the other class members, and (2) the members of the class would all take equal
shares. On the other hand, if the devise is construed to be to an individual and a
class, then (1) the devise to A could lapse and (2) A, if alive, would take a onehalf share not necessarily equal to (and usually greater than) that of the -members
of the class of which he is not a member (B's children).
These seemingly consistent results, however, are not found in most jurisdictions,
including North Carolina. The general rule is that the gift to A lapses (or invokes
an anti-lapse statute) should A die before the death of the testator. Henderson v. Womack, 41 N.C. 315, 316, 6 Ired. Eq. 437, 441 (1849); 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.13;
2 SIMES & Smtrn, supra note 7, § 616. Contra, RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 284
(1940). See also W. LEACH & 1. LOGAN, CASES AND TExT ON FuTuRE INTERESTS AND
ESTATE PLANNING 341 n.7 (1961). In other words, for purposes of lapse the gift is
treated as one to an individual, A, and a class, the children of B.
On the other hand, when the question is whether A takes a share equal to that
of each child of B or whether A takes a one-half share, the general presumption lies
in favor of a per capita distribution-A takes a share equal to that of each child. Tillman v. O'Briant, 220 N.C. 714, 18 S.E.2d 131 (1942); Culp v. Lee, 109 N.C. 675,
14 S.E. 74 (1891); Whitehurst v. Pritchard, 5 N.C. 255, 1 Mur. 383 (1810); 2 SimEs
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Both Resolutions were dicta, as the language of the devise in the case
was significantly different from "to B and his children." ' s Nevertheless
the Rule has generally been followed both in England 0 and the United
States. 0

The father of Wild's Case in North Carolina law is Justice Battle of
the mid-nineteenth century Supreme Court of North Carolina. He first
recognized and stated the Rule in the fountainhead 1850 case of Moore
v. Leach.2 ' In that case Battle cited Wild's Case, quoted its two
& SMITH, supra note 7, § 615; Long, supra note 9, at 321-24 (1944). Nevertheless,
a contrary intent will be given effect. Pardue v. Givens, 54 N.C. 211, 1 Jones Eq.
306 (1854); Henderson v. Womack, 41 N.C. 315, 6 Ired. Eq. 437 (1849). See also
Stowe v. Ward, 10 N.C. 327, 3 Hawks 604 (1825), rev'd, 12 N.C. 58, 1 Dev. 67 (1826),
rev'd, 17 N.C. 405, 2 Dev. Eq. 509 (1834) (the court held per capita, reversed itself,
then reversed itself again).
Thus the answer to the question whether the gift is to a single class or to an
individual and a class depends upon the purpose for which the question is being asked.
Rather than approaching the problem from the gross issue of class gift or no, the cases
use a finer scalpel, asking the purpose for which the classification may be relevant.
For purposes of lapse, the gift is treated as one to an individual and a class; for purposes
of shares, the gift is treated as one to a single class.
The inconsistent answers may cause conflict. For example, suppose there is a devise to A and the children of B, B having five children. A dies before the testator
and then one of the five children dies before the testator. Does one-sixth of the gift
lapse (A's per capita share before he died) or does one-fifth of the gift lapse (A's per
capita share had he not died)? See 2 SIMES & SMITH, supra note 7, § 615.
Whitehead v. Weaver, 153 N.C. 88, 68 S.E. 1059 (1910), involved a gift to A
and the children of B. Applying the Second Resolution in Wild's Case, the court held
that A and the eight children of B were tenants in common, each taking a one-ninth
share. This result was consistent with the per capita presumption reached according to
the cases discussed above. Apparently no other North Carolina decision has applied
Wild's Case to a gift to A and the children of B. With Whitehead v. Weaver, compare
Lockhart v. Lockhart, 56 N.C. 200, 3 Jones Eq. 205 (1857) (bequest to be equally
divided between the children of deceased son A, and sons B and C; there were three
children of A; held, division per stirpes, not per capita, so the children of A take
one-ninth each, not one-fifth each).
18. The devise was in the form "to A for life, remainder to B and the heirs of
his body, remainder to C and his wife, and after their decease to their children." 77
Eng. Rep. at 277. At the time of the devise, C and his wife had a son and a daughter.
B died without heirs of his body. C, his wife, and their son pre-deceased B. The son
of C left a daughter, D, who claimed an interest on the theory that C and his wife
had an estate tail. (If they had only a life estate followed by a remainder in the
children, D took nothing because the remainder to the children of C and his wife was
only for life-the limitation to "children" lacked words of inheritance [such as "and
their heirs"], and even though the creating instrument was a will for which words of
inheritance were not absolutely required, there was no manifestation of intention to
give the children a fee.) The court held that C and his wife took a life estate followed
by a remainder (for life) in their children; therefore, D, their grandchild, took nothing.
Id. at 277-79.
19. 2 SiMES & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 691 n.2.
20. See 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.16.
21. 50 N.C. 97, 5 Jones 88 (1857). Moore v. Leach was not the first case in
which the Rule in Wild's case might have been invoked. See the earlier cases of Doe
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Resolutions, and applied the Second Resolution to find a joint estate2 2 in

the testator's daughter and her children when the daughter had three
children at the making of the will, who all survived the testator. A year
later, on the supposed authority of Moore v. Leach, Battle applied the
First Resolution to give an absolute estate23 in personalty to the testator's
childless daughter.2 4 During his tenure, Battle recognized Wild's Case

as an issue in six cases ;25 by 1860 another judge had picked up his
lead 26 and since then about forty cases have grappled with the Rule.
A.

The FirstResolution

According to the First Resolution in Wild's Case, if A has no
children a devise "to A and his children" creates a fee tail in A. Thus
the words "and his children" are treated as words of limitation in the
sense of "and his bodily heirs." From the standpoint of effectuating the
testator's intention to benefit A's children, the fee tail construction is
justifiable since the entailed estate will pass on A's death to his children

(if he has any who survive him) .27
The case for the fee tail in A on the ground that the entailed

estate will pass on his death to his children, if any, is subject to one
flaw that seems not to have been noticed elsewhere. The problem arises
at common law where A dies leaving two or more children, at least
ex rel. Stowe v. Davis, 32 N.C. 311, 10 Ired. 431 (1844); Johnson v. Johnson, 38
N.C. 334, 3 Ired. Eq. 426 (1844); Skinner v. Lamb, 25 N.C. 111, 3 Ired. 155 (1842);
and Ponton v. McLemore, 22 N.C. 236, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 285 (1839), all involving
potential Wild's Case language but failing to perceive the doctrine.
22. Battle found a joint estate in fee, not for life, in contrast to Wild's Case.
The point is discussed in section I(B) intra.
23. Battle found a fee simple, not a fee tail, in contrast to Wild's Case. The
subject of the gift was personalty (slaves), in which fees tail do not exist. This point
is discussed in section I(E) infra.
24. Jenkins v. Hall, 57 N.C. 321, 4 Jones Eq. 334 (1858).
25. Faribault v. Taylor, 58 N.C. 234, 5 Jones Eq. 219 (1859); Jenkins v. Hall,
57 N.C. 321, 4 Jones Eq. 334 (1858); Coakley v. Daniel, 57 N.C. 96, 4 Jones Eq. 90
(1858); Chesnut v. Meares, 56 N.C. 395, 3 Jones Eq. 416 (1857); Bridges v. Wilkins,
56 N.C. 326, 3 Jones Eq. 342 (1857); Moore v. Leach, 50 N.C. 97, 5 Jones 88 (1857).
Wild's Case is not mentioned in the Bridges v. Wilkins opinion, but a later case indicates that Battle had it in mind. Faribault v. Taylor, 58 N.C. at 235, 5 Jones Eq.
at 220.
26. Gay v. Baker, 58 N.C. 273, 5 Jones Eq. 344 (1860) (Manly, J.).
27. It seems not to have been noticed that the potential interest in A's prospective
children could have been defeated by A. By the time of Wild's Case, the fictional
lawsuits of the fine and common recovery had been developed to allow the tenant in
tail in possession to "dock the entail" and convey a fee simple absolute. See 1 ALP,
supra note 7, § 2.2 n.8; 1 S rs & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 14. Therefore, while the
fee tail construction came close to creating an interest in A's prospective children, it
did not guarantee them one.
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one of them a male. Under the canons of descent, including the
doctrine of primogeniture, males would take in preference to females,
and among males the eldest son would take to the exclusion of younger
males. 28 Thus the only or eldest son would take the entailed estate;
only a single child, not all children, would take upon A's death. This
flaw would not exist at common law where A leaves only daughters;
they would take equally, as coparceners. 21 Further, in modern times
the fee tail would be divided equally among all children.30
Other constructions might have been employed to preserve an
interest for A's children. Although Wild's Case argued that "as immediate devisees they [the children] cannot take, because they are not in
rerum natura [in existence]," this obstacle does not seem a complete
barrier. For example, when there is an immediate devise to "the
children of A" and A has no children, the class remains open so that all
children of A subsequently born may take. 31 Future interests may be
created in unborn or unascertained persons, and the gift to children
could have been accomplished by giving A an estate subject to open
(subject to partial divestiture) to let in after-born children. The interest in the children would have been an executory interest, not a remainder, since it would have cut short the interest in A. Executory interests
were made legal by the Statute of Uses in 1535, some sixty-odd years
before Wild's Case, so the estate subject to partial divestiture theory was
possible. It may be, however, that at the time of Wild's Case English
law judges still were not comfortable with the concepts of executory
interests. Indeed, even today one can find authority for the hoary
canon that, since statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly
construed, no limitation shall be considered an executory interest if it
3 2
can possibly take effect as a remainder.
Another possible barrier to the executory interest construction was
that, for a time after the Statute of Uses, executory interests could not be
created directly but could be created only indirectly by first creating a
28. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 257-58 (2d
ed. 1959); see C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 41 (1962).
29. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 28, at 257-58.
30. T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS
36 (1966).
31. 2 SIMm & SMnTH, supra note 7, § 636, at 74. Note that if the creating instrument were a deed rather than a will, the deed could be regarded as failing for want
of a grantee. But see 2 Smrs & SMITH, supra note 7, § 637.
32. 1 ALP, supra note 7, § 4.36, at 472; 1 SIMES & SMITH, supra note 7, §§
204, 206.
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passive use that was then executed by the Statute. 33 Probably the
most important objection to the executory interest construction at the
time of Wild's Case was that the estate in A and his children would have
34
been only a life estate, since there were no words of inheritance.

Perhaps the major barrier to the executory interest theory is that it
treats the gift as one to a class composed of A and his children, and
under usual class gift rules if any member of the class is living at the

time of the gift the class closes. 35 Thus A would take, to the exclusion
of his children, and at the time of Wild's Case they would not even have

had a chance to inherit from him, as his interest would only have been a
life estate." The answer to this objection is that the class gift rule,
which closes the class to A's children, is not a good rule.

The class

closing rule is based on the assumption that the testator desires as early a
distribution as possible. 37 Nevertheless, when the subject of the gift is a

parcel of realty, distribution can be made while keeping the class open
to benefit as many class members as possible. There is no real hardship
in distributing to A, allowing him the income from the property, while

requiring him to hold subject to letting in after-born children.
Occasionally one finds the First Resolution defended on the ground

that it avoids any executory interests that might tend to a perpetuity.
This is a canard; if A's after-born children were allowed to take by

executory interest, clearly those interests would vest in possession,3 if at
all, within A's lifetime, well within the period of the Rule Against
Perpetuities,3 9 and interests vesting within a single life scarcely tend to a
1 SIMEs & SMITH, supra note 7, § 30, 221.
34. 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.16, at 286. Compare section I(E) infra which
discusses the question whether the Wild's Case fee tail lasted beyond the lives of A
and his children.
35. 2 SMES & SMITH, supranote 7, § 636.
36. See section I(E) infra. In § 692 of their treatise, Simes and Smith make
some argument in favor of the class gift construction, giving A an absolute interest
as the only living class member. The children thus would take as A's heirs only if
they survived A and he died without a will. This seems too little for the childrena mere chance of inheriting-when the devisor has manifested a clear intention that
the children take an interest under his devise. 2 SIMES & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 692,
at 158.
37. See 2 SIMES & SMrrm, supra note 7, § 634, at 70, § 636, at 71.
38. The perpetuities test for vesting of executory limitations is vesting in possession, while for other future interests the requirement is vesting in interest. See 6 ALP,
supra note 7, § 24.20; 3 SIMEs & SMrIH, supra note 7, § 1232.
39. At the time of Wild's Case (1599), the Rule Against Perpetuities as we now
know it had scarcely begun to develop. The Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1536),
which by legalizing executory interests perhaps made the perpetuities rule inevitable,
was only sixty-odd years old, and the Duke of Norfolk's Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch.
1682), the progenitor of the Rule, was not decided until 1682. Norfolk's Case did not
33.
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perpetuity. 40 From the standpoint of the related rule against suspension

of the power of alienation, that power would be suspended only for a
single life, that of A. 4

The other construction that would have given an interest to A's
children was that A took a life estate followed by a remainder in A's
children. Wild's Case rejected this interest in the children, saying that
"by way of remainder they cannot take, for that was not his [the
devisor's] intent, for the gift is immediate .... -42 This argument
assumes the conclusion-the issue is whether the devisor did intend an
immediate gift or a remainder when he makes an ambiguous gift to A
and his children, A having no children. Many writers have argued that
the life estate-remainder construction meets with the testator's likely
intent,4 3 and Wild's Case actually held that the testator had created a life
estate followed by a remainder.44 The major defect in this construction
at the time of Wild's Case was that the remainder was only for the lives

of the children, since there were no words of inheritance to give a fee."
The First Resolution in Wild's Case initially came before the North
Carolina courts in Jenkins v. Hall.46 There the testator bequeathed
slaves in trust "for my daughter Mary's sole use and benefit and to her
set the outer limits of the Rule, but decided only that an interest that must vest within
a life in being was good.
40. There is some suggestion in Thompson's real property text that the Rule in
Wild's Case is based on a policy against perpetuities: "The rule in Wild's Case is another
of the complex of legal property propositions . . . which whatever their origin have
the effect of avoiding a perpetuitity which the law abhors by vesting the title finally
at the earliest possible moment and cutting off dangling future interests." 4A G. THOmPsoN, supra note 11, § 2008, at 563 (footnotes omitted). This assertion is sadly mistaken. Thompson's section on Wild's Case is badly done and, in view of the frequent
citation of Thompson by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, e.g., Jernigan v. Ie,
279 N.C. 341, 346, 182 S.E.2d 351, 355-56 (1971), may be the source of part of the
Wild's Case confusion in this state.
41. Indeed, today the existence of interests in unborn remaindermen would not
seem to prevent sale. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-11, -11.1 (1976) permit sale of real
estate in which there are contingent remainders over to persons not in being and of
realty or personalty when there is a class gift subject to open. Although neither section
refers to executory interests, the legislative intent would seem to have been to reach
such interests. Compare id. § 41-12, validating prior sales of contingent interests, which
refers expressly to "contingent remainder, executory devise, or other limitations."
42. 77 Eng. Rep. at 279.
43. E.g., 2 SIMEs & SMITH, supra note 7, § 692, at 158. On the other hand,
in many of the North Carolina cases the grantor seems to perceive through a glass,
darkly, a fee tail. Devises in the form, "to A, her children and bodily heirs," have
a fee tail flavor.
44. See note 18 supra.
45. See sections I(E) & I(F) infra.
46. 57 N.C. 321, 4 Jones Eq. 334 (1858).
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children forever. '4 7 At the time of the case Mary had never had
children, and Justice Battle held that the limitation gave her an absolute
estate in the use of the slaves according to the rule laid down in Wild's
Case and recognized in Moore v. Leach. Battle's calm reliance on
Wild's Case was deceptively oversimplified; Wild's Case involved realty
(slaves apparently were regarded as personalty at the time of Jenkins v.
Hall4 ) and gave the devisee a fee tail (not an absolute estate). It is not
clear whether Battle gave Mary an absolute estate on the ground that
fees tail did not exist in personalty4" or on the ground that fees tail were
converted into fees simple by statute. ° Subsequent cases made it clear
that, at least for realty, the First Resolution in Wild's Case created a fee
tail in A that was then transformed into a fee simple by North Carolina
General Statutes section 41-1 or its predecessors.51 Thus one is left
with the marvelous paradox that a rule of construction designed to
create an interest in A's children by giving A a fee tail in fact cuts off
any interest in the children by giving A a fee simple; a rule explicitly
designed to give the children something results in their taking nothing!
This blindly mechanical approach might have been avoided simply on
the theory that, fees tail having been abolished in North Carolina, the
First Resolution was not germane.5" At the least, the courts should
have asked whether other constructions might have been preferable to
one that resulted in a fee simple in A. In this regard, it is significant
that by the time Justice Battle introduced Wild's Case into North
Carolina law devises were presumed to be in fee; thus either the executory interest or life estate-remainder construction could have been chosen
and the interests would have been in fee. One of the factors that
impelled the fee tail construction at the time of Wild's Case was that
any other construction would have created only life estates in the
47. Id. at 322, 4 Jones Eq. at 335.
48. E.g., Vass v. Freeman, 56 N.C. 215, 217, 3 Jones Eq. 221, 223 (1857) ("When
slaves or other personal chattels are bequeathed. . . .") (emphasis added) (Battle, J.).
See also Lockhart v. Lockhart, 56 N.C. 200, 3 Jones Eq. 205 (1857).
49. The Statute De Donis, 13 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1285), which gave effect to the intention of a grantor to create a fee tail, did not apply to chattels. Floyd v. Thompson, 20
N.C. (4 Dev. & Bat.) 478 (1834); Nichols v. Cartwright, 6 N.C. 107, 2 Mur. 137
(1812); 1 SIMEs & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 359; 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.21.
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-1 (1976); see section I(E) infra.
51. E.g., Silliman v. Whitaker, 119 N.C. 89, 25 S.E. 742 (1896). One might
surmise that one of the reasons behind § 41-1 is a desire to punish the grantor who
attempts to entail property, by converting the grantee's interest to a fee simple. If so,
there would be no reason to apply § 41-1 to the First Resolution in Wild's Case, since
by hypothesis the testator was not trying to create a fee tail.
52. Courts in some other jurisdictions have adopted this view. See 2 SImEs &
SMrrH, supra note 7, § 696.
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children53 ; this motivating factor had disappeared by Justice Battle's
time.

The preceding discussion assumes that the words "and his children" were originally intended by the testator to be words of purchase,
actually giving an interest to A's children as "purchasers" or takers. The
First Resolution effectuates this intention by construing the words as
ones of limitation. It should be noted that in either First or Second
Resolution cases it is entirely possible that the testator's actual intention
was to use "and his children" in the sense of words of limitation like
"and his heirs" or (more likely) "and his bodily heirs." If the words
were used as ones of limitation, "limiting" or describing A's estate, A
would take a fee simple or fee tail regardless of whether he had children.
Wild's Case would never be reached because it applies only if one first
determines that "and his children" were words of purchase. This article
generally assumes such an intention, but the reader should always
recognize that the testator may not have intended to give A's children
anything directly.5 4
B.

The Second Resolution

Under the Second Resolution in Wild's Case, if A has children" a
devise "to A and his children" is presumed to be a gift to a class
composed of A and his children. The duration of the estate is for life,
since the devise lacks words of limitation or any other manifestation of
53. 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.16, at 285-86.
54. Conversely, it is conceivable that a grantor or devisor might use the usual
words of limitation "and his heirs" in the unusual sense of the words of purchase "and
his children," invoking the Rule in Wild's Case for a transfer "to A and his heirs."
Ordinarily, however, the magic words will be given their usual meaning. Daniel v.
Bass, 193 N.C. 294, 136 S.E. 733 (1927). Even if the words were used in the sense
of "children," the result would be the same in First Resolution cases-a fee simple in
A. Similarly, a devise "to A and the heirs of his body" would result in a fee simple
in A when he had no children, whether the words were regarded as ones of limitation
or of purchase (in the sense of "children").
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6 (1976) creates a statutory presumption that "heirs" means
children. It does not apply, however, when a precedent estate is conveyed to the living
ancestor. E.g., Whitley v. Arenson, 219 N.C. 121, 12 S.E.2d 906 (1941); Starnes v.
Hill, 112 N.C. 1, 16 S.E. 1011 (1893). Thus § 41-6 will not pervert transfers "to
A and his heirs" into Wild's Case problems. Even if it did, where A had no children
the result would not change, as the First Resolution fee tail would be converted by
statute into a fee simple, the usual result of a transfer "to A and his heirs." For a
case in which § 41-6 does apply, see Condor v. Secrest, 149 N.C. 201, 62 S.E. 921
(1908).
55. Or a single child. In the following discussion, the word "children" includes
cases when A has a single child.
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joint
intention to devise a fee. 56 The form of concurrent ownership is
57
tenancies.
joint
for
preference
law
tenancy because of the common
This Resolution seems not too objectionable, although it is often
asserted that the average testator's likely intent is to create a life estate in
A followed by a remainder in A's children.5 At common law, of
course, the remainder in the children would have been for life only,
because of the absence of words of limitation. So there does not appear
to be much to choose between these alternatives; the only difference is
whether A's life estate is undivided or shared with the children. As A
often will be significantly older than the children, little harm seems to
be done to their interests by postponing enjoyment until A's death.
Furthermore, since each child's share is diluted by the shares of other
children, no single child suffers a disproportionate loss.
Perhaps the most significant problems in evaluating the Second
Resolution are whether the devisor in fact intends a class gift and, if so,
whether A is to take a share equal to that of each child. The dispute
concerning the joint estate and the life estate-remainder constructions
really comes down to the question of whether the testator intended a
class gift. It ignores the possibility that the testator intended neither but
rather used the phrase "and his children" as words of limitation (in the
sense, most often, of "and the heirs of his body"), not as words of
purchase, even though A had children.
Assuming the average testator intends a class gift, one should still
be careful to ask: What was the class-A's children or A and his
children? If the latter, what shares does A take? 9 If the former,
which children share? Moore v. Leach60 injected the Second Resolution
into North Carolina law. There the testator devised his houses and lots
in Pittsboro to his "beloved 6 ' daughter Eliza Ann... and her children,
the lawful heirs of her body, . . .to her, the said Eliza Ann.

her children

forever." 62

.

. , and

At the making of the will, Eliza Ann had three

56. E.g., 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.22.
57. Id.
58. E.g., 2 SImEs & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 692.
59. If A and the children take as joint tenants, A must take a share equal to
that of each child because of the rule that joint tenants must own equal undivided shares.
60. 50 N.C. 97, 5 Jones 88 (1857).
61. Arguably the use of the term of endearment, "beloved," indicated a primary
affection for the daughter and only a secondary intention to benefit her children. If
so, Eliza Ann should have taken more than a child-size interest as co-tenant. The
point was not noted.
62. 50 N.C. at 97-98; 5 Jones at 88-89.
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children, who all survived the testator."3 The court held that Eliza Ann
and her children took the property "together," apparently meaning "in
equal shares." Although the opinion was not entirely clear as to
whether their interest was (1) a tenancy in common or (2) in fee, later
cases answered both of these questions in the affirmative. The concurrent estate is in common, since that estate is now preferred over joint
tenancy,64 and the estate is in fee, since that interest is now presumed
unless a contrary intent is shown. 5
As with the First Resolution, the court did not inquire whether
changes in the law since the date of Wild's Case argued for repudiation,
or at least reexamination, of Wild's Case. The change in preference
from joint tenancy to tenancy in common would have permitted the
court to find unequal interests in A and the children, since tenants in
common, in contrast to joint tenants, need not own equal undivided
interests. The change in presumption from life estate to fee when the
will lacked words of limitation probably is neutral on the choice between
a concurrent estate in A and the children and a life estate in A with
remainder to the children; it does weaken any argument in favor of a fee
tail in A, because that construction is no longer necessary to create
something more than mere life estates in A and the children.
It is significant that Moore v. Leach, while finding a concurrent
estate, recognized the possibility of a different construction "if there be
something peculiar in the will, indicative of an intention in the testator
that she [the daughter] should take for life with a remainder over to the
children."66 Battle found that "something peculiar" in four out of five
subsequent cases during his tenure.6 7
C.

Rules of Construction
It is blackletter law that both resolutions in Wild's Case are rules of

63. The opinion does not indicate whether other children were born to Eliza Ann.
64. See section I(G) infra.
65. See section I(E) infra. In Moore v. Leach the gift to Eliza and her children
"forever" suggests a fee simple.
66. 50 N.C. at 99, 5 Jones at 90.
67. Bridges v. Wilkins, 56 N.C. 326, 327-28, 3 Jones Eq. 342, 344-45 (1857);
Chesnut v. Meares, 56 N.C. 395, 396-97, 3 Jones Eq. 416, 417-18 (1857); Coakley
v. Daniel, 57 N.C. 96, 97-99, 4 Jones Eq. 90, 91-93 (1858); Faribault v. Taylor, 58
N.C. 180, 181, 5 Jones Eq. 219, 220 (1858). Aside from Moore v. Leach, the only
Second Resolution case decided during Battle's tenure which adhered to Wild's Case
was Gay v. Baker, 58 N.C. 272, 274-75, 5 Jones Eq. 344, 346-48 (1860) (opinion
by Manly, J.). Battle wrote the opinions in the four cases finding a contrary intention.
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construction that yield to a showing of a contrary intention.68

A

number of North Carolina cases repeat the statement;69 however, the
decisions do not seem to respect the assertion. For example, in the recent

case of Tremblay v. Aycock7 1 the naming, granting, habendum and
warranty clauses of a deed" l ran "to Lemon Lee and the heirs of his

body. ' 72 Following the description and preceding the habendum clause
was a statement that, "The intent and purpose of this deed is to convey
to Lemon Lee a life estate . . . and at his death a fee simple estate to
the heirs of his body if any . . ,,17 At the time of the deed Lemon
Lee had no children, although children were later born to him. The

court held that under the naming, granting and habendum clauses
Lemon Lee took an estate tail, which was converted to a fee simple by

section 41-1. Alternatively, the court said that even if the words "heirs
of his body" could be construed to mean "children," the estate of Lemon
Lee would still have been a fee simple. The court quoted from Davis v.
Brown:
It is settled law with us that when a conveyance is made to A
and his children, if A has children when the deed is executed, he
and they take as tenants in common. But if A has no children
when the deed is executed, he takes an estate tail which, under our
statute, is converted into a fee. G.S. 41-1 .... 74

This result is peculiar in light of the express statement in the deed that
Lemon Lee was to take a life estate followed by a remainder. Although
Tremblay v. Aycock might be explained as an ordinary deeds case

rejecting as surplusage any inconsistent statements not found in the
granting clause,7 5 the surplusage rule would not seem properly invocable
68. 5 ALP, supra note 7, §§ 22.19, 22.24; 2 SIMES &

SMITH,

supra note 7, §

693.
69. E.g., Cole v. Thornton, 180 N.C. 90, 104 S.E. 74 (1920) (First Resolution);
Coakley v. Daniel, 57 N.C. 96, 4 Jones Eq. 90 (1858) (Second Resolution).
70. 263 N.C. 626, 139 S.E.2d 898 (1965) (five to two decision).
71. Not a devise. Wild's Case was stated as a rule for devises. As to extension
of Wild's Case to deeds, see section I(E) infra.
72. 263 N.C. at 627, 139 S.E.2d at 899.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 629, 139 S.E.2d at 899-900 (quoting Davis v. Brown, 241 N.C. 116,
118, 84 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1954) (citations omitted)).
75. Webster cites Tremblay v. Aycock for the proposition that a clause following
the description that purports to reserve a life estate in the grantor is not effective. He
then criticizes the mechanical rule of construction that, in the case of premiseshabendum conflict, automatically invalidates any limiting provisions in the habendum.
He also points out that the Rule makes it impossible for grantors to use printed forms
when a life estate is to be reserved. Webster, Doubt Reduction Through Conveyancing
Reform-More Suggestions in the Quest for Clear Land Titles, 46 N.C.L. Rav. 284,
295-96 n.42 (1968).
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against an intention-seeking rule such as the Rule in Wild's Case.
Perhaps the problem in Tremblay was that the creating instrument was a
deed, not a will as in Wild's Case. In a deed, the need for balancing
the rights of two parties; grantor and grantee, may call for a more

objective rule, while in a will one may focus on the testator's intention
without fear of commercial prejudice to any bargaining party. 70 This
somewhat facile explanation of Tremblay loses some force, however,
when one examines other North Carolina cases. 77 Furthermore, Tremblay made the disturbing assertion that "[w]hen rules of construction have
been settled they should be observed and enforced,
seems to prevail even in the wills cases.

78s

and this attitude

It was not aways so. As mentioned above, 70 Moore v. Leach,80
despite its application of the Second Resolution, said that the Rule
would not apply if "there be something peculiar in the will, indicative of
an intention in the testator that [A] should take for life with a remainder over to the children." ' In the same term, Chesnut v. Meares"2
(mentioning Wild's Case) and Bridges v. WilkinsA (not mentioning
Wild's Case) found an intention to create a life estate in A followed by a
remainder in the children. All in all, Battle found "something peculiar"
to rebut Wild's Case in four 84 of his six Wild's Case decisions. 85
Gradually, however, the foundation of the Rule as one of construction
began to erode. Only a handful of cases since Battle's time may in any
sense be read as finding a contrary intention to rebut Wild's Case.80 Of
76. The opinion does not disclose whether value was paid.
77. See text accompanying notes 79-103 infra.
78. 263 N.C. at 630, 139 S.E.2d at 900; accord, Davis v. Brown, 241 N.C. 116,
84 S.E.2d 334 (1954). This assertion seems to confuse the Rule itself with the result
of applying the Rule.
79. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
80. 50 N.C. 97, 5 Jones 88 (1857).
81. Id. at 99, 5 Jones at 90. See also Wilson v. Wilson, 119 N.C. 588, 590, 26
S.E. 155, 155 (1896) ("The result would be otherwise if anything in the instrument
indicated reasonably a different intention.").
82. 56 N.C. 395, 3 Jones Eq. 416 (1857).
83. 56 N.C. 273, 3 Jones Eq. 342 (1857).
84. In addition to the cases cited in the preceding two footnotes, see Coakley v.
Daniel, 57 N.C. 96, 4 Jones Eq. 90 (1858), and Faribault v. Taylor, 58 N.C. 180,
5 Jones Eq. 219 (1859).
85. The decisions applying Wild's Case are Moore v. Leach, 50 N.C. 97, 5 Jones
88 (1857), and Jenkins v. Hall, 57 N.C. 321, 4 Jones Eq. 334 (1858).
86. See Coffield v. Peele, 246 N.C. 661, 100 S.E.2d 45 (1957) (devise "unto my
seven children . . . to be divided equally among the seven children of mine, and their
children"; held, the testator's children take a fee); Griffin v. Springer, 244 N.C. 95,
92 S.E.2d 682 (1956) (premises of deed to Bennett, party of the second part, and Bennett's children, Mary and Nona, parties of the third part; granting clause to Bennett
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those cases, only one decided in 188087 clearly involves language in the
basic form of "to A and his children." Most of the others involve some

conflict between parts of a deed.

8

For example, some cases take the

form of a granting clause "to A" followed by a habendum "to A and his

children"; rejection of an interest in A's children may be attributed to
the rule that the habendum may not cut down a fee in the granting
clause.8 9 In others "children" clearly was not used as a word of

purchase. 90
a life estate, at his death to Mary and Nona a life estate, with remainder to their
children; held, Mary and Nona take life estates and their children have a remainder);
Mayberry v. Grimsley, 208 N.C. 64, 179 S.E. 7 (1935) (premises of deed to Nonnie
and her children, granting and habendum clauses to Nonnie, her heirs and assigns; held,
Nonnie takes a fee: her children not meant to take any interest); Tate v. Amos, 197
N.C. 159, 147 S.E. 809 (1929) (devise to Grace, or her children; held, substitutional
construction: Grace takes a fee if she survives testator; if not, children are substituted
for her and take fee); Martin v. Knowles, 195 N.C. 427, 142 S.E. 313 (1928) (premises
of deed to Sallie and her children, granting clause and other parts to Sallie for life
and then to her heirs, executors, administrators and assigns; held, Rule in Shelley's Case
applies and gives Sallie a fee; Wild's Case not discussed); Weeks v. McPhail, 128 N.C.
130, 38 S.E. 472 (1901) (superior court decree that devise to Hester and her children
created a life estate in Hester followed by a remainder in her children was not appealed
from; held, the decree is an estoppel on the parties though it may be erroneous in law;
citing Silliman v. Whitaker, 119 N.C. 89, 25 S.E. 742 (1896)); Blair v. Osborne,
84 N.C. 417 (1881) (premises of deed to Araminta for life only (the deed lacking
words of limitation), habendum to Araminta and her children; held, life estate in
Araminta, remainder to children); Pollard v. Pollard, 83 N.C. 96 (1880) (devise of
three tracts of land, two to wife for life, the other to son, daughter, and grandson as
tenants in common for the life of the wife; at wife's death, all three tracts to be sold
and the proceeds divided equally among the son, daughter, grandson, and their children, the children to take the share of the parent who may die before testators death;
held, the son, daughter, and grandson take'vested estates, and the children of any who
may die before the testator succeed to the share of their deceased parent); Jernigan v.
Lee, 9 N.C. App. 582, 176 S.E.2d 899 (1970), rev'd, 279 N.C. 341, 182 S.E.2d 351
(1971) (devise of gift over to Berry and his heirs, if any, in the event that two prior
takers die without issue; held, Berry and his one child take fee as tenants in common;
Rule in Wild's Case does not apply because Berry and his heirs did not take an estate
directly and immediately from testator; citing Cole v. Thornton, 180 N.C. 90, 104 S.E.
74 (1920). This theory clearly is mistaken, see text accompanying notes 119-31 infra,
and the North Carolina Supreme Court did not even refer to Wild's Case in holding
that Berry took a defeasible fee.).
Only one of these cases in any way touches the First Resolution, and only because
in that one case, Martin v. Knowles, the record was silent as to whether A had children.
87. Pollard v. Pollard, 83 N.C. 96 (1880).
88. Mayberry v. Grimsley, 208 N.C. 64, 179 S.E. 7 (1935); Martin v. Knowles,
195 N.C. 427, 142 S.E. 313 (1928); Blair v. Osborne, 84 N.C. 417 (1881). See also
Coffield v. Peele, 246 N.C. 661, 100 S.E.2d 45 (1957); Griffin v. Springer, 244 N.C.
95, 92 S.E.2d 682 (1956).
89. Coffield v. Peele, 246 N.C. 661, 100 S.E.2d 45 (1957); Blair v. Osborne, 84
N.C. 417 (1881). See also Griffin v. Springer, 244 N.C. 95, 92 S.E.2d 682 (1956);
Mayberry v. Grimsley, 208 N.C. 64, 179 S.E. 7 (1935); Martin v. Knowles, 195 N.C.
427, 142 S.E. 313 (1928).
90. Mayberry v. Grimsley, 208 N.C. 64, 179 S.E. 7 (1935).
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Long has read the cases as "indicat[ing] that wherever counsel are

astute in pointing out the disadvantages of the rule, its application
becomes uncertain."91 This view is mistaken; Long's conclusion is
premised on four of Battle's decisions finding a contrary intention9 2 and
If these
on an 1881 case involving a granting-habendum conflict.9
cases are excluded, only one of about forty cases since Battle's time has
rejected a Wild's Case construction; it may reasonably be assumed that
in at least some of these cases there was "something peculiar" to rebut
Wild's Case and that counsel vigorously, but unsuccessfully, argued the
point.94

Thus the cases bear out the attitude expressed in Tremblay v.
Aycock that settled rules of construction ought to be observed and
enforced. A leading case, Silliman v. Whitaker,"' is typical:
It is proper to say that if the devise had been to A for life,
remainder to such children as may be living at her death, a very
different case would have been presented. [O]r even if the devise
had been to A for life, with remainder to her children. But here
the devise to "B and her children (if she shall have any)" is in
substance that which has been construed in Wild's case and others
above cited to confer upon B, when she has no children at the
death of the testator, not a life estate, but an estate tail in England
and a fee simple in this country. When words used in a will have
received a settled judicial construction the testator is taken as using
them in that sense, unless a different intent plainly appears. Applying that rule, the devise here was, in legal effect, to "Sarah and
her children, if she shall have any at the death of the testator, and
if not, then to Sarah in fee simple," and the law hath been so written "these three hundred years," say the authorities. 90
Another well-known case, Cullens v. Cullens9 7 even concedes that the
grantor's intention was to convey a life estate followed by a remainder
but nevertheless follows the crowd of cases filing into the Wild's Case

doorway:
The answers of the defendants contain no allegation that the word
"heirs" was omitted by mistake and that it was the plain intention
91. Long, supra note 9, at 301.
92. Faribault v. Taylor, 58 N.C. 180, 5 Jones Eq. 219 (1859); Coakley v. Daniel,
57 N.C. 96, 4 Jones Eq. 90 (1858); Chesnut v. Meares, 56 N.C. 395, 3 Jones Eq.
416 (1857); Bridges v. Wilkins, 56 N.C. 273, 3 Jones Eq. 342 (1857).
93. Blair v. Osborne, 84 N.C. 417 (1881).
94. See sections I(H) & I(I) infra.
95. 119 N.C. 89, 25 S.E. 742 (1886).
96. Id. at 94-95, 25 S.E.2d at 743 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also
Cole v. Thornton, 180 N.C. 90, 104 S.E. 74 (1920).
97. 161 N.C. 344, 77 S.E. 228 (1913).
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of the grantor, William Lassiter, to convey the land to his daughter

Sarah and her then living children in fee. The defendant asks for
no equitable relief. But we are not prepared to say that upon the
face of this deed it was the manifest intention of William Lassiter
to give the land to Sarah Cullens and her then living children in fee
to the exclusion 6f those after-born. It was more likely his intention to convey it to Sarah herself in fee and after her death to her

children, using the word "children" in the sense of heirs of her
body. But under the settled decisions of this Court the instrument
fails to effectuate such purpose, and in our opinion conveys to Sarah
and her children living at date of the deed an estate for life as
98

tenants in common.

How does one account for the extraordinary devotion to the Wild's
Case rules, even in the face of clear showings of contrary intention? One

answer may be that the North Carolina courts confuse adherence to the
rules of construction with adherence to the usual (but not universal)
results of those rules. But one may honor the constructional rules while
still finding a contrary intent to rebut the presumption created by the

rules. Nevertheless, the North Carolina courts seem to be saying that
the presumption always controls, a far different matter from saying that
Wild's Case applies. The rules seem to be ones of property, not
construction, applied despite any contrary intention and with no fundamental policy to support them.

Another explanation may be that the courts feel that rigid adherence to the results presumed by Wild's Case will discourage litigation of
"A and his children" issues.

The simple answer to this hypothesis is

that litigation has not been discouraged.99 Discouragement of unmeritorious litigation is one thing; discouragement of meritorious litigation
another. If all rules of construction were interpreted so as to discourage
98. Id. at 347, 77 S.E. at 229-30 (emphasis added). The reasons for the court's
view as to the grantor's likely intention do not appear from the facts. The premises
of the deed ran "unto Sarah A. Cullens and her children" and the habendum "unto
her the said Sarah A. Cullens and her children forever." The result of the decision
was that the property reverted to the grantor's estate after the life estate, thence to
his heirs (apparently Sarah). See also Davis v. Brown, 241 N.C. 116, 118, 84 S.E.2d
334, 337 (1954).
99. Of course, this conclusion does not automatically follow from the fact that
a large number of Wild's Case disputes have found their way into the appellate reporters.
Ideally, one needs to know the total number of instruments using Wild's Case language,
the number of these instruments that were subjected to trial court construction, and
the number of trial court decisions appealed. Nevertheless, in the absence of more
definitive statistics, one may reasonably assume that the existence of forty-odd appellate
decisions on a single issue indicates that litigation has not been discouraged.

770

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

litigation, there would be no rules of construction as we now know
100
them.
A third hypothesis is that certainty in result is needed to enable the
draftsman to predict the effect of his language. But certainly no
draftsman intending to give A a fee simple (knowing A to have no
children) would draw a deed "to A and his children" on the assumption
that Wild's Case would give A a fee tail that section 41-1 would convert
to a fee simple! The case against reliance is somewhat muddier with
respect to the Second Resolution (when A has children). Certainly,
however, the competent draftsman would not draw a limitation simply
"to A and his children" because of the multitude of questions inherent
0 the competent draftsman would choose other lanin that limitation; 11
guage to express the client's idea. It is not altogether clear that the
incompetent draftsman would choose the "A and his children" formula
in reliance on the result of most cases; if incompetent, he probably
would not have checked the cases in advance. The lay draftsman
clearly would not have relied on the cases, so we may safely inquire into
his actual intention, unbound by seemingly irrebuttable presumptions.
A final hypothesis is that ironclad predictability in result gives
certainty to land titles. One finds overtones of title security in Silliman
v. Whitaker'0 2 where a purchaser had bought forty years earlier in
reliance on a trial court decree applying the Rule in Wild's Case.
Silliman is exceptional, however, because usually no one has relied on
the title and the decision is prospective. If so, it would seem that the
court should search for the transferor's intention.
In sum, the North Carolina cases seem to have regarded the
intention-oriented rules of Wild's Case as vehicles for reaching automatic decisions on result. This view is not justifiable unless one can say
that the transferor must have intended a fee simple or a class gift. It is
quite possible that the creator intended something different. 03
D.

Time of Determining Existence of Children

1. Which Resolution Applies
Another matter that cuts across both Resolutions is whether the
time of determining the existence of children is the making of the will or
100. This might not be Armageddon; one wades hopelessly through the present rules
of construction, with none pointing a clear path.
101. See section II infra.
102. 119 N.C. 89, 25 S.E. 742 (1896).
103. See sections I(A) and I(B) supra.
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the death of the testator. Obviously the same time should govern both

Resolutions, else one would have either a gap unaffected by either
Resolution or an overlap bringing the two Resolutions into conflict. The
language of Wild's Case referred to time as follows:
[I]f A. devises his lands to B. and to his children or issues, and he
hath not any issue at the time of the devise [B takes a fee tail] . . .
but if a man devises land to A. and to his children or issue, and
they then have issue of their bodies '[A and his children take a joint
estate].1 04
"The time of the devise" could be taken to mean the time of making the

will, especially when one's view is focused on execution by the old
English doctrine that a will did not pass title to real property acquired
after making the will.'" 5 On the other hand, if the testator's purpose
was to give an interest to A's children, that purpose is best carried out by
delaying the determination of children as long as possible. This not
only gives more time for children to be born to A, but also benefits as
many children as possible.'0°
The state of the English authorities is somewhat confused, 10 7 with
some authority for each time, but American courts generally have
chosen the date of the testator's death. 0 8 So has North Carolina.
The choice in North Carolina of the testator's death seems not to
have been advertent. The early cases did not present fact situations in
which children had been born or had died in the period between the
making of the will and the testator's death. In Moore v. Leach, '01 for
104. 77 Eng. Rep. at 278-79.
105. E.g., T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLs § 3, at 18 (2d ed. 1953).
The modem presumption is that a will is ambulatory; it speaks as of the death of the
testator. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-41 (1976).
106. Although sometimes conflicting with other canons, one of the accepted rules
for construction of class gifts is that the testator intended to benefit as many class
members as possible. E.g., 2 SIMES & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 634. In the ordinary
Wild's Case situation, there is no reason to postpone class closing beyond A's death,
as (obviously) no more children can be born after A's death, except children en ventre
who are allowed to take. See text accompanying note 115 infra.
There is, of course, a risk to the child of A in existence at the making of the
will if determination of the class is postponed until the testator's death; that child may
die after the making of the will, but before the testators death, causing his share to
go to other class members or to lapse (instead of going to the child's estate). This
risk is outweighed by the benefits of postponing determination of the class. The children of A normally will not die before the testator, who in most cases is their grandparent. Also, under some modem lapse statutes it appears that a share will be preserved
for the issue of the deceased child of A. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-42(b) (1976).
107. Compare 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.18 with 2 SIMEs & SMrr, supra note
7, § 694.
108. 2 SIMEs & SMrr, supra note 7, § 694.
109. 50 N.C. 97, 5 Jones 88 (1857).
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example, A had three children as of the making of the will, all of whom
survived the testator (apparently no other children were born). The
court applied the Second Resolution after discussing cases in which A
had children living at the death of the testator. Later cases seemed to
assume that the relevant time was the testator's death, even though the
question seems never to have been argued. 110 It is difficult to find a
case squarely raising the time question, i.e., a case in which the report
indicates that A had no children at the execution of the will but had
children as of the testator's death. The cases nearest the question are
ones in which A had some children as of T's death and others born
later."' As discussed below,' the question which children take is
different from the question whether children exist for purposes of
determining the applicability of the First or Second Resolution.
Regardless of the dubious strength of the precedent, the choice of
the testator's death rather than the execution of the will is a good one. It
is consistent with the usual class gift assumption that the testator intends
to benefit as many children as possible and also tends to cut down the
number of cases in which the First Resolution applies, 18 an altogether
desirable result in North Carolina, where the fee tail in A is converted
into a fee simple. Since the basis of the Rule is a presumed intention to
benefit directly the children of A, the better time for determining the
existence of children is the testator's death. If the time of making the
will were chosen, and A only had children born after the will but before
the testator's death, A would take a fee tail--converted by statute into 'a
fee simple-to the exclusion of the children. But if the time of the
testator's death were*chosen, the children would share. Further, in the
same case, if the time of making the will were chosen, and A died
during the lifetime of the testator, the devise to A in fee simple would
lapse, to the detriment of the children. But if the time of the testator's
death were chosen, the gift to the children would not lapse."14
One wrinkle that should be noted in North Carolina" 3 is that a
child en ventre sa mere at the time of the testator's death is regarded as
110. See, e.g., Silliman v. Whitaker, 119 N.C. 89, 94-95, 25 S.E. 742, 743 (1896)
("at the death of the testator"); cf. Doggett v. Moseley, 52 N.C. 450, 452-53, 7 Jones
587, 590-91 (1860) ("but if [A] has children or issue when the will is made and at
the death of the testator").
111. See, e.g., Cullens v. Cullens, 161 N.C. 344, 77 S.E. 228 (1913).
112. See section I(D) (2) infra.
113. See 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.18.
114. 2 H. UNDERHmL, supra note 11, § 581. If the jurisdiction had an anti-lapse
statute, the children would likely be protected.
115. This view is followed elsewhere. See 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.18 n.5.
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in being for purposes of the Rule in Wild's Case. This proposition seems
not too difficult to one steeped in the traditions of the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 11 but it was somewhat difficult to accept in North Carolina, particularly because North Carolina cases have extended Wild's Case
to deeds as well as to devises, with nary a recognition that the Rule in
Wild's Case was expressly stated as a rule for devises." 7 The child en
ventre cases all involved deeds, with confusion resulting from the usual
rule that a deed must have a grantee. The primary case holding that a
child en ventre cannot be a grantee is Dupree v. Dupree,"" a model of

scholastic quibble that undoubtedly has influenced later North Carolina
cases limiting the membership of class gifts. In Dupree the grantor
conveyed a slave to the children of Robert and Rachel Dupree. Two
children were in existence at the date of the deed, and the plaintiff
apparently was conceded to have been conceived six days before the
deed was delivered. The court quaintly stated the issue as whether "an
atom, a thing in its mother's womb, six days old [can] acquire a right of
property by a common law conveyance." ' 9 The court dropped a
common law bomb on the atom, holding that the child en ventre was
barred because not in esse. Whatever the merits of Dupree (and there
are few), the case certainly evidences an unusual hostility to executory
interests. It was distinguished in Gay v. Baker' 20 on the ground that in
a conveyance to a trustee for the benefit of A and her children, the
trustee could take as grantee the legal title for the benefit of the child en
ventre.12' Almost immediately the legislature adopted a statute declaring that "an infant unborn, but in esse, shall be deemed a person
capable of taking by deed or other writing, any estate whatever, in the
same manner as if he were born.' 22 This statute was held to make the
child en ventre a child in being for purposes of the Rule in Wild's
124
Case, 23 but the Dupree hostility to other afterborns lingered on.
116. See, e.g., I. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUIIES §§ 220-222 (4th ed. 1942).
117. See section I(A) supra & section I(E) infra.
118. 45 N.C. 149, Busb. Eq. 164 (1852).
119. Id. at 150, Busb. Eq. at 167.
120. 58 N.C. 273, 5 Jones Eq. 344 (1860).
121. Although other children born after the conveyance were not entitled to share.
122. N.C. Rev. Code. 270, ch. 43, § 4 (1855) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 41-5 (1976)). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-9 (1976) (intestate succession); N.C.
GeN. STAT. § 39-6 (1976) (revocation of deeds of future interests made to persons
not in esse).
123. Campbell v. Everhart, 139 N.C. 502, 52 S.E. 201 (1905); Heath v. Heath,
114 N.C. 547, 19 S.E. 155 (1894). Query: What result if the child is stillborn?
124. E.g., Heath v. Heath, 114 N.C. 547, 19 S.E. 155 (1894) (under a deed to
a woman "and her children," a child en ventre at the time of the conveyance will
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In determining whether A has children at the time of the devise,
situations may arise in which A has only illegitimate or adopted children. The proper inquiry is whether the testator intended such children
to take; if so, A had "children" within the meaning of Wild's Case as a
rule of construction. As an alternative ground of decision, the old case
of Doggett v. Moseley'2 5 found that the testator did not intend his

daughter's illegitimate children to be included in the term "issue" (assuming it to be synonymous with "children"), even though the testator
was himself a bastard. There may be some modem trend toward
construing class gifts as including illegitimates . 2 6 Although there is no
decision in the context of Wild's Case, the trend is also toward including
adopted children in class gift terminology.12

One other fairly standard case is that of the postponed gift: to X
for life, then to A and his children. If the normal time of determining
children is delayed from the execution of the will to the testator's death

in order to reduce the number of First Resolution cases and increase the
number of eligible children, one would reasonably expect the time for

determining children in the postponed gift cases to be the time of X's
death, not the testator's death. One's expectation would be reasonable,
but it would not be met in North Carolina. 12 8 Moore v. Leach12 cited
postponed gift cases from other jurisdictions in apparently choosing the
time of the testator's death for immediate gifts, and subsequent North
Carolina postponed gift cases chose the time of the testator's death,

30

take, but children born more than a year later will not take); cf. Powell v. Powell,
168 N.C. 561, 84 S.E. 860 (1915) (deed to a parent for life with a remainder over
to children conveys an interest to all children alive at the termination of the life estate,
whether born before or after execution of the deed).
125. 52 N.C. 450, 7 Jones 587 (1860). Compare Howell v. Tyler, 91 N.C. 207
(1884), in which a bequest to the heirs of a living person, all the children of the person
being illegitimate, was held to go to the children under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6 (1976),
which declares that a limitation to "heirs" shall be construed to mean children, unless
a contrary intention appears. Note that the entire bequest would have failed if § 416 were not applied, whereas in the Wild's Case situation A may take even if his illegitimate children may not.
126. Cf. N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 29-19 (1976) (illegitimate child may inherit from
the mother and, under certain circumstances, the father); id. §§ 49-14 to -16 (paternity
may be established by civil action).
127. A gift to "children" presumptively includes adopted children under appropriate
circumstances. Smyth v. McKissick, 222 N.C. 644, 24 S.E.2d 621 (1943); cf. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 31-5.5 (1976) (after born, after-adopted or illegitimate after born children
may share in testator's estate unless clearly excluded). For a recent case allowing afteradopted children to take as "issue" under their great-grandfather's will, see Stoney v.
MacDougall, 31 N.C. App. 678, 230 S.E.2d 592 (1976), cert. denied, 291 N.C, 716,
232 S.E.2d 208 (1977).
128. Nor in other states. 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.18 n.4.
129. 50 N.C. 97, 5 Jones 88 (1857).
130. E.g., Hampton v. Wheeler, 99 N.C. 222, 6 S.E. 236 (1888).
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although it did not appear that there was any difference in the existence
of children between the testator's death and X's death. In Ziegler v.
Love, 1' 1 however, the testator devised a lot to his wife for life and at her
marriage or death to the testator's son, Frederick, and to his children or
issue, but in case Frederick should die childless and without issue, to the
testator's heirs in equal degree. Frederick had no children as of the
testator's death; a son was born to him after the testator's death but
before the wife's death. The court applied the First Resolution, giving
Frederick a fee tail which was converted by statute into a fee simple.
The fee was defeasible, however, in the event that Frederick died
childless and without issue.
It is difficult to explain the choice of the testator's death in the
postponed gift cases where there is no necessity for an early determination of takers. The choice does tend to make the title alienable at an
earlier date, but this reason is insufficient because the question is the
testator's likely intention, not some extraneous rule of policy which
yields to intention, and because it may reasonably be supposed that in
most cases the life tenant is a fairly elderly spouse or child of the testator
with a consequent short life expectancy. 3 ' If the early choice has the
effect of excluding children born after the testator's death, 3 3 it is
inconsistent with the principles of the cases that reject the Second
Resolution in favor of finding an intention to create a life estate in A
followed by a remainder in his children. Those cases do not restrict the
class of children to those in existence at the testator's death but instead
allow all children of A, whenever born, to take. 13 4
Another explanation may be that the early choice is based on a fear
of defeating the interest of a child of A who survives the testator but
131. 185 N.C. 41, 115 S.E. 887 (1923).
132. In Ziegler v. Love, for example, the life tenant widow died two years after the
testator. Id.
133. Which it seems to do. See text accompanying notes 143-48 infra.
134. Coakley v. Daniel, 57 N.C. 96, 4 Jones Eq. 90 (1858). In Faribault v. Taylor,
58 N.C. 234, 5 Jones Eq. 219 (1858), the court stated:
The construction, which would give the property to her and her present children only, as tenants in common of the absolute interest in it, is inadmissible,
both because it might, by diminishing the present and immediate interest in
the wife, be an inadequate support for her during her life, and, because it would
exclude from the benefit of the fund, any children she may hereafter have. The
manifest intent of the testator will be much more effectually carried out by
giving to the wife a life-estate, with a remainder to all the children which she
now has, or may hereafter have; and as the property is beqeathed [sic] to
trustees, in trust, for the benefit bf her and her children, this construction is
fully supported by the recent cases of Bridgers [sic] v. Wilkins, 3 Jones' Eq.
Rep. 342, Chesnut v. Mears [sic], Ibid. 416, Coakley v. Daniel, 4 Jones' Eq.
Rep. 89.
id. at 235, 5 Jones Eq. at 220.
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predeceases the life tenant. The cases, however, seem to suggest that a
child of A who predeceases the relevant time for determining children is
entitled to a share, 135 so postponement of the time does not prejudice the
rights of predeceased children. Allowing the deceased child to take is
consistent with normal class gifts concepts that prefer early vesting and
do not imply a condition precedent of survivorship. 18 °
2. Which Children Share
The preceding paragraph is based on the postulate that the time of
determining the existence of children for purposes of applying the First
or Second Resolution in Wild's Case does not necessarily control the
question of which children share. That is, assuming that the Second
Resolution applies so that A's children's share, which of A's children in
fact share? Assume the following case: T devises Blackacre to X for
life, remainder to A and his children. X dies after T, survived by A.
A has the following children:
B, born before T's death, who survives T and X
C, born before T's death, who survives T but not X
D, born before T's death, who survives the making of the will but
who survives neither T nor X
E, born before T's death and before the making of the will, who
does not survive the making of the wil
F, born after T's death, who survives X
G, born after T's death, who does not survive X
H, born after X's death
Clearly the Second Resolution applies to give a tenancy in common to
A and his children, but which children? B will share, but whether C, D
and E will take are questions of minimum membership. C's interest is a
question of survivorship: Is there an implied condition precedent that
he be alive when the co-tenancy becomes possessory? Traditionally, the
"better view" in class gifts is that a class member need not survive to the
time of distribution.1 7 Whether D will take is a question of lapse; 18 8 an
135. See note 148 infra.
136. E.g., 2 SimEs & SMrrH, supra note 7, §§ 654, 656.
137. E.g., 2 SIMES & SMrrH §§ 654, 656. A similar question may arise when
it is found that Wild's Case does not apply. If A takes a life estate with remainder
to A's children, must the children survive A in order to take? The question is the
testator's intention; the better presumption would appear to be that there is no condition
of survivorship implied from postponement of the time of possession. See, e.g., id. §
655.
138. Dictum in Hampton v. Wheeler, 99 N.C. 222, 225, 6 S.E. 236, 238 (1888),
suggests that D would take.
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anti-lapse statute may be interpreted as preserving his interest. 3 9 E's
gift is a "void" devise; normally E would not take unless an anti-lapse
statute applied (a) to class gifts and (b) otherwise void devises, a

somewhat unusual happenstance.140
The rights of F, G and H are ones of maximum membership or

class closing. In typical class gift situations a member such as F would
take; since the time for distribution has not arrived the class is kept open

so as to benefit as many children as possible.

41

If F is allowed to

share, so should G, unless failure to survive X defeats his share. The
answer to that question would be determined by C's similar case.

Finally, H would not be given a share, since he was born after the time
of distribution, although as pointed out above,' 42 if the subject matter of
the gift is realty there would seem to be no insurmountable bar to
granting H a share. After all, the testator's gift was to A and his

children, not to A and some of his children. Distribution could be
made as of X's death, subject to partial divestiture by shifting executory
interest in H.

Not surprisingly, few North Carolina cases

43

deal expressly with

these problems. Indeed, the possible difference between existence of
children for purposes of choosing the Resolution and for purposes of

taking a share seems not to have been clearly perceived. The few cases
which have arisen tend to resolve questions of minimum membership

(survivorship) in favor of the child who predeceases the life tenant and
to decide questions of maximum membership (class closing) against the

child born after the testator's death.

In Cullens v. Cullens,144 for

139. E.g., 2 SIMES & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 662; cf. Doggett v. Mosely, 52 N.C.
450, 7 Jones 587 (1860):
A bequest to a woman and her issue, undoubtedly gives her an absolute estate
when she has no children or issue during the life of the testator; but if she
has children or issue when the will is made and at the death of the testator,
she and her children or issue, may take absolute estates as tenants in common,
unless there is something in the will indicative of an intention that she will
take as tenant for life, with remainder to her children or issue (emphasis
added).
Id. at 453, 7 Jones at 590-91.
140. E.g., 2 SIMES & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 664.
141. E.g., id. § 640.
142. See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
143. Or, for that matter, few cases or materials from other states. Class closing
cases that have arisen under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6 (1976) ("heirs" presumed to mean
"children") appear to be inconsistent. See, e.g., Cooley v. Lee, 170 N.C. 18, 86 S.E. 720
(1915); Graves v. Barrett, 126 N.C. 267, 35 S.E. 539 (1900).
144. 161 N.C. 344, 77 S.E. 228 (1913).
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example, the grantor 145 conveyed land to his daughter "Sarah... and
her children forever," reserving a life estate to himself and his wife,
Parthenia. At the date of the deed, Sarah had three children, one of
whom predeceased Parthenia. Several children were born after Parthenia's death, all of whom survived Sarah. The court held that Sarah
and the three children living at the delivery of the deed took a joint

estate, 148 even though the court believed that the testator did not intend
to exclude after-born children! 47 Thus, Cudlens indicates that, in terms
of the schematic problem above, C will take.'
E.

Application to Deeds or Personalty

1. Deeds
Literally, the Rule in Wild's Case applies only to "devises"; i.e.,
gifts of real property by will. It seemingly does not apply to deeds,
whether of realty or personalty, or to bequests (gifts of personal proper-

ty by will). Nevertheless, the North Carolina courts, which have been
quite literal in applying the First Resolution to create an interest which
145. The creating instrument was a deed, not a will. Id. at 345, 77 S.E. at 229.
146. The deed lacked words of inheritance. Id. at 346, 77 S.E. at 229; see section
I(E) infra. Each grantee took only an estate for his or her life, so the construction
giving the deceased child an estate was relatively painless. Since the child had died
before the case was litigated, the life estate had terminated and there was no messy
interest to trace through the child's estate.
147. See text accompanying notes 97-98 supra. The court thus regarded the problem as all-or-nothing: a life estate-remainder, giving all children a share, or a joint
estate (Wild's Case), cutting off after born children. The court did not recognize that
it might have chosen Wild's Case but still have allowed all children to share. See
text accompanying note 142 supra.
148. The only other apposite case is Pollard v. Pollard, 83 N.C. 96 (1880), in
which a share was sought for the representatives of children who survived the testator
but died before the life tenant. Id. at 98-99. The court said that ordinarily the representative would take according to Moore v. Leach, 50 N.C. 97, 5 Jones 88 (1857),
apparently failing to recognize that Moore v. Leach involved an immediate gift, not
a postponed one. Nevertheless, the court rejected this construction on the ground that
the testator intended a substitutional construction, with A to take if he survived the
testator and the children to take only as substitutes for A, if A failed to survive the
testator. This decision appears reasonable in view of the testators language: "[Upon
the death of the life tenant] to be equally divided between [sic] my daughter Henrietta,
my son, Elias, and my grandson Joseph A. Lewis, and their children, the children to
take the share of the parent who may die before my death." Id. at 98. Because of this
unique language, Pollard is not inconsistent with Cullens. Note that if a substitutional
construction is intended, the time for determining whether to substitute could be the
testators death or the life tenant's death. In Pollard the testators death was expressly
chosen.
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fleetingly passes through the purgatory of a fee tail into the statutory

heaven of a fee simple, have been quite liberal in overlooking the narrow
meaning of "devise."

While this may not be a serious extension for

Second Resolution cases, it is regrettable where the First Resolution is
concerned.
As a matter of first impression, Casner and others have argued that

the First Resolution could not have applied to deeds at common law
because:
In order to create in land an estate in fee tail by deed at common
law the magic word "heirs" had to appear along with the words of
procreation, and its absence in the limitations governed by the first
resolution prevented the creation of an estate in fee tail when a gift
of land to a parent and his children was made by deed.' 4 9

This statement is somewhat puzzling, since the theory of the First
Resolution is that "such words [and his children] shall be taken as

words of limitation, scil. as much as children or issues of his body."'150 If
"issues of his body" is synonymous with "heirs of his body," the deed

supplies both words of inheritance ("issues") and words of procreation
("of his body").

The authorities cited by Casner are not clear on this

point.' 5 ' It may be that the words "heirs of the body" actually had to
be used, but that is doubtful.' 52 Or it may be that Wild's Case meant
149. 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.21, at 297. To the same effect is 2 SIMES & SMITH,
supra note 7, § 696, at 165.
150. 77 Eng. Rep. at 279; see 2 H. UNDERHILL, supra note 11, § 580.
151. H. CHALLIS, REAL PPOPERTY 292 (3d ed. C. Sweet 1911). Simes and Smith
cite Fales v. Currier, 55 N.H. 392 (1875) (Cushing, C.J.), which seems to argue against
their thesis:
In Ross v. Adams, 4 Dutch. 168, cited in 1 Washb. on Real Property 93,
it was held that a grant to a married woman for life, and at her death to her
children of her by her husband begotten, was by the law of New Jersey an
estate tail in the wife, nor would it enlarge it to a fee although the covenants
in the deed were to her and her heirs generally. Washb., vol. 2, p. 560, says,'Thus, the words 'child or children' are in their usual sense words of purchase,
and are always so regarded unless the testator has unmistakably used them as
descriptive of the extent of the estate given, and not to designate the donees.
But they may be used as words of limitation. * *
"In a will a testator may use the word 'children' as meaning heirs of the
body: possibly a grantor may do this, but his intention must be clearly shown.
Words of purchase will be treated as such until it has been unmistakably shown
that the grantor designed to use them in a different sense." 2 Washb. on Real
Property, book 2, ch. 4, see 8.
55 N.H. at 394, cited in 2 SIMES & SMITH, supra note 7, § 696, at 165 n.23. The
court found a life estate in A with remainder to her children, reserving judgment on
the question whether the remainder was for life or in fee. 55 N.H. at 394. At common
law a conveyance "to A and his heirs, but if A die without issue to B and his heirs"
created a fee tail in A on an indefinite failure of issue theory. See, e.g., 1 SIMES
& SMITH, supra note 7, § 522, at 521.
152. Since, for example, a fee tail could be created by a devise "to A and his heirs,
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"issues of his body" in the definite sense rather than indefinite sense of
bodily heirs, but that is inconsistent with the fee tail result for wills.
The answer apparently is that the conveyance had to contain words of
inheritance as to A, in addition to words confining succession to bodily
heirs. 5 '
Whatever the truth of the matter, at least it was arguable that the
First Resolution should not have been applied to deeds where words of
inheritance were necessary to create a fee (in this case a fee tail). Justice
Battle introduced Wild's Case into North Carolina law in the 1850's.
North Carolina General Statutes section 39-1, which presumes a fee
whether a deed contains words of limitation or not, was not enacted
until 1879.11' Although it appears that prior to 1879 the common
law's absolute requirement of words of inheritance had been somewhat
relaxed in North Carolina, still the requirement generally remained.1 5
Not one North Carolina case has been found raising a First Resolution question for a pre-1879 deed, although pre-1879 Second Resolution deed cases do exist. 55 The few' 57 post-1879 First Resolution
deeds cases apply the First Resolution without noting the possible
restriction of Wild's Case to wills. 158 The only deed case that may be
read as rejecting the First Resolution does so on grounds other than that
the Rule is limited to devises. 5" In view of the fact that the First
Resolution leads to a rather anomalous fee simple result in North
Carolina, one might wish that the Resolution had been restricted to
devises.' 60 The fee simple result seems particularly inept for deeds. In
but if A shall die without issue, to B and his heirs." 1 SIMES & SMITH, supra note
7, § 522, at 491.
153. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 59 (1940). Note that this independent requirement of words of inheritance for deeds raises some question about Wild's Case
and wills. While at common law words of inheritance were not absolutely required
to create a fee by will, their absence created a presumption of a devise of a life estate.
If so, how could a Wild's Case fee tail last beyond the lives of A and his children?
154. Law of Mar. 7, 1879, ch. 148, § 1, [18791 N.C. Pub. Laws 279 (now N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 39-1 (1976)).
155. See N.C. GEm. STAT. § 39-1, Editor's Note (1976).
156. E.g., Gay v. Baker, 58 N.C. 273, 5 Jones Eq. 344 (1860); Chesnut v. Meares,
56 N.C. 395, 3 Jones Eq. 416 (1857).
157. This lack of cases is understandable since it is unlikely that a grantor would
convey property "to A and his children" when A had no children.
158. Boyd v. Campbell, 192 N.C. 398, 135 S.E. 121 (1926) (citing Cole v. Thornton, 180 N.C. 90, 104 S.E. 74 (1920), a will case); Davis v. Brown, 241 N.C. 116,
84 S.E.2d 334 (1954) (citing Boyd and Cole, supra).
159. Martin v. Knowles, 195 N.C. 427, 142 S.E. 313 (1928) (conflict between
premises and other parts of deeds).
160. Casner is less disturbed, suggesting merely that when the ultimate result is a

1977]

RULE IN WILD'S CASE

a will, one might reasonably say that if the testator makes a devise to A
and his children, A having no children, the testator expects children to

be born later. When it turns out that no children are born, it is not
unreasonable to say that, the testator's prediction having failed, he

Would not mind A's taking a fee. But if a grantor executes a deed'' to
A and his children, knowing full well that A has no children, he must

have some intention of benefiting the children via a remainder.1'
had meant A to take in fee, he would have said so.
The Second Resolution has also been extended to deeds.

2

If he
Here

there was no great break with the past, nor was there an aggravated
result to be avoided. According to Wild's Case, when A had children
at the time of the devise, A and the children took a concurrent estate.
However, that concurrent estate was for life 63 since the devise lacked
words of inheritance to create a fee.'1 4 If the Second Resolution were
extended to deeds, the result would also have been a concurrent estate
for life, since words of inheritance were required to create a fee by
deed." 5
fee simple in A the "more sensible approach is to go there directly and not through
the channel of first creating a fee tail estate." 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.21, at 298.
It could also be argued that in the case of deeds, there being no children, the
deed would fail as to such children for want of a grantee. This problem could be
avoided by construing the deed as creating a life estate in A, remainder to the children,
or a fee in A, subject to partial divestiture by executory interest in the children.
161. At least an immediate rather than postponed grant.
162. Or a fee tail. But the fee tail would be converted into a fee simple. Query,
too, whether American grantors have much conception of the possibility of entailing
their estates. Our laws were born in England, but our frontier attitudes were hostile
to much of the Anglo-Saxon tradition of preserving wealth. E.g., N.C. CONsT. art.
1, § 34 ("Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state and
shall not be allowed."); Tax. CONsT. art. 1, § 26 ("Perpetuities and monopolies are
contrary to the genius of a free government, and shall never be allowed, nor shall the
law of primogeniture or entailments ever be in force in this State.").
163. Apparently measured by the life of each cotenant, with the share of a cotenant
being divested by his death, rather than passing to the estate of the deceased cotenant
until the death of the last cotenant to die. See 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.22, at 300-01.
164. At common law, words of inheritance were not absolutely required to create
a fee by devise. In contrast to deeds, the rules for wills (the Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. 8,
c. 1, not passed until 1540) were more intention-oriented and gave primacy to the
testator's intention over the presence or absence of technical words. At the time of
Wild's Case, however, life estates were more common than fees, and in the absence of
words clearly indicating a fee it was presumed that the testator intended only a life
estate. Now, of course, fees are more common and the presumption is reversed. 1
SIMES & SMITH, supra note 7, § 493, at 472, § 496, at 478.
165. Note here that at common law words of inheritance were absolutely required
to create a fee. It was not enough that the grantor intended a fee-he had to use
the technical words "and his heirs." See 1 SIMEs & SMITH, supra note 7, § 493, at
472.
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Nevertheless, because of the history of North Carolina statutes
bearing on the necessity of words of inheritance, our courts might have
refused to extend the Second Resolution to deeds. The statute, now
North Carolina General Statutes section 31-38, which presumes that a
devise is in fee, was first passed in 1784,10 while the statute, now
section 39-1, which presumes that a conveyance is in fee, was not passed
until 1879.167 The early Wild's Case decisions in North Carolina were
made in the 1850's and involved wills. While the court might have
rejected Wild's Case on the ground that its common law effect was a
concurrent estate for life, while if adopted in North Carolina in the
1850's it would result in a concurrent fee, the court properly did not so
reject it.' 68 But when the question arose as to whether to extend the
Second Resolution to deeds, the court might have noted that a concurrent life estate (under a deed) was substantially different from a concurrent fee (under a will). Of course, this assumes that some better
construction was available, and none was. A could not have been given
a defeasible fee, since words of inheritance were lacking, and a fee tail in
A either was not possible due to the absence of words of inheritance, 1
or was not sensible due to its conversion into a fee simple by statute. 70
A remainder in the children (following a life estate in A) would have
been only for life, due to the absence of the magic words.
As already indicated, the North Carolina courts have extended the
Second Resolution to deeds, both those executed before"'1 and those
executed after"'2 the statute of 1879. Indeed the applicability of the
Second Resolution to deeds seems to have been assumed and never
contested. 1 3 The North Carolina courts generally have recognized the
words of limitation problem in Second Resolution deeds cases. The
leading case is Cullens v. Cullens,"74 where the grantor in 1865 deeded
166. Ch. 22, § 12, 24 Stat. Records of N.C. 576-77 (1777-1778)
STAT. §

(now N.C. GEN.

31-38 (1976)).

167. Law of Mar. 7, 1879, ch. 148, § 1, [1879] N.C. Pub. Laws 279 (now N.C.
GEN. STAT.

§ 39-1 (1976)).

168. This inadvertent refusal to distinguish the cases was not without merit: (1)
the testator likely intended a concurrent fee and only a somewhat technical presumption
kept him from it at common law; (2) Wild's Case could be regarded as neutral on
the life estate-fee problem, indicating only that the question is to be decided according
to the presumption in effect at the time of decision; and (3) Wild's Case established
only a concurrent estate-the life estate was the result of other rules.
169. See note 153 supra.
170. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
171. E.g., Cullens v. Cullens, 161 N.C. 344, 77 S.E. 228 (1913) (1865 deed).
172. E.g., Heath v. Heath, 114 N.C. 547, 19 S.E. 155 (1894) (1881 deed).
173. See cases cited notes 171-72 supra.
174. 161 N.C. 344, 77 S.E. 228 (1913).
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land to his daughter and her children, reserving a life estate to himself
and his wife. The premises of the deed ran to "Sarah . . . and her
and her children
children" and the habendum to "'Sarah . .
forever."' The clause of warranty was from the grantor "'William
* * * , for myself, my heirs and assigns'" to "'Sarah . . . and her
children forever.' "1i5 Although the case was decided in 1913, and the
court noted the statute of 1879, the court held that Sarah and her

children each took only an estate for his or her life, since the deed
lacked the word "heirs" in connection with any grantee. 170

In deeds

executed after the statute of 1879, the grantee and his children apparently take as cotenants in fee, although it is difficult to find a case clearly
77

in point.1

2. Personalty
The Rule in Wild's Case was stated as a rule for devises of "land."
Nevertheless, the early cases applied both Resolutions to personalty;
whether by accident or design, few twentieth century cases have involved personal property. As with the extension of the Rule to deeds,

application of the First Resolution to personalty was not desirable.
The First Resolution, creating a fee tail in A, might well have been
regarded as inapposite for gifts of personalty, since fees tail do not exist
175. Id. at 345, 77 S.E. at 229.
176. Id. at 346, 77 S.E. at 229; accord, Blair v. Osborne, 84 N.C. 418 (1881)
(Second Resolution rejected in favor of life estate in A and remainder in children; remainder held to be for life only). Helms v. Austin, 116 N.C. 751, 752-53, 21 S.E.
556, 557 (1895), involving a pre-1879 deed, displays a somewhat different, less technical,
attitude:
It is a well known rule that if two constructions can be put on a deed
or any part of it, that shall be given to it which is most beneficial to the
grantee. These deeds were inartificially [sic] drawn, using the words "heirs"
and "children" indifferently, by one having no legal conception of their
technical meaning, but the intent is clear. It would be unreasonable to assume
that the father, in providing for his family, meant to give them only a life estate leaving the fee undisposed of, after reserving his own life estate. We are
entirely satisfied from the context and from the nature and purposes of the
deed that it was the intention of Ennis Staton to convey a fee simple to his
wife and children, and we declare that to be the effect of each of the deeds.
In other cases, the problem seems not to have been recognized. Wilson v. Wilson,
119 N.C. 588, 26 S.E. 155 (1896) (pre-1879 deed); Heath v. Heath, 114 N.C. 547,
19 S.E. 155 (1894) (post-1879 deed). In others, the date of the deed is not indicated.
Darden v. Timberlake, 139 N.C. 181, 51 S.E. 895 (1905); King v. Stokes, 125 N.C.
514, 34 S.E. 641 (1899).
177. Cf.Darden v. Timberlake, 139 N.C. 191, 51 S.E. 895 (1905) (deed conveying
property to a husband and wife and their heirs, including the children of the wife by
a former marriage, created a tenancy in common among the husband, wife and children); King v. Stokes, 125 N.C. 514, 34 S.E. 641 (1899) (deed reserving a life estate
in the grantors and conveying property to H and upon his death to H's wife and children and their heirs created a remainder in fee in common in H's wife and children).
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in personalty.178 Courts in some other jurisdictions have so held. 179 It
is not clear whether North Carolina applies the First Resolution to
personalty. There are a few old cases involving slaves that apply Wild's

Case to reach a fee simple in A.110 The cases do not indicate, however,
whether the fee simple results directly, on the theory that fees tail do not

exist in slaves, or indirectly, on the theory that fees tail do exist in slaves
but are converted into fees simple by statute. This distinction is important to the question, since the first theory would suggest that the First
Resolution does apply to personalty, while the second theory would not
support the applicability of the Resolution to personalty. In some states
it was possible to create estates tail in slaves, 8 in which case application
of the First Resolution to slaves would not necessarily support application to personalty (in which estates tail do not exist).' 82
Assuming arguendo that the First Resolution applies to North
Carolina personalty, there is a kind of primitive consistency to the
Rule: for realty the fee tail is perverted into a fee simple in A, cutting
off the children, and for personalty a fee simple results from lack of
entails, also cutting off the children.

As with deeds, extension of the Second Resolution to personalty
seems not unreasonable. If the language "to A and his children"
indicates a concurrent estate for land, then there is nothing in the nature
of personalty which should change that result.' 8 3 Words of limitation
were not required even at common law to create fees in personalty.,
178. 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.21, at 297; 2 SIMES & SMITH, supra note 7, §
696, at 165.
179. E.g., Williams v. McConico, 36 Ala. 22 (1860); Audsley v. Horn, 53 Eng.
Rep. 872 (M.R. 1858); Horn v. Stokes, 59 Rev. R. 652 (Ir. Ch. 1842).
180. Doggett v. Moseley, 52 N.C. 450, 7 Jones 587 (1860); Jenkins v. Hall, 57
N.C. 321, 4 Jones Eq. 334 (1858).
Ziegler v. Love, 185 N.C. 40, 115 S.E. 887 (1923), involved a gift of land together
with the improvements, outhouse and shop upon it, but the improvements probably were
regarded as attached to the land and therefore part of it.
181. Vanzant v. Morris, 25 Ala. 285 (1854); 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.21, at
297 n.1; 2 SIMES & SMITH, supra note 7, § 696, at 165. Slaves generally were regarded
as personalty in North Carolina.
AND SLAVERY 11 (1927).

B. HOLT, THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

A recent North Carolina case, Riegel v. Lyerly, 265 N.C. 204, 143 S.E.2d 65
(1965), applies the Rule in Shelley's Case to personal property, citing as authority a
number of cases decided in 1858" and before involving slaves. While extension of Shelley's Case to personalty is regrettable and is contrary to most jurisdictions, e.g., In
re Trusteeship of Creech, 130 Ind. App. 611, 159 N.E.2d 291 (1959); 1 ALP, supra
note 7, § 4.41, the case does suggest that slaves were regarded as personalty.
182. 2 SIMEs & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 696, at 165.
183. 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.26, at 306.
184. 1 SiMEs & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 498, at 481.
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North Carolina seems to regard personalty as within the Second Resolution, although there is no square holding.18 5
3.

Combinations:

Deeds and Personalty

Wild's Case applied to devises of land.

So far this section has

considered its application to deeds of land and to bequests of personalty:
Deed
Will
Realty
Realty
(Section E(1))
(Wild's Case)
Personalty
Personalty
(Section E(2))
Suppose the two variables were combined-i.e., a gift of personalty by
deed-would Wild's Case apply?
For the First Resolution, one has the same question as discussed
Creating Instrument:
Property Transferred:

with respect to bequests of personalty: since fees tail do not exist in
personalty, is the Rule therefore inapplicable? It should not apply, but
there is no case on point.

As to the Second Resolution, there is no obstacle to application of
the Rule.

Indeed, the case may be stronger for personalty than for

realty; since words of limitation are not required in deeds of personalty1 88

the concurrent estate in A and his children would be in fee. This

185. The clearest statement is dictum in the leading case of Moore v. Leach, 50
N.C. 97, 5 Jones 88 (1857), which involved land. After stating the Second Resolution,
the court went on to say:
The same rule applies to bequests of personalty to a mother and her
children, and if there be children living at the death of the testator, she and
her children will take equally, unless there be something peculiar in the will,
indicative of an intention in the testator that she should take for life with a
remainder over to the children. 2 Jar. Wills, 316 and 317; Davis v. Cain, 1
Ire. Eq. Rep. 304; Chesnut v. Mears [sic], (in Equity), decided at the present
term.
Id. at 99, 5 Jones at 90. It is not clear whether Chesnut v. Meares [the spelling of the
case name in the official reporter], 56 N.C. 395, 3 Jones Eq. 416 (1857), is cited
as authority for applying the rule to personalty or for refusing to apply the rule where
there is a contrary intention. The headnote in Chesnut refers to "[a] limitation of
slaves or other chattels," id. at 395, 3 Jones Eq. at 446 (emphasis added), but the
opinion speaks only of "slaves," id. at 395-96, 3 Jones Eq. at 416-17. Other cases
assuming the general applicability of the Second Resolution but finding a contrary intention involve slaves. Bridges v. Wilkins, 56 N.C. 273, 3 Jones Eq. 342 (1857); Faribault
v. Taylor, 58 N.C. 180, 5 Jones Eq. 219 (1859). Another slave case does apply the
Second Resolution. Gay v. Baker, 58 N.C. 273, 5 Jones Eq. 344 (1860). Perhaps
the closest case is Pollard v. Pollard, 83 N.C. 96 (1880), in which the court assumed
the general applicability of Wild's Case to a gift of land containing a direction that
it be sold and the proceeds divided among A and his children. Byrd v. Patterson,
229 N.C. 156, 48 S.E.2d 45 (1948), and Weeks v. McPhail, 128 N.C. 130, 38 S.E.
472 (1901), involve gifts of land and personalty, with no exception to the Wild's Case
discussion being made for the personalty.
186. 1 SiMEs & SmrrH, supra note 7, § 498, at 481.
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would seem to be closer to the creator's intention than the life estate
resulting from Wild's Case at common law. There is no square North
18 7
Carolina holding.
F.

Life Estate or Fee

The question whether interests given to A or to the children are for
life or in fee is implicit in the preceding section. In sum, the answers
are as follows:
First Resolution
Subject
Creating
Date
Result
Matter
Instrument
Fee simple in A
Realty
Will
Absolute interest in
Personalty
A (?)
No cases
Pre-1879
Realty
Deed
(pre- § 39-1)
Fee simple in A (I)
Post-i 879
Absolute interest in
Personalty
A(!)
Second Resolution
Creating
Instrument
Will

Subject
Matter
Realty

Date

Personalty
Deed

Realty

Pre-1879
(pre- § 39-1)
Post-i 879

Personalty
G.

Result
Concurrent estate in
A and children
Concurrent, absolute interest in fee
Concurrent estate
for life in A
and children
Concurrent estate in
fee (?)
Concurrent, absolute interest in fee (2)

Nature of Cotenancy

According to the Second Resolution, A and the children took "a
joint estate for life"-a life estate because of the presumption in favor
187. The closest cases are ones involving testamentary gifts of slaves. Gay v.
Baker, 58 N.C. 273, 5 Jones Eq. 344 (1860) (applies Second Resolution); Chesnut
v. Meares, 56 N.C. 395, 3 Jones Eq. 416 (1857) (finds contrary intention). See also
Byrd v. Patterson, 229 N.C. 156, 158, 48 S.E.2d 45, 47 (1948) (dictum relating to
a conveyance that included personalty as well as land).
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of life estates in the absence of words of limitation and a joint tenancy
because of the presumption in favor of joint tenancies in the absence of
language clearly indicating tenancy in common. On the face of it, the
question whether a concurrent estate for life is in joint tenancy or tenancy
in common seems meaningless; if the tenant has only a life estate, it
terminates on his death regardless of the label one puts on the interest.
But there is some significance to the distinction, and the confusion arises
from failure to specify whose life is the measuring life. If each concurrent owner's life estate is measured by the duration of his own life,
obviously his interest terminates at his death. On the other hand, if each
owner has an estate measured by the life of the last cotenant to die, in
effect a life estate pur autre vie, then he has an interest that may last beyond his own life. Apparently this second interpretation is the one put on
Wild's Case, so the question whether the concurrent ownership was joint
or in common had some substance to it. The interest of a deceased
cotenant could be regarded as passing (1) to his estate, (2) to his surviving cotenants by right of survivorship, s8 (3) to his surviving cotenants by implied cross-remainder, or (4) as terminating upon his death,
without increasing the fractional share of surviving cotenants. 189
Under modem statutes, of course, the interest in the concurrent
owners is in fee, so the nature of the tenancy has even more economic
impact.
North Carolina has a curious history of joint tenancies, and for
Wild's Case the problem is compounded by the life estate-fee and willdeed differentials woven into her history. In 1784 the legislature
188. Powell v. Morisey, 84 N.C. 421 (1881), involved a deed from 0 to five grandsons, A, B, C, D, and E (with no words of inheritance). 0 died leaving plaintiffs
the residue of his estate. A, B, C and D later died; E was still alive and had conveyed
his interest in the property to defendants.
Plaintiffs argued that the grandsons took only life estates for their own lives; therefore plaintiffs were entitled to % of the property as residuary devisees. Defendants
argued for a fee simple in the grandsons, asking for reformation of the deed to correct
inadvertent omission of words of inheritance.
The court held that the estates in the grandsons were for life. It also held that
the Law of June 2, 1784, ch. 22, § 6, [1791] Laws of N.C. 489-90 (J. Iredell) (now
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1976)), abolishing survivorship in joint estates, applied only
to interests in fee, not life estates. The result was that "upon the death of his companions and by virtue of the doctrine of survivorship, [El, as the last survivor became
seized of the entire lands.

. .

for and during the term of his life . . . .' Id. at 423.

In other words, the measuring life is the life of the last cotenant to die.
189. Compare 2A R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY If 324 (1967) and 3 id.

355 with

3 W. WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 300, at 141 (1947).

Walsh says that when a bequest is made to two or more persons for their lives, remainder to another person on the death of the survivor of the life tenants, the life
tenants are presumed to take cross-remainders.
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seemingly tried to do away with joint tenancies; however, it did not take
the standard paths of flatly abolishing joint tenancies or more temperately creating a presumption against them. Rather, it attacked the
right of survivorship:
AND whereas in real and personal Estates held in joint Tenancy
the Benefit of Survivorship is a manifest Injustice to the Families
of such as may happen to die first, Be it therefore enacted by the
Authority aforesaid, That in all Estates real and personal, held in
joint Tenancy, the Part or Share of any Tenant dying shall not for
the future descend or go to the surviving Tenant or Tenants, but
shall descend or be vested in the Heirs, Executors, Administrators
or Assigns respectively of the Tenant so dying, in the same Manner
as Estates held by Tenancy in common, any Law, Usage or Custom
to the contrary notwithstanding .... 190
The courts interpreted the Act of 1784 as not barring joint tenancies but
rather as abolishing only the right of survivorship incident thereto. The
first indication of this view is in Vass v. Freeman,""' an 1857 case
finding that a bequest of the testator's estate to his mother and sister,
"the whole of my estate jointly, and upon the demise of either, the
survivor to have the whole in fee simple forever"' 92 created a joint
tenancy for life, with the entire remainder to the survivor. The effect of
the statute was considered at length in the 1876 case of Powell v.
Allen' 93 in which the testator devised land in 1859 to his daughter for
life, and at her death to his three grandsons, Joseph, Richard, and
David, "for them to use it during their natural lives. ..

, and at their

death. I give all the above property to their children." 0 4 Joseph and
David died without children and it was held that as the surviving joint
tenant Richard was entitled to the whole property for his life. Note that
the life estate was assumed to be a joint tenancy (1) in the absence of
words indicating tenancy in common and (2) despite the direction "at
their death" to give the property "to their children"--an ambiguous
phrase that might be read as mandating distribution of a share upon the
death of each child leaving children.'0 5 The court refused to apply the
statute to the joint life estate for two reasons:
190. Law of June 2, 1784, ch. 22, § 6, [1791] Laws of N.C. 489-90 (J. Iredell) (now
N.C. Gm. STAT. § 41-2 (1976)).
191. 56 N.C. 215, 3 Jones Eq. 221 (1857) (Battle, J.).
192. Id. at 216, 3 Jones Eq. at 222.
193. 75 N.C. 450 (1876).
194. Id. at 451.
195. Of course, the word "their" could also be read as postponing distribution until
the death of all of the grandsons.
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It is obvious that these words cannot be made to apply to
joint tenants for life. In regard to real estate, on the death of one
of the tenants for life his part cannot descend to his heirs, but must
go either to the survivor or some third person entitled to take, not
by descent but by purchase, under the limitation law. In regard
to personal estate, on the death of one of the tenants for life his
part cannot pass to his executors, administrators or assigns, but
must go either to the survivor or some third person entitled to take,
not under the tenant dying, but by force of the limitation over. The
word "assigns" has no signification, but evidently is a mere expletive thrown in by force of habit to accompany the words "executors and administrators;" for if the tenant dying had in his lifetime
made an assignment of his part, the effect was to sever the joint
tenancy, and there was no occasion for a statute to prevent his share
from being acquired by the "jus accrescendi."
It is also obvious that the case of tenants for life does not come
within the mischief which called for the enactment of the statute.
The evil was that when an estate of inheritance was held in joint
tenancy on the death of one, his part passed absolutely to the survivor, and the heirs of the tenant dying were wholly excluded; the
object was to legislate in favor of the heirs of the dying tenant, but
as far as the statute indicates, the rights of third persons taking by
purchase under the limitation, and the rights of the survivor claiming under the common law rule, were not intended to be interfered
with, for as between them the doctrine of survivorship works no
crying hardship. 19 6
The court's first argument seems mistaken: Why cannot the part of a
deceased tenant descend to his heirs or be distributed to his executor?
The court appears here to be following the old common law view that
life estates were not inheritable, 197 but that view was based on a failure
to differentiate life estates measured by the life of the deceased life
tenant (obviously not inheritable because they die with the life tenant)
from life estates pur autre vie, which properly are inheritable but at
common law were not. 9 " If the decedent's life estate is pur autre vie, it
is a descendible freehold estate and the court's rationale fails. Indeed, to
assume that the life tenant's interest is measured by his own life is to
assume the conclusion. 99
196. 75 N.C. at 453-54.
197. J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 51-52 (2d ed. 1975).
198. Id. at 52. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-2(2) (1976) (For purposes of inheritance the term "estate" includes "an estate for the life of another.").
199. Note, too, that the statute refers to "all Estates, real and personal, held in
joint Tenancy. . . ." See text accompanying note 190 supra (emphasis added). Certainly a life estate was and is an estate in land, and the legislature appeared to intend
an all-inclusive statute.
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Alternatively, the court may have been looking to the nature of
joint tenancy and arguing that the statute simply does not reach common law joint tenancies. The theory would be that the statutory
language "the part or share of any tenant dying shall not descend or go
to the surviving tenant" does not apply to a right of survivorship, which
in common law contemplation is a right given to the survivor by the
creating instrument; the survivor does not take any share from the
deceased joint tenant, and further the interest that the survivor takes is
regarded as always having belonged to him, not as a share coming partly
from the deceased joint tenant. Under this theory, however, even joint
tenancies in fees would escape the statute, and the courts have applied
section 41-2 to fees. 200 The draftsmen, by referring to "estates . . .
held in joint tenancy," obviously intended to reach at least some joint
tenancies. 201
The second argument in Powell v. Allen, that the case of life
tenants was not within the mischief calling for the statute, °2 is less
objectionable. The court again appears to overlook the possibility of
life estates pur autre vie, but clearly there is more detriment to the heirs
of a deceased joint tenant in losing the inheritance of a fee rather than a
203
life estate.
Subsequent cases have affirmed Powell v. Allen.20 4 It is significant, too, that the cases have continued to follow the common law
presumption in favor of joint tenancies. The most emphatic statement
comes in Burton v. Cahill,20 a 1926 case finding that an 1895 deed
conveying land to A and B for life created a joint tenancy:
So that, in North Carolina, in a conveyance in which the four
unities concur, the law favors joint tenancy, or, in other words, the
common-law rule prevails in the absence of restrictive, exclusive or
200. E.g., Burton v. Cahill, 192 N.C. 505, 135 S.E. 332 (1926).
201. The argument that the statute does not use apt words to describe the right
of survivorship also seems to be rebutted by the appearance in § 41-2 of the phrase
"or go to" the surviving tenant, which seems broad enough to reach rights of survivorship. Again, however, one could argue that upon the death of the first joint tenant
there is no share "going to" the surviving joint tenant; rather, the surviving joint tenant
originally owned the whole estate, subject to the equal rights of the other joint tenant,
whose death has terminated his rights.
202. 75 N.C. at 453-54.
203. The standard argument against joint tenancies is that allowing the surviving
joint tenant to take to the exclusion of the decedent's heirs is an unexpected, undesirable
and substantial loss to the decedent's heirs. See, e.g., J. CRunnaT, supra note 197, at 99.
204. Burton v. Cahill, 192 N.C. 505, 135 S.E. 332 (1926); Powell v. Morisey, 84
N.C. 421 (1881); Blair v. Osborne, 84 N.C. 417 (1881).
205. 192 N.C. 505, 135 S.E. 332 (1926).
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explanatory words manifesting an intention to create a tenancy in
common. The language of the deed is not ambiguous, and an
examination of the entire instrument does not disclose either explanatory or restrictive words necessary to take the conveyance out of
the general rule; neither is any language used which manifests
an intention
on the part of the grantor to create a tenancy in com20 o
mon.
How do these cases bear on Wild's Case?
1. Deeds
Assume A has children. The forerunner of section 39-1, which
presumes a fee in deeds lacking words of inheritance, was not enacted
until 1879. Therefore, in pre-1879 deeds running simply "to A and his
children" without the words of limitation "and their heirs," A and the
children would take only a life estate. Further, the life estate would
seem to be in joint tenancy 2 07 and the joint tenancy would be unaffected
by section 41-2.208 The North Carolina courts do not seem to have
recognized this complete chain of propositions. The most significant
case is Cullens v. Cullens, 20 9 a 1913 decision involving an 1865 deed
"unto Sarah and her children." The court held that Sarah and her
children took only a life estate since the word "heirs" did not appear in
the deed in connection with the grantees, although it did appear elsewhere.2 10 The court found, however, that the life estate was held as a
tenancy in common. 211 This latter result is puzzling; section 41-2 is
silent on the question whether a concurrent estate is in joint tenancy or
in common-the statute only speaks to the effect of a purported joint
tenancy once it is found that the estate was intended to be created. It
does not reverse the common law presumption in favor of joint tenancy,
I 1 2 indicates that if the four unities
and Burton v. Cahill
are present a
joint tenancy results.
206. Id. at 509, 135 S.E. at 335. Similar statements are found in Powell v. Allen,
75 N.C. at 452, and Powell v. Morisey, 84 N.C. at 423. Although these cases all
involve deeds, Powell v. Allen notes that the rule "has been further released" for wills
by allowing such words as "to take share and share alike" or "to be equally divided
between them" to create tenancies in common. 75 N.C. at 452. This relaxation reflects
the usual deference to the testator's intention but is scarcely a repudiation of the common law presumption. All the announcements of the common law unities rule are
made in the context of life estates but do not so restrict the dicta.
207. See, e.g., Burton v. Cahill, 192 N.C. 505, 135 S.E. 332 (1926).
208. See, e.g., Powell v. Allen, 75 N.C. 450 (1876).

209. 161 N.C.344, 77 S.E.228 (1913).
210. Id. at 346-47, 77 S.E. at 229.
211. Id. at 347-48, 77 S.E. at 229-30.
212. 192 N.C. 505, 135 S.E. 332 (1926). Powell v. Morisey, 84 N.C. 421 (1881),
and Powell v. Allen, 75 N.C. 450 (1876), take the same view.
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Apparently another line of cases has assumed that the common law
presumption of joint tenancy has been reversed in favor of tenancy in
common.

This reversal of the common law presumption seems not to

have been done consciously. Rather, one simply finds in the decisions a
reference to the fact that the concurrent estate in A and the children was

joint at common law but "now" is in common. These decisions do not
cite authority for their tenancy in common assertion. Nowhere do the
cases face the fact that section 41-2 is silent on the threshold question of

whether the cotenancy created was joint or in common. 218 One thus
has parallel lines of decision that, by definition, never intersect.
This is not to say that a judicial change from the presumption of
joint tenancy to a presumption of tenancy in common is necessarily
bad, 14 but rather to suggest that the issue ought to have been faced
213. In Silliman v. Whitaker, 119 N.C. 89, 25 S.E. 742 (1896), the supreme court
stated the result of the application of the Second Resolution in Wild's Case in North
Carolina. It stated, "(by virtue of our statutes), if there are children . . . at the testator's death, the father and children take as tenants in common instead of joint tenants.
Wheatland v. Dodge, 10 Metc., 502; Nightingale v. Burrell, 15 Pick., 104 (on p. 114);
3 Jarman on Wills, 174; Schouler on Wills, secs. 555, 556." Id. at 93, 25 S.E. at
742. Since the applicable North Carolina statute, present § 41-2, did not convert joint
tenancies into tenancies in common, but just removed the right of survivorship, the
statement made in Silliman appears to be incorrect.
The two cases cited in Silliman as supporting its conclusion are Massachusetts
cases: Wheatland v. Dodge, 51 Mass. (10 Met.) 502 (1845); and Nightingale v. Burrell, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 104 (1833). These cases do seem to indicate that in Massachusetts under the Second Resolution the parent and children would take as tenants in
common, but that construction was not an issue in either case. The Massachusetts statute abolished joint tenancies and substituted tenancies in common in 1785. Neither do
the treatises cited support the quoted passage, but simply support the general application
of Wild's Case in the American and English jurisdictions.
The tenancy in common rule is also stated in Hunt v. Satterwhite, 85 N.C. 73
(1881). The court quoted J. O'HARlA, ON WILLs 814 (1872): "'A devise to one and
his children gives the parent an estate tail, if he has no children at the time of the
devise; but if he then has children then, he takes jointly with them and, under the
operation of our statute, as tenants in common."' 85 N.C. at 75. O'HARA was a general treatise on American wills and presumably was referring to typical American statutes which reverse the cotenancy presumption, not the unusual North Carolina type
of statute. The Satterwhite court also cited Gay v. Baker, 58 N.C. 359, 5 Jones Eq.
344 (1860), as support for its tenancy in common construction. That case did give
the parent and children a tenancy in common, but the court relied upon the express
language in the deed that read, "The whole, equitable interest in the said negroes
is to belong to my daughter Elizabeth and her children in common." 58 N.C. at 360, 5
Jones Eq. at 345.
214. The commentators generally agree with the change, arguing that the right of
survivorship is not anticipated by the creator. E.g., J. CRIEHET, supra note 197, at 99.
Some states have gone so far as to forbid joint tenancies, but that approach is unwarranted; if the parties understand the joint tenancy and intend a right of survivorship,
there is no fundamental policy against the estate-indeed it may be useful, as a means
of avoiding probate. Persistent attempts to avoid probate by means of the joint tenancy
may have encouraged courts to avoid the Draconian rule forbidding joint tenancies by

1977]

RULE IN WILD'S CASE

squarely, especially when another line of cases reiterated the existence

of the common law preference. Certainly section 41-2 did not necessarily reverse the common law presumption; indeed, the adoption of a

statute tinkering with the effect of joint tenancy rather than attacking
the root problem of whether the estate has been created may be regarded
as an affirmation of the common law presumption. 216

The fundamental question, however, is whether and how any
change in the common law rule that A and the children take as joint
tenants should affect the application of the Rule in Wild's Case. This

question seems not to have been considered in other materials.2 16 For
pre-1879 deeds lacking words of limitation, it would appear that A and
the children took a life estate as joint tenants (section 41-2 not applying)-the same result as at common law.

However, Cullens v.

Cullens217 found the life estate but presumed it to be in common.
Assuming Cullens is controlling, the change from a life estate in joint
tenancy to one in common would not seem materially to affect the
creator's intention. The question is whether giving the deceased life
tenant's share to his heirs or devisees instead of to the life tenants who

survive him is such a substantial change that the creator would likely
have preferred something other than a concurrent estate in A and the

children (most probably, a life estate in A followed by a remainder in
A's children). The first life tenant to die most likely would be A, who
could reasonably be supposed to be 21 years or more older than his
children. According to the common law rule, upon A's death the
children would take A's "share" as surviving joint tenants. If the
tenancy has been changed to one in common, the takers upon A's death
would be A's heirs or devisees. A's heirs would be A's children,21 8 so
holding that prohibitory statutes do not bar the parties from creating a right of survivorship by contract.
215. On the other hand, the statute, by legislating against the right of survivorship,
could be taken as a legislative judgment that rights of survivorship are not favored and
therefore tenancies in common are favored.
216. See, e.g., 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.22, at 300; 2 SIMES & SMITH, supra note
7, § 698, at 169.
217. 161 N.C. 279, 77 S.E. 228 (1913).
218. This assumes that A's surviving spouse would not be an heir; at common law
a surviving spouse was entitled to dower or curtesy but was not an heir under the canons
of descent (although the surviving spouse did take a share in personal property with
the children as a next of kin under the statute of distribution). T. ATKINSON, supra
note 105, 99 6-7, at 37-50. In North Carolina the surviving spouse was made an heir
in 1960 by the Intestate Succession Act, ch. 879, H9 1, 14, [1959] N.C. Sess. Laws 886
(now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-2(3) (1976)). Prior to that, the spouse was entitled to
dower or curtesy. See McCall, North Carolina's New Intestate Succession Act, 39
N.C.L. REV. 1 (1960). The surviving spouse did take an interest in personalty as next
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there would be no difference in takers unless children were born to A or
died between the time of the deed (when children were determined for
purposes of Wild's Case) and the time of A's death (when heirship was
determined for purposes of inheritance). 219 Even if there were some
difference in the class of children at the time of the creating deed and
the class at the time of A's death, it would not seem substantial enough
to change the application of the Second Resolution. Indeed, Wild's
Case with the tenancy in common construction is closer to the competing life tenant-remainder construction than is Wild's Case with the joint
tenancy construction, since A's share may go to his children at his death
(like a remainder) rather than to his children determined as of the
delivery of the deed.
The preceding discussion assumes that A died intestate with respect to his life estate pur autre vie. If A has an interest as tenant in
common he could, of course, alienate it or devise it to someone other
than his children. Nevertheless, the odds are that any alienation or
devise by A would be to A's children. Further, even under the joint
tenancy presumption A could sever the joint tenancy and create a
tenancy in common, so creation of an alienable or devisable interest in A
by virtue of a presumed tenancy in common does not differ much from
the result of the common law joint tenancy.
Note that A's interest as tenant in common, while perhaps likely to
pass to the same persons as the interest in joint tenancy, would be a part
of A's estate for purposes of administration and death taxes. In the
mid-eighteenth century, however, it is doubtful whether probate avoidance was so religiously sought as in modem times, and there was no
federal estate tax,220 so these considerations did not bear on the grantor's intention.
One further consideration is the difference in result between joint
tenancy and tenancy in common upon the subsequent deaths of other
class members. Assuming A dies first, the next class member to die
likely would be A's eldest child. Under the common law presumption,
of kin beginning in 1784. Law of June 2, 1784, ch. 22, § 7, [1791) Laws of N.C. 490
(J. Iredell). As originally stated, of course, Wild's Case applied only to realty. Even
if the spouse is an heir, the problem of the spouse's share would be avoided if A survived his spouse.
219. As to the right of children born or dying after the date of the deed to take
under the Second Resolution, see section I(D) supra.
220. The blessings of the federal estate tax began in 1916. Act of Sept. 8, 1916,
ch. 463, tit. II, 39 Stat. 777-80 (1916).
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that child's share would pass to his brothers and sisters (determined as
of the date of the creating deed) who survived him, whereas under the

tenancy in common the share would pass to his heirs, devisees or
grantees, who might well be his children or surviving spouse.

This

latter result would seem to be more in keeping with the creator's likely
intention than the joint tenancy; at least it is arguable that the creator
would favor the child's descendants over the child's siblings, 22 1 despite

the presence of an original gift to the child's siblings.

If a reasonable

case can be made for the result of the tenancy in common, it would

seem that Wild's Case should not be abandoned as a result of the change
in presumed cotenancies. 222
221. In connection with statutes of descent, and of the choice between per capita
and per stirpetal distribution, it is often argued that grandparents are fonder of their
grandchildren than of their children. E.g., T. ATINSON, supra note 105, § 7, at 43.
222. It is generally assumed that all Second Resolution interests will be held in
the same kind of tenancy-either joint tenancy or tenancy in common. Nevertheless,
could not a case be made for A holding his interest as a joint tenant with respect
to the children and the children holding their interests inter se as tenants in common?
This would pass the parent's interest to his surviving children but would give each child
a devisable, descendible interest for his own family.
What result for post-1789 deeds? Assume, again, that A has children. In post1879 deeds "to A and his children" lacking words of inheritance, § 39-1 nevertheless
presumes a fee. Also, pre-1879 deeds containing words of inheritance would create a
fee. As noted above, § 41-2 applies to joint tenancies in fee, abolishing the right of survivorship. The question of the effect of § 41-2 on Wild's Case has not been considered in
the North Carolina decisions, because all the opinions assume that the fee interest created
is in common. Buckner v. Maynard, 198 N.C. 802, 153 S.E. 458 (1930) (1912 deed of
real property); Tart v. Tart, 154 N.C. 502, 70 S.E. 929 (1911) (1906 deed of real property); Darden v. Timberlake, 139 N.C. 181, 51 S.E. 895 (1905) (1905 deed of real
property); Wilson v. Wilson, 119 N.C. 588, 26 S.E. 155 (1896) (1861 deed to trustees
and their heirs); Gay v. Baker, 58 N.C. 273, 5 Jones Eq. 344 (1860) (1819 deed of
personal property). If the concurrent estate were found to be joint, how, if at all, should
the impact of § 41-2 affect the application of Wild's Case?
The considerations would appear to be the same as those discussed in connection
with the effect of a tenancy in common construction as opposed to a joint tenancy
in the pre-1879 deeds creating life estates, with the caveat that any difference in takers
would be exacerbated by the magnitude of the interest involved-a fee rather than a
life estate. According to § 41-2, the "part or share of any [joint] tenant dying shall
not descend or go to the surviving tenant, but shall descend or be vested in the heirs,
executors, or administrators, respectively, of the tenant so dying, in the same manner
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1976). Thus,
as estates held by tenancy in common .......
for purposes of devolution on death, the joint tenancy would be treated like a tenancy
in common. If the change from joint tenancy to tenancy in common would not clearly
affect the Second Resolution where life estates are involved, it would not seem to rebut
the presumption as applied to fee interests. Alternatively, adherence to the Second Resolution might be explained on the ground that Wild's Case merely deals with the question whether a cotenancy is created, and local law determines the precise nature of
the cotenancy. This explanation seems too facile; certainly a rule based on presumed
intention should look to the ultimate result in takers rather than stopping at an intermediate way-station.
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Wills

The situation for wills is less involved. Devises have been presumed to be in fee since the enactment of the Revised Code of 1784,
containing the predecessor of section 31-38.22' That same Code also
included the predecessor of section 41-2 dealing with joint tenancies.2 24
Thus at the time of the judicial adoption of Wild's Case in 1857 in a
case involving a will, a gift "to A and his children" was presumed to be

in fee. If the devise was in joint tenancy, section 41-2 destroyed the
right of survivorship and property passed on death as by tenancy in

common. If the devise was in common, the property obviously passed
to the deceased tenant's heirs or devisees.

All the cases involving

devises assume that the tenancy is in common; none examines whether
As
this alteration should affect the application of Wild's Case' 22
noted above with respect to deeds, the result of the tenancy in common
would not seem materially to differ from the testator's likely intention.
H. Rebuttal-FirstResolution

Since the Rule in Wild's Case is one of construction, it may be
overcome by a showing of contrary intention. One might expect the
First Resolution to be easily rebutted in North Carolina, as it otherwise
results in a fee simple, not a fee tail, in the first taker. Nevertheless, no
clear-cut First Resolution case in North Carolina has ever rejected the
Rule, despite actual or potential arguments of contrary intention.220
223. Law of June 2, 1784, ch. 22, § 12, [1791] Laws of N.C. 491-92 (J. Iredell).
224. Law of June 2, 1784, ch. 22, § 6, [1791] Laws of N.C. 489-90 (J. Iredell).
225. E.g., Snowden v. Snowden, 187 N.C. 539, 122 S.E. 300 (1924); Benbury v.
Butts, 184 N.C. 23, 113 S.E. 499 (1922); Silliman v. Whitaker, 119 N.C. 89, 25 S.E,
742 (1896); Hunt v. Satterwhite, 85 N.C. 73 (1881).
226. Martin v. Knowles, 195 N.C. 427, 142 S.E. 313 (1928), is not contrary to
this assertion. In Martin the premises of the deed designated "Sallie . . . and her children" as "parties of the second part." The granting clause and other parts of the deed
conveyed "unto said party of the second part a life estate therein, and then to her
heirs, executors, administrators and assigns," a described tract of land. Further, "[iut
is the purpose of this deed to convey the above tract of land to Sallie . . . during
her lifetime, then to her heirs in fee simple, forever." Id. at 428, 142 S.E. at 313. Looking at the deed as a whole, the court determined that the word "children" in the premises
was an inadvertence. Id. at 429, 142 S.E. at 313. (The deed thus ran to Sallie for life,
remainder to her heirs, which limitations under the Rule in Shelley's Case gave Sallie a
fee simple).
Although the Rule in Wild's Case was not noticed in Sharpe v. Isley, 219 N.C.
753, 14 S.E.2d 814 (1941), the result is consistent with the First Resolution. A devise
to the testator's wife "Ruth . . . to her and her heirs by me", id. at 754, 14 S.E.2d
at 815, was held to constitute a fee tail special, which by statute was converted into
a fee simple. If the limitation to Ruth's "heirs by me" were regarded as one to Ruth's
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Probably the strongest case for rejection of the First Resolution was
Silliman v. Whitaker,2 27 where realty was devised "in trust for Sarah
Ward and all her children, if she shall have any. ' 228 Sarah was the

testator's daughter and was eleven or twelve years old at his death. The
court adhered to the usual presumption, arguing that the words "'if she
shall have any' . . . merely indicate that at the time of writing the will
the testator knew his daughter had no children. '22 The words were
read as meaning "if she shall have any [children] at the death of the
testator." Sarah's age was dismissed: "From the allegations of the
complaint it appears that Sarah was eleven or twelve years of age at the

testator's death, but non constat [it does not appear] that he might not
have expected that at his death she would have been married and the
280
mother of a child.
The opinion in Silliman v. Whitaker is not persuasive. The refer-

ence to "all" her children, coupled with the phrase "if she shall have

any" certainly imports an intention to create an interest in Sarah's
children. It is not unreasonable to assume that the testator, at his death,

knew the words of his will and persisted in a gift to Sarah and her
children, knowing her to have none at the time, because he wanted
after-born children to share. If Sarah had attempted to marry at age

twelve, the marriage might have failed for want of her capacity, 231 and
any children of hers would have been illegitimate and encountered some

difficulty in taking.2 32 The testator, therefore, must have been looking
children, the result under Wild's Case would also be a fee tail (converted by statute
into a fee simple).
In Daniel v. Bass, 193 N.C. 294, 136 S.E. 733 (1927), Wild's Case was not applied
to a devise "to my beloved sisters, Nancy Daniel and Mahala Daniel .. . to them
and their heirs forever, if any. If not, to the heirs of my sisters, Mary Jane Hathaway,
Celia Bass, and Sallie Rowe, to them and their assigns forever." Id. at 294-95, 136 S.E.
at 733. The court held that "heirs" was used as a word of limitation, despite the presence
of the words "if any," the gift over to the "heirs" of the other sisters, and the use of the
word "assigns" in connection with the gift over. According to the court, the gift over
was repugnant to the fee simple devised to Nancy and Mahala and therefore failed.
Id. at 298, 136 S.E. at 735. One wonders what it takes to overcome the presumption
that "heirs" is used in its technical sense.
227. 119 N.C. 89, 25 S.E. 742 (1896). See also Cole v. Thornton, 180 N.C. 90,
104 S.E. 74 (1920) ("to my daughter Alice and her children, if any") (emphasis
added).
228. 119 N.C. at 92, 25 S.E. at 742.
229. Id. at 93, 25 S.E. at 742.
230. Id.
231. Under Law of February 12, 1872, ch. 193, § 2, [1871-72] N.C. Pub. Laws 328,
marriage between a female under fourteen and any male was void, unless followed by
cohabitation, birth of issue and death of either party.
232. Under 1 N.C. Rev. Code 237, ch. 38, rule 10 (1855) (originally enacted
in 1799), an illegitimate child was considered an heir of the mother and could inherit
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to future children. It thus appears that the court should have found a
life estate in Sarah followed by a remainder in her children or a fee in
Sarah subject to partial divestiture by executory interests in her children.
Clearly the references to children were words of purchase, not of
limitation.
The true explanation of Silliman may lie in the court's references to
"public policy, which is adverse to tying up estates; and.

. .

justice,

which would be outraged by turning out the parties who have held the
realty undisturbed for forty years under mesne conveyances from a
purchaser who bought in reliance upon the decree of a court of equity., 233 As to public policy, the title would only be tied up until Sarah's
death,234 and as to justice, the proceeds of sale presumably were still held
in trust and could be paid to those losing the realty to Sarah's only child.
235
Even if Silliman is good policy, it is bad logic.
Several cases involve the effect, if any, of a gift over following the
limitation to A and his children. In Elkins v. Seigler21 6 the devise was
to Chapman for life, and after his death to Louisa, and to the child or
children of her body, forever; provided if Louisa dies without leaving
any children, then to testatrix' lawful heirs. The court applied Silliman
v. Whitaker to give Louisa a fee simple, but held that her fee was
defeasible if Louisa should die without leaving a child. Analyzed in
light of the nature of the fee tail, this result was impossible. In order to
apply the First Resolution, the words "and her children" have to be read
as words of limitation in the sense of "bodily heirs," importing a fee tail.
A fee tail lasts as long as there are bodily heirs-the usual form of
language to introduce a gift over following a fee tail is "if she dies
without issue" in which case the phrase is read as meaning an indefinite
from her, but- could not claim, as her representative, any part of the estate of her lineal
or collateral kindred.
233. 119 N.C. at 94, 25 S.E. at 742. Apparently the will in Silliman had been
construed in an earlier proceeding as devising a fee to Sarah, and that decree was not
appealed.
234. The relevant measure of the policy against dead-hand tying up of estates would
seem to be the Rule Against Perpetuities. Under the construction the court should
have reached, all interests would have vested no later than Sarah's death, a period well
within the Rule. Further, if the tying up of titles is so objectionable, why did North
Carolina, until enactment of the Marketable Title Act, give unlimited duration to possibilities of reverter and powers of termination? See Webster, The Quest for Clear Land
Titles-Whither Possibilities of Reverter ahd Rights of Entry?, 42 N.C.L. Rav. 807
(1964).
235. Silliman does not consider the effect on construction, if any, of the interposition of a trust. See section I(1) infra.
236. 154 N.C. 374, 70 S.E. 636 (1911).
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failure of issue, i.e., "if her issue (bodily heirs) fail, whenever that may
occur." 23 ' Since in Elkins v. Seigler the gift over was made upon death
without leaving any children, the estate in Louisa could not be a fee tail,
for the reasons that the gift over referred to a definite time (Louisa's
death) and was made upon death without leaving a specific class,
children (not bodily heirs).2 8 If Louisa did not take a fee tail,
Silliman v. Whitaker could not be applied to convert the estate to a fee
simple. If Wild's Case is not applied, one could still argue for a fee
simple in Louisa 23 9 although a life estate-remainder construction seems
more in keeping with the implications of the gift over.
Cole v. Thornton2 40 is another case failing to analyze closely the
effect of a gift over. There the will devised the testator's residuary
estate to his wife for life, then to his daughter A and her children, but
if A "die leaving no living issue" to other devisees. The testator's
wife was dead; the daughter A was alive at the time of -the case, but no
children had been born to her. The court applied the First Resolution
to give A a fee tail, converted by statute into a fee. The fee was, never241
theless, subject to divestiture if A should die leaving no living issue.
This result could not have been reached if the court had examined
the implications of the gift over. The word "issue" is acceptable to
introduce a gift following a fee tail, and in Cole it strengthens the case
for reading the basic devise "to A and her children" as meaning "to A
and her issue," but the court failed to notice the effect of North Carolina
General Statutes section 41-4.242 Under section 41-4 a limitation depending on the dying of a person without issue is interpreted as taking effect
when the person dies not having such issue living at the time of his
death. This is a definite failure of issue, in contrast to a gift over
following a fee tail which by definition must be indefinite-whenever
A's issue (lineal descendants) fail.2 43 In other words, a fee tail cannot
be followed by a gift over on a definite failure of issue, so section 41-4
made the court's First Resolution fee tail impossible. This is not to
237. See 1 SIMEs & SMITH, supra note 7, § 522.
238. See Martin v. Martin, 52 W. Va. 381, 44 S.E. 198 (1903); cf. Pells v. Brown,
79 Eng. Rep. 504 (K.B. 1620) (to A and his heirs, but if A die without issue, living B,
then to B and his heirs; held A takes a fee simple, not a fee tail).
239. On the theory that the gift over was substitutional-in the event of Louisa's
dying without children before the life tenant (or the testator).
240. 180 N.C. 90, 104 S.E. 74 (1920).
241. Id. at 91, 104 S.E. at 75.
242. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-4 (1976) (originally enacted in 1827).
243. E.g., 1 SIMES & SmITH, supra note 7, § 522.
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suggest that the court in Cole could not have reached a defeasible fee
construction, only that it could not have done so via Wild's Case.244
Finally, other instruments have contained superadded words suggesting that the word "children" was used as a word of limitation in the
sense of "heirs." The deed in Boyd v. Campbell,24 for example,
contained clauses running to: (1) "Pleas Clodfeler, his children, their

heirs and then to his grandchildren forever;" (2) "Pleas Clodfellow his
children and then to his grandchildren forever, and heirs and assigns;"
and (3) "Pleas Clodfellow, to him and his children, their lives, heirs
and assigns to and then to his grandchildren forever." The court

considered only the question whether the grandchildren took an interest
via executory limitation or remainder, found neither

40

and gave Pleas a

fee simple. Although the court did not do so expressly, it might well
have found that all the words except "Pleas Clodfeler" were words of

limitation giving Pleas a fee simple or fee tail (although not via Wild's
Case).

In Davis v. Brown,247 a deed to "Myrtle and her children or heirs"
was treated as a garden variety First Resolution case. Note, however,
that "or heirs" could by ejusdem generis be regarded as giving "chil-

dren" a meaning of words of limitation. Alternately, but not with much
plausibility, the gift might have been read as substitutional:

to Myrtle

and her children, or if she had no children, to Myrtle and her heirs (as
purchasers). Since Myrtle's heirs could only be determined at her death,
it is arguable that Myrtle was to take a life estate followed by a remainder to her children, or if none, remainder to her heirs. The point was not
noticed.

248

244. Another gift over case, Ziegler v. Love, 185 N.C. 41, 115 S.E. 887 (1923),
is truly puzzling. The devise was to the testator's wife for life then to his son Frederick
"and to his children or issue, but in case he should die childless and without issue"
to testator's heirs. There at least the language of the gift over jibed with the language
of the prior gift, but what did "issue" mean? Was it synonymous with "children"?
Did it color "children" and indicate that "children" meant "issue"? Was the entire
phrase "children or issue" words of limitation for Frederick's estate? The court saw
the will as a garden variety First Resolution case.
245. 192 N.C. 398, 135 S.E. 121 (1926).
246. The grandchildren did not take a shifting executory interest, said the court,
because no contingency was stated on which the use would shift. They did not take
a remainder because their interest followed a fee simple, not a prior particular estate.
Id. at 402, 135 S.E.2d at 123. These arguments assumed the conclusion-that Pleas
took a fee simple.
247. 241 N.C. 116, 84 S.E.2d 334 (1954).
248. Cf. Ziegler v. Love, 185 N.C. 41, 115 S.E.2d 879 (1927) (to Frederick, and
to his children or issue); see note 244 supra.
That the subject of the gift was entirely or partly personalty, in which fees tail
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Rebuttal--SecondResolution

Since the Second Resolution (which gives A and the children a
concurrent estate) is not as divorced from reality as the First Resolution
(which gives A a fee simple), one might expect fewer Second Resolution
cases to find a contrary intention than First Resolution cases. This expectation is not borne out: a higher percentage of cases find a contrary
intention when A has children (Second Resolution) than when A does
not have children (First Resolution). Upon close inspection, a number
of these cases seem not to involve pure Wild's Case language. Conversely, some cases adhering to the Second Resolution seem to ignore clear
showings of contrary intention.
There are several alternatives to the Second Resolution
concurrent estate: (1) a fee tail or even a fee simple in A, on the theory
that the words "and his children" were words of limitation, not words of
purchase; (2) a life estate in A with remainder to the children, in
keeping with the testator's intention; (3) a fee simple in A if he survives
the testator, or a fee simple in the children if A does not survive the
testator, on a substitutional construction theory. Each of these results
has been argued in North Carolina, but only the life estate-remainder
and substitutional construction arguments have had much success.
The first potential words of limitation construction was, indeed,
in the inaugural case of Moore v. Leach.24 9 The testator devised a house
and lot "to my beloved daughter Eliza Ann Leach (the wife of John
Q.A. Leach,) and her children, the lawful heirs of her body . . . to her,
the said Eliza Ann Leach, and her children forever." In another clause,
there was a devise to the testator's son George, "to him... his heirs and
do not exist, has not been noted as a factor. See Masters v. Randolph, 183 N.C. 3,
110 S.E. 598 (1922); Jenkins v. Hall, 57 N.C. 321, 4 Jones Eq. 334 (1858). A gift
to "A and his children, if any," has invoked Wild's Case. Cole v. Thornton, 180 N.C.
90, 104 S.E. 74 (1920).
See also Sharpe v. Isley, 219 N.C. 753, 14 S.E.2d 814 (1941), in which the testator
devised his entire estate (personalty and realty) to his wife "Ruth Lee Sharpe, to her
and her heirs by me .

. .

.

My wife is to have the exclusive and sole use of . . .

my. . . property and should she have living heirs by me, then all my estate. .. shall
belong to her and her heirs in fee simple." Ruth had no heirs by testator. Wild's
Case was not argued; a life estate-remainder construction was sought but rejected in
favor of a fee simple absolute in Ruth.
The court did put a substitutional construction on a bequest of slaves to the testator's daughter "Nancy or her issue" in Doggett v. Moseley, 52 N.C. 450, 7 Jones 587
(1860). This case is hardly a repudiation of Wild's Case, as the language varied so
much from "A and his children." The court assumed arguendo that "or" meant "and"
but still rejected Wild's Case because Nancy had only illegitimate children.
249. 50 N.C. 97, 5 Jones 88 (1857). For a collection of cases indicating various
factors bearing on intention, see Annot., 161 A.L.R. 612 (1946).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

assigns forever." Eliza had children at the execution of the will and at
the testator's death, and the court followed Wild's Case, noting that the
devise to George showed that the testator well knew how to use words

of limitation.

Although one might quibble with this decision,2 50 on

balance there seems insufficient evidence to rebut Wild's Case.

Instruments in some subsequent cases have a very strong flavor of
words of limitation in their use of the term children, yet only one has
overcome Wild's Case.251 Several of them seem to use "children"
in the sense of bodily heirs, while others even seem to use the word in
the sense of heirs general. Whether failure to overcome Wild's Case is
due to the early influence of Moore v. Leach is difficult to say.

One of the strongest suggestions of words of limitation, according
to the court, is Cullens v. Cullens.252 There the premises of the deed
ran "unto Sarah . . . and her children," but the habendum and the
clause of warranty ran "unto her the said Sarah . . .and her children

forever." The court conceded that the grantor's "more likely intention"
was to convey to Sarah in fee and after her death to her children, using
the word "children" in the sense of heirs of her body, but held that
"under the settled decisions of this Court" Sarah and her children living
at the date of the deed took an estate for life as tenants in common.25
The court thus overlooked the fact that Wild's Case is only a rule
of construction, which should have been overcome by the grantor's

"more likely" intention.254 Other cases have rejected the fee tail construction; 255 the most compelling case for the fee tail (or even a fee
250. The devise to George shows that the testator knew how to use words of limitation to create a fee simple absolute, not whether he knew how to use words of limitation
to create a fee tail. There is some conflict in the devise to Eliza, since heirs of the
body is a broader term than children, although children are a subclass of the class
of bodily heirs. (The opinion does not disclose whether George had children.)
251. Mayberry v. Grimsley, 208 N.C. 64, 179 S.E. 7 (1935). See text accompanying note 260 infra.
252. 161 N.C. 344, 77 S.E. 228 (1913).
253. The statement of the court is quoted in text accompanying note 98 supra.
Note that the court adheres to Wild's Case even when it results only in a life estate,
whereas the contrary construction would have yielded a fee in Sarah.
254. See the discussion at section I(C) supra. The court does not explain why it
thought the grantor's likely intention was a fee in Sarah.
255. E.g., Buckner v. Maynard, 198 N.C. 802, 153 S.E. 458 (1930) (premises "to
Eller Riddle and her children"; witnesseth clause "to the said Eller Riddle and children,
her bodily heirs and assigns"; habendum clause "to the said . . .heirs and assigns"
left blank; held, that the words "bodily heirs" were used as descriptilo personae and not
in their technical sense). See also Lewis v. Stancil, 154 N.C. 326, 70 S.E. 621 (1911)
(devise "to my grandson, Joseph A. Lewis. . . .to him and his children, born in wedlock, forever." The words of limitation possibility was not considered, although two
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simple) being Benbury v. Butts. 256 In that case the devise was "to Dora

Benbury, my wife's daughter, the house and lot. .. [described], to her
and her children, and to their children's children .
-*"7 The initial
mention of Dora alone, the comma before the pseudo habendum clause,
and the reference "to their children's children" all denote -that "her

children" were words of limitation, yet in a short opinion the court
thought it clear that Dora and her children took as tenants in common
in fee.
In Benbury the court did not disclose whether counsel argued for a

words of limitation construction, but in Snowden v. Snowden25 8 counsel
contended that use of the words "her heirs" in a testamentary gift

"to my daughter Laura, children, her heirs and assigns" resulted in a
fee simple in Laura.

The court, citing Benbury v. Butts, inter alia,

rejected the argument: "[W]e cannot draw that inference from the
word 'her' since at the death of the testatrix there might have been no

children, and the use of it does not obliterate the word 'children' from
the devise. '259 The court's meaning is not entirely clear, but in any
event the words of limitation construction would not have obliterated the
word "children"; the construction would simply have given it the meaning the testatrix evidently intended, i.e., an example of heirship.

The only case in which "children" was, in effect, treated as a
word of limitation is Mayberry v. Grimsley.260 There the premises
ran "to Nonnie . . . and her children" while the granting clause and
habendum were "to said Nonnie. . . , her heirs and assigns." In this

case of conflict the court found that the deed taken as a whole excluded
the children as grantees, so Nonnie took a fee simple. Somewhat similar is Coffield v. Peele,2 6 ' holding262that the testator did not intend to
give any interest to A's children.
dissenting judges argued for a life estate-remainder. The phrase "born in wedlock"
suggests that "children" was used as a word of purchase.).
256. 184 N.C. 23, 113 S.E. 499 (1922).
257. Id. at 24, 113 S.E. at 499-500.
258. 187 N.C. 539, 122 S.E. 300 (1924).
259. Id. at 541, 122 S.E. at 301.
260. 208 N.C. 64, 179 S.E. 7 (1935).
261. 246 N.C. 661, 100 S.E.2d 45 (1957).
262. Testator devised his entire estate "unto my seven children, . . . [all of my
real and personally [sic] property, to be divided equally among the seven children of
mine, and their children." All 7 children survived the testator, as did 44 grandchildren.
In this case of repugnancy, the court found it more likely that the testator intended
the children to take shares of * rather than ,61. Id. at 665-66, 100 S.E.2d at 48.
Martin v. Knowles, 195 N.C. 427, 142 S.E. 313 (1928), also finds that "children" was
not used as a word of purchase where it appeared only in the premises and not in
the granting and other clauses.
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In sum, the words of limitation argument rarely has succeeded in
North Carolina, despite strong cases for it.2 60 It is difficult to discern
any clear reason for this rigidity, especially when the court concedes the
likely intention.2 6 4 The facts stated in the opinions are so sparse as to

make any judgment about the testator's general plan and family relationships impossible; only the spare words of the instruments are parsed.

It might also be noted that where the word "heirs" or "issue" clearly is
used to mean "children" Wild's Case may be applied.26 5 Conversely,
where "children" is used clearly to mean children, it will not be read as
"heirs."2 66
The life estate-remainder argument has been more successful, perhaps because the courts have been willing to look at the motive for the
gift or perhaps because it was successful in an early case, Bridges v.
Wilkins.2 67 There the gift was, variously, to the testator's sisters and
their lawful issues, to the sisters and their children, and to the sisters
and their progeny. The testator had six sisters, of whom one had a

child at the testator's death. This multiple gift situation-some sisters
263. Cases in other jurisdictions sometimes have accepted the words of limitation
construction. See 5 ALP, supranote 7, § 22.23, at 301 n.14, § 22.24, at 303 n.1.
264. See, e.g., Cullens v. Cullens, 161 N.C. 344, 77 S.E. 228 (1913).
265. Bridges v. Wilkins, 56 N.C. 326, 3 Jones Eq. 342 (1857). As noted before,
cases in which "issue" is read as "children," thereby invoking the Rule, are fairly common in other states. See 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.17. The Uniform Property Act,
discussed in section III(C) infra, applies to conveyances to A and his "issue" as well
as to A and his "children," suggesting that the "issue" phrase has commonly occurred
elsewhere. The problem seems not to have come up very often in North Carolina.
In First Resolution cases, the North Carolina result would be the same whether "issue"
were regarded as carrying its usual meaning of "bodily heirs" or as meaning "children."
If it means "bodily heirs" the result is a fee tail in A, converted by N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 41-1 (1976) to a fee simple in A. If it means "children" the result is a fee tail
in A via Wild's Case, also converted to a fee simple.
On its face, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6 (1976) ("heirs" construed to be "children"
in certain limitations) would seem to direct all transfers "to A and his heirs" toward
Wild's Case by presuming "heirs" to mean children. As is well-known, however, §
41-6 does not apply where there is a precedent or concurrent estate to the living ancestor
of the heirs. E.g., Whitley v. Arenson, 219 N.C. 121, 12 S.E.2d 906 (1941); Starnes
v. Hill, 112 N.C. 1, 16 S.E. 1011 (1893). The word "heirs," therefore, is one of limitation and A takes a fee. Even if § 41-6 applied, in First Resolution cases the result
would be the same-A would take a fee.
266. See Helms v. Austin, 116 N.C. 751, 21 S.E. 556 (1895) (deeds made between
grantor and "his wife and her heirs named on the back of this deed"; on the back
were endorsed the names of grantor's children; held, the wife and children took a fee
simple); cf. Tremblay v. Aycock, 263 N.C. 626, 629, 139 S.E. 898, 900 (1965) ("we
have found no case, in which the conveyance is merely to A and the heirs of his body,
and A has children at the time, that 'heirs of the body' has been construed to mean
'children."'); Jernigan v. Lee, 9 N.C. App. 582, 176 S.E.2d 899 (1970) (reading "heirs"
as "children" but not applying Wild's Case), rev'd, 279 N.C. 341, 182 S.E.2d 351 (1971)
(reading "heirs" as "heirs" to comport with testatrix's general plan).
267. 56 N.C. 326, 3 Jones Eq. 342 (1857).
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having had no children (First Resolution) and one having had children
(Second Resolution)-may have compelled the life estate-remainder
construction as a way to resolve the fee tail-cotenancy impasse.2"" Indeed, a subsequent case stresses the point in reconciling Bridges with
Moore v. Leach.26 9 In any event, the court treated "issues" and "progeny" as synonymous with "children," and posited that the testator did not
2 70
intend to exclude the children that his unmarried sisters might have.
Several cases have found the life estate-remainder construction on
the basis of a perceived intention to provide solely for A during his (or
more often, her) life. A deed of slaves to a trustee in Chesnut v.
Meares2 was made in consideration of love and affection for the
settlor's wife, as well as for her better maintenance and support, and the
trust was first declared for the wife alone-the children were not
mentioned until the warranty clause. The court found a life estate in
the wife because of the settlor's purpose of providing support and
maintenance for her.2" 2 A similar view was taken in Faribault v.
Taylor,2 73 involving a bequest of "property'2 7 4 to a trustee for the
benefit of the testator's oldest daughter and children, free of the control
of her husband. The court commented:
The construction, which would give the property to her and her
present children only, as tenants in common of the absolute interest
in it is inadmissible, both because it might, by diminishing the present and immediate interest in the wife, be an inadequate support for
her during her life, and because it would exclude from the benefit of
the fund, any children she may hereafter have. The manifest- intent
of the testator will be much more effectually carried out by giving to
the wife a life-estate, with a remainder to all the children which she
now has, or may hereafter have; and as the property is bequeathed
to trustees, in trust, for the benefit of her and her children, this
construction is fully supported by the recent cases of Bridgers (sic)
v. Wilkins, 3 Jones' Eq. Rep. 342, Chestnut v. Mears [sic], Ibid.,
416; Coakley v. Daniel, 4 Jones' Eq. Rep. 89. Had the bequest
been a direct one to Mrs. Spivey and her children, then, under the
268. See the discussion in section I(U) infra.
269. Coakley v. Daniel, 57 N.C. 96, 99, 4 Jones Eq. 90, 93 (1858); see note
305 infra.
270. 56 N.C. at 328, 3 Jones Eq. at 344.
271. 56 N.C. 395, 3 Jones Eq. 416 (1857).
272. The gift was to the wife "and her children which she has, or may have, by
me"; the reference to future-born children also inclined toward a life estate-remainder
construction so as not to close the class to after-born children.
273. 58 N.C. 234, 5 Jones Eq. 219 (1859).
274. The headnote in the North Carolina Reports describes the gift as slaves, but
the opinion describes only "a share of the estate," "the fund," and "the property."
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authority of Moore v. Leach, 3 Jones' Rep. 88, we should have
been constrained to hold that the wife and children living at the
took an absolute interest in the fund as tendeath of the testator,
2 75
common.
in
ants
This statement is remarkable in several respects. First, the argument that the tenancy in common construction should be rejected because it would exclude afterborn children is really an indictment of the
Second Resolution. There was nothing unique in Faribaultto indicate
a special concern for afterborns, yet the court recognized the penalty in
excluding them. Second, it is not clear why the court found a primary
intention to support the daughter-was it because of: (1) the relationship between the donor and A (wife, daughter); (2) the subject
matter of the gift (slaves or other property); 276 (3) the imposition of a
trust on the property; (4) special language in the instrument (for her
support, free of her husband's control); (5) some other unstated factor;
or (6) some combination of these factors? The portion of the opinion
quoted appears to say that the controlling factor is the presence or
absence of a trust, yet in Hunt v. Satterwhite2 " a devise of realty in trust
for the testator's daughter and her children was held to result in a
tenancy in common. At one point the Satterwhite court suggested that
the interposition of a trustee supports the cotenancy construction.21 8 It
should be noted that there were no words superadded to "A and her
children" to indicate primary concern with the daughter, and the court
said that the life tenant-remainder cases were "based on an intent...
gathered from other parts of the instrument. ' 279 Nor did the facts that
the subject of the gift was slaves and that the donee was a daughter
overcome the presumption, at least when the instrument recited love and
affection for the daughter and her children, declared that the daughter
shall have the use, together with the children, and stated that the whole
equitable interest shall belong to the daughter and her children, in
280
common.
275. 58 N.C. at 235, 5 Jones Eq. at 220.
276. Compare the discussion in section I(E) supra. According to Underhill, the
life estate-remainder construction is easily found in case of gifts of personalty, especially
money. 2 H. UNDERmLL, supra note 11, § 583, at 776.
277. 85 N.C. 73 (1881).
278. Id. at 76. See also Wilson v. Wilson, 119 N.C. 588, 26 S.E. 155 (1896)
(deed to trustees for the benefit of the settlor's wife and children "and any others thereafter born" resulted in a cotenancy).
279. 85 N.C. at 76.
280. Gay v. Baker, 58 N.C. 359, 5 Jones Eq. 344 (1860).

1977]

RULE IN WILD'S CASE

807

The argument of a protective motive seems to have been turned
around to support the cotenancy construction, at least when the subject
of the gift was a family home. In Hampton v. Wheeler 28 ' the purpose
of a gift of a small tract (25 acres) was seen as perhaps providing a
place on which the daughter could live with her family, thereby giving
the children an interest as cotenants .2 2 Similarly, in Wilson v.
Wilson 28 3 a cotenancy was found to result from a deed of property (of
undisclosed nature) to a trustee "'for the. . . benefit of. . .Samantha
. . .(wife of one of the grantors) and her two children, Delia. . .and
Clara . . . and any others thereafter born' ,:281
.I]t appears to have been the purpose to provide for the comfort
of the children as well as the wife. The defendants' contention
would strip the children of their maintenance and education at the
period of life when such assistance was more needed than at any
other time. We cannot impute such a purpose in the mind of the
father in the absence of any language to justify it. He might be
improvident and reckless, but when moved by a generous impulse
to provide and secure something for his family it would be28a5 most
unusual act to disinherit the most helpless members of it.
This result is particularly startling in light of the gift to children "thereafter born," which certainly supports a life estate-remainder construction. The only conclusion one may safely draw is that the cases appear
to be inconsistent.
Other life estate-remainder cases are sui generis.2 88 Where the
premises of a deed run to A and the habendum to A and his children,
Wild's Case is not precisely involved, since North Carolina follows the
rule that the habendum may never introduce one who is a stranger to the
287
premises to take as grantee, but he (or they) may take by remainder.
281.

99 N.C. 222, 6 S.E. 236 (1888).

282. Id. at 224, 6 S.E. at 237.
283. 119 N.C. 588, 26 S.E. 155 (1896).
284. Id. at 589, 26 S.E. at 155 (emphasis added).
285. Id. at 590, 26 S.E. at 155.
286. Underhill suggests an interesting theory:
If the gift is to the parent, either expressly for life, or at common law without
words of limitation, and the gift to the children is to them and their heirs,
or in any terms which would convey the fee to the children, it is evident that
the testator could not have meant them to take as joint tenants. He must have
intended a life estate in the parent and a remainder in fee in the children as
purchasers. This would be the case where the gift was to the parent for the
benefit of herself, and after her death to go to her children.
2 H. UNDERHILL, supra note 11, § 582, at 773 (footnote omitted). This kind of case
does not appear to have arisen in North Carolina.
287. Blair v. Osborne, 84 N.C. 417 (1891).
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The life tenant-remainder construction may be reached to reconcile the
288
two clauses.
Finally, in Lewis v. Stancil,289 where the majority applied the
Second Resolution, two of five judges on the court dissented in favor of
a life estate-remainder based on a devise "to my grandson, Joseph
: .,. .

to him and his children, born in wedlock, forever."

The dissent-

ing judges based their reading on the language of the will and a perusal
of the entire instrument,290 but it is difficult to tell from the opinion just
what motivated them; indeed, the case for a fee tail seems stronger.2" '
The third possible construction is a substitutional one. For example, in Pollardv. Pollard292 property was to be divided upon the widow's
death among the testator's daughter, son and grandson, "and their
children, the children to take the share of the parent who may die before
my death." The court found the testator's intention to be that the
children take only if their parent died before the testator293 in order to
prevent a supposed lapse.29 4 This construction seems reasonable and
was also reached in Tate v. Amos"' on somewhat different language,
"to Grace.

.

. or to her children."

Pruden v. Paxton296 is interesting for an unusual, but unsuccessful,
argument. The testator devised the residue of his estate (after a life
estate in the family dwelling to the wife) "to my dear wife and beloved
children, to be divided among them according to law." It was argued
that the widow's share upon intestacy ("according to law") was only a
dower interest and that, having failed to claim even that interest, she
took nothing in the residue! The court rejected the argument, noting
first that the life estate in the family dwelling amounted to dower, and
reasoning that the "to be divided among them according to law" clause
288. Condor v. Secrest, 149 N.C. 201, 62 S.E. 921 (1908); Blair v. Osborne, 84
N.C. 417 (1881).
289. 154 N.C. 326, 328, 70 S.E. 621, 622 (1911) (dissent).
290. Id.
291. In Weeks v. McPhail, 128 N.C. 130, 38 S.E. 472 (1901), the trial court
reached an apparently erroneous life estate-remainder construction, described by the supreme court as one which "may be erroneous in law," but the decree was not appealed.
292. 83 N.C. 96 (1880).
293. Id. at 100. In general the more likely time for determining whether to substitute children is the death of the life tenant-widow, since distribution is not required
until that time. See 1 SIMES & SMiTH, supra note 7, § 535.
294. The court found that the existence of a lapse statute that would have substituted issue in the absence of an express substitutional gift did not overcome the substitutional construction. 83 N.C. at 100.
295. 197 N.C. 159, 147 S.E. 809 (1929).

296. 71 N.C. 446 (1878).
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of the estate, but of how the
was merely declaratory, not of the quantity
2 97

devisees were to hold, viz. in severalty.
In Coakley v. Daniel29 8 the testator divided his estate among his

three children, directing equal division between his sons, Henderson and
Thomas, and their heirs as gifts, and his daughter, Sarah "as a loan for

the benefit of her and her children." The court was not certain of the
testator's meaning but ultimately concluded that
he meant that [Sarah] should not take it to be disposed of absolutely at her pleasure, but that her interest in it was to be limited
to her for life, and then it was to be for the benefit of her children.
It will be noticed that the devise and bequest is not to her and
her children, which, as she had children at the time of her father's
death, would have given the property to her and them, as tenants
in common, according to the case of Moore299v. Leach, but it is to
her "for the benefit of her and her children."

J. Multiple Gifts
One situation in which the North Carolina result has received some
favor in other quarters is that of multiple gifts-gifts to two or more
persons and their children. In the leading case of Bridges v. Wilkins 00
various items of property 0 1 were given by will to the testator's sisters

and their children

02

with a proviso that the property should go to the

sisters directly and their children, and not to their husbands. One sister
was married at the time of the will and had one child born before the
297. Id. at 448.
298. 57 N.C. 96, 4 Jones Eq. 90 (1858), discussed in Pollard v. Pollard, 83 N.C.
96,99 (1880).
299. 57 N.C. at 98-99, 4 Jones Eq. at 92-93; cf. Chesnut v. Meares, 56 N.C.
395, 3 Jones Eq. 416 (1857) (deed to trustee for use of mother and children when
there are children living normally creates tenancy in common unless purpose of gift
is to provide for the mother; then the mother takes a life estate with a remainder to
the children as tenants in common). The court in Coakley also indicated that trusts
would be construed like wills. 57 N.C. at 99, 4 Jones Eq. at 93.
300. 56 N.C. 326, 3 Jones Eq. 342 (1857).
301. The property included slaves and cash, but the opinion is not altogether clear
on whether land was included. Id. at 326-27, 3 Jones Eq. at 342-43.
302. The language was somewhat more complex than this, using three different
phrases:
Item 1: to my sisters, that may be living at the time of my death, and their
lawful issues ....
Item 2: to my sisters and their children as above-mentioned, with the express
condition that no property, of which I am now possessed, or may hereafter fall heir to, shall go to any but my sisters directly and their
progeny, and not their husbands ....
Item 4: to my sisters, as before stated ....
The court read all phrases as being equivalent to "my sisters and their children." Id.
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testator's death30 3 and another born afterward. A second sister married
before the testator's death but had no children, and four sisters were
single at the testator's death. The court was asked to determine whether
the children took any interests and, if so, whether as cotenants with their
mothers or as remaindermen after the death of the mothers. It concluded that the sisters took life estates with remainders to their children:
We have no doubt that . . . the testator meant that all the
children which his sister might have should be benefitted by the
bequest. . . . [H]e certainly did not intend to exclude the children
which his unmarried sisters might have if they should think proper
at any future time to marry and bear children. To give full effect
to the will, therefore, it is necessary to adopt the construction that
the sisters shall take estates for life in the slaves and other property,
with remainders to their children. This . . . is supported by the
case of Ponton v. McLemore, 22 N.C., 285.
It is very certain that the testator intended his married sister
should take what he gave her for her sole and separate use. The
expression that none of his property should "go to any but my
sisters directly and their progeny, and not their husbands," can
admit of no other fair interpretation. . . . It must therefore be
declared to be the opinion of the Court that the testator's sisters
take each a life-estate in the property bequeathed to them, with
remainders to their children respectively, and that they take their
life-estates to their sole and separate use exclusive of their husbands
304

303. It is not clear whether this child existed at the making of the will. See id.
at 327-28, 3 Jones Eq. at 343-44.
304. Id. at 328, 3 Jones Eq. at 344-45. The court's reliance on Ponton v.
McLemore, 22 N.C. 236, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 285 (1839), appears well-placed. Although
Ponton apparently is not cited in any other Wild's Case decision, it does, in a way,
reject the Second Resolution. Property was left to a daughter as follows:
[A]nd the part which I design for my daughter, with the exception of five
hundred dollars aforesaid, to my friend Henry Doggett, as aforesaid, in trust
for the support and maintenance of my daughter Mary E. Avent.-The property
I hereby leave in trust, for the benefit of my daughter Mary E. Avent, is to
be applied at the discretion of the trustee, for the support and maintenance of
Mary E. Avent and her children, and no part or parcel thereof to be subject
to the debts of her husband.
22 N.C. at 237, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. at 286. One issue was:
whether the said Mary E. Avent and her children had any other interest in
the bequests to the trustee, Doggett, beyond support and maintenance during
their lives and the life of the longest liver of them; and whether, if they had
any interest beyond such support and maintenance, the said Mary E. Avent had
the absolute interest, or she and her children were tenants in common, or
whether she was tenant for life with the remainder to her children.
Id. The court chose the life estate-remainder:
But the other question is by no means so easily answered. Taking into
consideration, however, the pointed declaration of the testator, that "of the part
designed for his daughter" he desires that "no part or parcel be subject to the
debts of her husband;" that the bequest thereof is made to a trustee; that the
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The court thus seemed to be influenced by an assumed desire to benefit

after-born as well as existing children 0 5 and by the inference that
exclusion of the sisters' husbands limited the sisters to life estates. 306
The life estate-remainder construction is favored by the Restatement on the ground that "[i]t is more reasonable to infer that the
limitation was intended to create identical interests as to each named
parent."30 7 The Restatement chooses the life estate-remainder in ordinary First Resolution cases and the cotenancy in Second Resolution

ones. Casner states that most cases choose the life estate-remainder and
adds, somewhat sympathetically, "[t]his result is obviously motivated
by a desire to give the children born later an equal chance to share with
trusts are to be collected from intimations as to the object of his bounty in
different parts of his will; that in the first part, his daughter, Mary E. Avent,
is solely named as that object; and, in the latter part, his said daughter and her
children are all named as such objects, we are of opinion that the testators
purpose will be most effectually promoted by holding that the bequest was
made in trust for his daughter, Mary, to her sole and exclusive use -for life,
and after her death, then in trust for her children. This interpretation, we
think, is the more strongly called for, because, if we construe the immediate
beneficial bequest to be made to Mary E. Avent and her children, none of the
children could take under it, but those in being at the death of the testator.
This, we are satisfied, could not have been his intention.
Id. at 238, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. at 287.
305. Bridges was explained on this ground a year later in Coakley v. Daniel, 57
N.C. 96, 4 Jones Eq. 90 (1858); see section I(I) supra. Coakley dealt with a devise
"to be divided between Sarah B. Coakley, Henderson L. Daniel and Thomas P. Daniel,
share and share alike-to Henderson and Thomas and their heirs and assigns as giftsto Sarah B. Coakley as a loan, for the benefit of her and her children." Id. at 97,
4 Jones Eq. at 91. This was not a multiple gift case (unless "heirs" were read as
"children," a strained construction), but the court needed support for its holding that
while Henderson and Thomas took absolute interests, Sarah took only a life estate followed by a remainder in her children born or to be born. The court found support
for the life estate-remainder where necessary to effectuate intent to benefit all children,
as in Bridges:
It has been suggested that the cases of Moore v. Leach and Bridges v. Wilkins
were opposed to each other, because one of the sisters of the testator in the
latter case had a child living at his death, and yet we held that she took a lifeestate only in the property given, with a remainder to all her children as a
class. But there is this manifest difference between the two cases: that in the
former the devise is to one woman only and her children, she at the time being
a married woman and having children, while in the latter the bequest was to all
the testator's sisters and their children, most of whom were then unmarried and
without children. In the case of the unmarried sisters the intention of the
testator in favor of any children which they might have could only be carried
out by giving the sisters estates for life, with remainders to their children
respectively as a class, which would,.of course, embrace all they might have
during life. As the married sister was embraced in the same clause, and as
no distinction whatever was indicated in the will between her and the others,
the same construction was applied to her also. . . . [W]hen the intention of a
testator or settler [sic] of a trust requires it, the children will not take with
their mother, but in remainder after her.
Id. at 94, 4 Jones Eq. at 93 (citations omitted).
306. The inference raised by exclusion of husbands was emphasized in Pollard v.
Pollard, 83 N.C. 96 (1880).
307. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 283, Comment d (1940).
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the children already born, and the life interest and remainder construction makes this possible with the least inconvenience."308 On the other
hand, Simes and Smith argue that "[tihe reason given by the Bridges
court [that the gift is in the form of a single phrase] would appear
insufficient to. . .depart from the cotenancy construction in the case of
a person who had children. ' 09
Is the Bridges v. Wilkins view well-taken? Certainly it is surprising that a construction that is rejected in gifts to a single parent both
when he has and has not children is suddenly embraced as a magic
healer when the two Resolutions conflict. The question actually comprehends a number of discrete sub-questions. First, is the limitation to
be construed as making a separate gift to each parent and his children or
a single gift? If each gift is separate, it would seem that the same
language could mean different things as applied to different situations.310 If Blackacre were given to A and his children (A having no
children) and Whiteacre to B and his children (B having children) a
construction of a fee tail in A and a cotenancy in B and his children
would not be unreasonable. If in single parent situations the meaning
of "A and his children" may ebb and flow according to whether A has
children, it would seem a more modest act in multiple gift cases to
determine each named donee's interest according to whether he has or
has not children. After all, in the multiple gift situation the named
donees may have no close relationship to each other. This all assumes
that Wild's Case is correct in mandating two Resolutions rather than a
single, consistent one to govern all cases regardless of whether A has
children, the latter result being favored in some quarters.'' If different
meanings are allowed, the usual Wild's Case Resolutions should then be
invoked as aids to construction.
The question of how one determines whether there are separate
gifts to each parent and his children seems not to have been noticed by
the cases or writers. The most important factor would seem to be the
relationship of the parents and the children to the testator. If all the
parents were kin and equally related to the testator, there would seem to
be a good case for equal treatment. Much would depend on the family
situation."1 2
308. 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.27, at 311.
309. 2 SIMES & SMITH, supra note 7, § 702, at 175.
310. 5 ALP, supranote 7, § 22.27; 2 SIMES & SMITH, supra note 7, § 702.
311. E.g., the proposed Uniform Property Act, discussed in section III(C) infra.
312. See the discussion of Wills v. Foltz, 61 W. Va. 262, 56 S.E. 473 (1907),
in note 317 infra.
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Second, assuming that the multiple parent gifts are not separate
(whatever "separate" means), must the magic phrase be given a single
meaning or may it still wear its chameleon skin, changing according to
whether a particular parent has children? It is arguable that different
meanings are still possible, but this conclusion would depend on specific
factual settings.
Third, if a single meaning is to be chosen, what should that
meaning be? It is conceivable that the First Resolution could control
the Second (as, in effect, the Restatement advocates), that the Second
Resolution could control the First (as one might intuit), or that one of
several other constructions could control both Resolutions (as with the
life estate and remainder in Bridges v. Wilkins).
The resolution of these issues lies in the purpose or purposes one
ascribes to the creator and the law as to ancillary matters such as the
necessity for words of limitation and the presumption of joint tenancy or
tenancy in common. As to the creator's purposes, clearly he intends for
the named parents to take. Obviously, too, he intends for the children
to share for, as Wild's Case said, "the intent of the devisor is manifest
and certain that his children or issue should take. 31 3 Any choice to
resolve the conflict, therefore, ought to give due recognition to the
interests of the children as well as the parents.
The life estate-remainder is not a bad choice in modern times. In
a jurisdiction such as North Carolina the Wild's Case choice is between
a First Resolution fee tail converted by statute into a fee simple in the
parent and a Second Resolution tenancy in common. The fee tail-fee
simple result is bad since it cuts off the children entirely;"' the cotenancy is bad because it cuts off after-born children.3 15 The Bridges v.
Wilkins choice avoids both these difficulties and indeed may be premised on a subliminal intention to benefit all children. Thus read, it is a
strong indictment of the First Resolution in North Carolina law and
supports the case for repeal of it."1 6
313. 77 Eng. Rep. at 278.
314. See Knight v. O'Brien, 202 Ala. 440, 80 So. 824 (1919), holding that both
the parent without children and the parent with children received fees tail that were
converted into fees simple!
315. See Robinson v. Harris, 73 S.C. 469, 53 S.E. 755 (1906), allowing living children to share but excluding after-born children.
316. On the specific language of the instrument involved, Bridges v. Wilkins also
seems a good decision. The proviso excluding the sisters' husbands argues against fees
in the sisters. Further, the exclusion of husbands, when at the time of the will only
one sister was married, indicates that the testator anticipated changes in family situations
and desired equal treatment of all sisters. The court's assumption that all parents should
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Of course, the life estate-remainder is not the only alternative to the
Wild's Case Resolutions; the fee simple subject to open with executory

interests in the unborn children would seem a good choice, provided
that some solution could be found for the title problems created by the
executory interests.
The Bridges result rests on one additional assumption: While the
will is not construed as making separate kinds of gifts, but as making
similar kinds of gifts to each parent and his children, nevertheless each
group composed of a parent and his children takes a share distinct from
those given to other parents and children. In other words, while each
parent-children group takes a life estate-remainder, those life estates and
remainders are separate from the life estates and remainders of other
parents and children. It might be argued that the entire gift should be
held in equal shares by all parents for life with remainder to all children
equally. This does not seem a likely intention, since it would require
some children to await taking until the death of a parent not their
own.

81

7

II. DRAFTING
From the materials on Wild's Case, many conclusions may be
drawn. One conclusion that certainly never can be drawn, however, is
that it is advisable to make a gift in haec verba to "A and his children."
Even if A has children at the effective date of the instrument, the phrase
bristles with ambiguities and, further, the creator's presumed intention

of making cotenants of A and his children is subject to rebuttal. It is
far better to choose phraseology that anticipates the latent questions and
is not subject to rebuttal.
be treated equally makes sense when all parents were in equal degrees of kinship (sisters) to the testator.
317. A somewhat related situation has arisen in other jurisdictions. Simes and
Smith state the case as follows:
Sometimes property is devised to several named persons and their children. The
application of the doctrine of Wild's Case to this situation has given rise to
at least two questions: First, suppose all the named persons had children living
at the testator's death. Do these children and their parents all take per capita?
To take a concrete illustration: In Wills v. Foltz [61 W. Va. 262, 56 S.E.
473 (1907)], it appeared that testator gave the residue of his property to A,
B, and C and their children. At his death A had three children, B four children, and C five children. The question was whether the property should be
divided into three equal parts, one part to be held jointly by A and her children, or whether it should be held in equal shares by A, B, C, and all the children. The court decided in favor of the latter construction.
2 SIMEs & SMrrH, supra note 7, § 702, at 174. This situation is one of the few Wild's
Case variations that seems not to have been the subject of a square holding in North
Carolina. Dictum in the recent case of Coffield v. Peele, 246 N.C. 661, 100 S.E.2d
45 (1957), indicates the equal share construction.
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Casner suggests that normally a prospective transferor who verbally requests a draft for "A and his children" has in mind one of three
plans: (1) an absolute interest in A; (2) concurrent interests in A
and his children; or (3) successive interests in A and his children.3 18
While the drafting considerations may be more complex for wills than
for deeds, these three plans are a useful outline for discussion.
Under the first plan the creator intends to confine the children's
benefit to what they may receive from A by descent or devise, and he
mentions the children because he naturally expects them to take from
their parent, A.3 19 The draftsman may therefore suggest a gift of a fee
simple to A, pointing out that A will be free to disinherit the children by
lifetime transfer or by will.3 20 If the transferor then reveals that his
desire is to create a primitively conceived fee tail, he will have to be
advised that his wishes cannot be accomplished in North Carolina. 32 '
A limited kind of entailment might be accomplished by expressly
creating a series of life estates in A and then his children, but the series
normally could not be continued into2 unborn grandchildren without
32
violating the Rule Against Perpetuties.
An alternative method of giving A in substance a fee while creating
an express interest in the children would be to give A a life estate
coupled with a general power of appointment by deed or will or both,
followed by a gift in default to A's children. 23 Casner seems to favor
this approach 32 4 but the instrument would need to be carefully drawn to
answer some of the questions about children raised by the successive
interest plan discussed below. Additional questions would be raised if
the life estate were legal instead of equitable.3 25 Also, the client should
be advised of the estate administration, tax and other consequences in
A's estate of giving him an absolute interest instead of some generation318. 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.28.
319. Id.
320. The pretermitted heir statute protects from disherison only after-born children
who are inadvertently omitted. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.5 (1976).
321. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-1 (1976) abolishes fees tail and converts them into
fees simple.
322. Assuming that A could have other children and that vesting of the life estates
was postponed until the death of A's children. If A's after-born children were excluded,
or if the gift to grandchildren were confined to those in existence when the interests
were created, the gift would not violate the Rule.
323. Traditionally, a gift in default is regarded as vested subject to divestiture by
exercise of the power. E.g., RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 276 (1940).
324. 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.28.
325. WAcHOVIA BANK & TRUST, Co., NORTH CAROLINA WILL MANUAL SERVICE

XVI-12 n.1 (N. Wiggins ed. 1958).
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skipping plan such as a life estate-remainder, coupled perhaps with a
special power of appointment.

2

The new rules of the Tax Reform Act

of 1976 should be considered before choosing any apparent generationskipping plan. 327 Finally, if the creating instrument is a will rather than
a deed, provision will need to be made for the case of A's death before
the testator.

The concurrent interest plan requires the draftsman to consider
several questions.3 28 First, what constitutes the class of concurrent
owners? The class may consist only of A's children or it may consist of
A and A's children. It is difficult to assay the likely desires of "most"
people; perhaps most donors would prefer a single class, so that in case
of lapse A's share would go to his children. Second, what is the form of
concurrent ownership? While North Carolina appears to have abolished most estates in joint tenancy,8 29 the statute has been held not to

prohibit the creation of rights of survivorship by contract. 30 Most
people probably intend a tenancy in common. 33 Third, what are the
respective shares of the cotenants? If the class members (whoever they
may be) are joint tenants, each must own an equal undivided share. But
if they are tenants in common, they may be given unequal shares."'
326. See text accompanying note 335 infra.
327. The new law imposes a tax on generation-skipping transfers under a trust or
similar arrangement upon the distribution of the trust assets to a generation-skipping
heir or upon termination of an intervening interest in the trust. Tax Reform Act of
1976, § 2006, Pub. L. No. 94-455, tit. I, § 101, 90 Stat. 1525 (adding I.R.C. H9 260114). There is, however, a $250,000 exemption; transfers to a grandchild of the grantor
of a trust are not treated as taxable transfers except to the extent that the total amount
of the transfers exceeds $250,000 for each deemed transferor (i.e., the child of the
grantor who is the parent of the grandchild receiving the transfer). I.R.C. § 2613(b)
(6). The new generation-skipping rules apply to a generation-skipping "trust or trust
equivalent." A "trust equivalent" apparently includes legal interests under § 2611
(d) (2) ("arrangements to be taken into account. . . include.
ing life estates and remainders . . . .").
Id. § 2611(d)(2).

arrangements involvSee generally Stevens,

. .

Estate Tax Benefits of Generation-SkippingTransfers Sharply Curtailed by New Rules,
4 EsT. PLAN. 78 (1977); Sweeney & Wright, New Tax on Generation-Skipping Transfers: A New Concept; Planning Implications,46 J. TAx. 66 (1977).
328. For a brief discussion of class gifts, see Bolich, supra note 10, at 23-30 (1956).
329. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-2 (1976).
330. Wilson County v. Wooten, 251 N.C. 667, 111 S.E.2d 875 (1960); see section
I(G) supra.
331. E.g., J. CRMBET, supra note 197, at 99.
332. Id. at 103. The possibilities up to this point begin to boggle the mind. Assume that A has two children, B and C. Some possibilities are:
(1) A, B and C own equal shares as joint tenants;
(2) A, B and C own equal shares as tenants in common;
(3) A owns one-half and B and C one-fourth each as tenants in common;
(4) A owns one-half as a tenant in common with B and C, who own their half
as joint tenants between themselves.
Most testators probably are not so devious; a tenancy in common between A and the
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The creator's intention on this point would seem to depend on the

particular family situation, including as factors the number of children,
the ages of A and the children, and the financial positions of A and the

children.
Fourth, what is the effect of the death of A or any of his children
before distribution? For wills this may involve questions of void gifts

(when a beneficiary is dead at the making of the will), of lapsed gifts
(when a beneficiary dies after the making of the will but before the
testator), or of survivorship (when a beneficiary dies after the testator

but before the time of distribution, for example, before a life tenant)."'
Awarding a share to the dead beneficiary may increase death taxes and

administration expenses in his estate, but may be desired for other
reasons, for example, equality among family branches. A better solution would be to provide a gift over to the decendants of the deceased

child; this would preserve equality among the stirpes but avoid subjection of the share of a deceased child to creditors' claims, death taxes or

administration in the decedent's estate.
Fifth, within what time period must a child be born in order to

share in the gift? This is the question of maximum class membership,
which may or may not be treated differently from the question of
minimum membership or survivorship. Casner points out that if the
dispositive instrument is a deed, and afterborn children are to be included, it may be wise to interpose a trustee to hold legal title until all
children are born in order to avoid the doctrine that immediate gifts to

unborn grantees are invalid.3"'
Sixth, who is included within the term children-adopted children,
illegitimates, grandchildren? Individual desires would seem to vary.
children in equal shares probably would be desired, but in view of A's being a parent
of the other class members, one might expect A to hold his interest as a joint tenant
with the children holding in common as between themselves.
333. The draftsman should not overlook the possible problem of accrued shares.
Bolich gives the following example:
The problem of end limitations and accrued shares is tricky. T leaves
"the residue of my estate in trust to my wife for life, corpus at her death to
my three children, A, B, and C in equal shares. Should any of them die before
my wife unsurvived by issue, his portion shall pass to the survivors of the said
three children in fee." If A so dies without issue his one-third goes to B and
C. If B then so dies his original one-third goes to C, but his accured share
does not and belongs to B's estate. Since this is a rule of construction if you
add to the above limitation that "upon the death of any one of the above
named persons who dies unsurvived by issue then both his original and accrued shares shall go over to the others of the original takers under this gift"
you can avoid the above result as to accrual shares.
Bolich, supra note 10, at 29 (footnote omitted).
334. 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.28; see sections I(A) and I(E) supra.
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Finally, if the creating instrument is a will, provision must be made
for the case where A has no children at the operative time.
The successive interest plan, a life estate in A with remainder to the
children, has several questions in common with the concurrent interest
plan. (1) Do the children take the remainder as a class gift, and, if so,
what is the form of concurrent ownership? Presumably they take equal
shares. (2) What is the effect of the death of A or of a child before the
date of distribution? (3) Within what time must a child be born in
order to share? Obviously all children of A are born (or en ventre) by
A's death, but are children born after the testator's earlier death entitled
to take? (4) Who is included within the term "children"? Note also that
the draftsman should consider the effect of termination of A's life estate
by means other than his death. As Phillips 33 5 perceives it, the basic
alternatives are (1) to fix the class as being A's issue per stirpes living at
the date of death of the testator or (2) to fix the class as being A's issue
per stirpes living at the date of death of A. The first plan creates
immediately vested interests with attendant alienability, devisability and
descendibility, but at a cost of subjecting the interests to creditors'
claims, death taxes and administration expenses in the event of death of
a class member before A. It also disregards the presumed basis for
the testator's beneficence-common kinship-by excluding later-born
children. The second plan seems preferable.
The successive interest plan would, of course, require the draftsman to provide for other contingencies such as the death of A before the
testator (in the case of a will) or failure of any children to be born to A
(in the case of a will or deed). Further, if A is given a life estate, care
must be taken to avoid the common problems associated with life
estates. Ordinarily legal life estates are not recommended because of
the sharp conflict of interest between life tenant and remainderman.
There may also be doubt as to the responsibility for taxes, maintenance
and insurance. 336 These problems are exaggerated when the property is
personalty and therefore subject to more damage by use. 337 The usual
solution, at least where values justify the formality, is to make the life
335. See Phillips, supra note 10, at 44-47, who points out that if the life estate is
prematurely terminated, as by renunciation, the draftsman needs to consider: (1) possible risk of applicability of the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders (if
the remainder is a legal one in realty); (2) assuming no destructibility, whether the remainder is to be accelerated; and (3) if acceleration occurs whether the class simultaneously closes or whether it remains open until A's actual death.
336. WACHOVIA BANK & TRUST, Co., supra note 325, XVI-12 n.1.
337. Bolich, supra note 10, at 26.
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estate equitable. 38 In all the plans, if the gift to A and the children
follows a life estate in a stranger, the draftsman must consider the additional possibilities introduced by the presence of the intervening life
39
estate.
III.

A.

STATUS AND REFORM OF THE RULE IN WILD'S CASE

Status of Current Rule

Wild's Case occupies but two and one-half pages in the English
Reports. The two so-called Resolutions in the case are dicta, inessential to the actual decision. Nevertheless, the impact of this small piece
of English material has been large, confounding the Supreme Court of
North Carolina in almost fifty decisions. In his class gifts article, Long
bravely asserted that the phrase "'to A and his children'" was "so
notoriously ambiguous that the trained draftsman avoids it. '3 40 Perhaps
the trained draftsman does avoid it, but there must be a number of
untrained draftsmen in the woods, for the cases continue to march into
the courts. As Casner remarks, it is a "reasonable guess, but a sad
commentary" that lawyers have drafted some of the troublesome instruments.3 4 '
Wild's case litigation is unfortunate because the problems are avoidable by careful analysis and drafting, 4 2 and because the Rule as interpreted in North Carolina often frustrates the creator's likely intention.
According to the First Resolution, a devise to "A and his children" when
A has no children results in a fee tail in A. This construction was due
in part to the early common law preference for the fee tail, and in part to
the testator's desire to benefit the children. In North Carolina, however, where the frontiersmen rejected the entailed estate with its connotations of a landed aristocracy, the fee tail is abolished and the children
take nothing because A's fee tail ripens into a fee simple in him. We
thus suffer the marvelous paradox that a rule designed to benefit the
children in fact harms them. It is said that the First Resolution generally has been repudiated in other jurisdictions. 43
According to the Second Resolution, if A has children the devise
results in a joint tenancy for life among A and his children. A number
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

WACHOviA BA 'K & TRUsT, Co., supranote 325, at XVI-12 n.1.
See section I(D) supra.
Long, supra note 9, at 301-02.
Casner, supra note 11, at 469.
See section II supra.

343.

C. MoYNI

AN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY

See also B. SPARKS, CASES ON TRUSTS AND ESTATES 857-58 n.2 (1965).

47 (1962).
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of writers contend that the testator's more likely intention is a life estate
in A with remainder to the children. 8 "4 The North Carolina courts
could have avoided the Second Resolution and reached the life estateremainder result by holding that state law preferences in favor of
tenancies in common and estates in fee rendered Wild's Case inapt.
They did not do so. The Second Resolution is more widely followed in
45
other states than the First.8
Both Resolutions are rules of construction that yield to a contrary
intent.340 North Carolina decisions state this proposition, and some
early cases found sufficient evidence to rebut the presumptions. Recent
cases, however, display a rigid attitude toward the Resolutions, adhering
to them in the face of clear evidence in rebuttal. It is difficult to explain
this rigidity, especially when in other states slight evidence of a contrary
3 47
intent is sufficient.
Not all the local decisions are obstinately wrong. For immediate
gifts, the cases determine the existence of children at the time of the
testator's death (not the time of execution of the will), a result that
tends to cut down the operation of the First Resolution and to benefit as
many children as possible. Children en ventre are even regarded as
lives in being. This praiseworthiness is short-lived, however, for one
next encounters the rule that when the gift to A and his children is
postponed by an intervening life estate, the time of determining children
is still the death of the testator, not of the life tenant. Literally, Wild's
Case did refer to "the time of the devise" as the time for determining
whether A had children, but this reference should not control the
intervening life estate situation, since the court was talking about a
direct gift to A and the children, not a postponed one. Indeed, Wild's
Case could have been held to be irrelevant to the postponed gift situation. It may be noted, nevertheless, that other states follow the same
view as North Carolina in applying Wild's Case to postponed gifts and
determining children at the testator's death. 48
As to which children share, there is little North Carolina authority.
The few cases tend to resolve questions of minimum class membership
(survivorship) in favor of the child who predeceases the life tenant,
thereby displaying a preference for early vesting. Questions of maxi344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

E.g., Bolich, supra note 10, at 26.
J. DuamINm &S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS XI-55 (1969).
E.g., B. SPARKS, supra note 343, at 857-58 n.2.
5 ALP, supranote 7, § 22.17, at 289,
Id. §§ 22.21, .26.
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mum membership (class closing) tend to be decided against the child
born after the testator's death, a result that cuts against the assumed
desire to benefit as many children as possible.
Although Wild's Case spoke of "devises," both Resolutions have
been applied to deeds in North Carolina. This extension causes no
great harm where A has children but does work mischief where A has
no children and therefore takes a fee simple to the detriment of possible
after-born children. Other states have extended the Second Resolution
to deeds, but such extension of the First Resolution is unusual else4
where. '
This state seems also to extend both Resolutions to personalty,
despite the reference in Wild's Case to "devises." Again application of
the Second Resolution is not absurd, but application of the First Resolution might well have been avoided on the theory that a rule creating a
fee tail was irrelevant to personalty, in which fees tail do not exist. Some
states have so held, although others have given A an absolute interest
(the result in North Carolina)."'
Penultimately, the decisions as to the exact nature of any cotenancy
seem to overlook some fine points of analysis, although in result they are
not bad.
Finally, in the case of gifts to a number of parents and their
children, North Carolina chooses the life estate-remainder construction
for all the gifts, as do most other states which have faced the issue. 351
This result is acceptable, although it seems to be a silent indictment of
both the First and Second Resolutions.
In sum, as applied in North Carolina, the First Resolution is
abominable, the Second Resolution is better but still does not carry out
likely intention, and both have been somewhat unduly extended. The
Rule has been invoked too automatically, diverting attention from: (1)
whether the gift is a class gift or one to individuals; (2) if a class gift,
who are the members of the class; and (3) what are the shares of class
members. Despite a rigid judicial attitude, the issues continue to be
litigated. People seem to persist in making these strange dispositions
"to A and his children." Something ought to be done to resolve these
cases before they come to court and in a manner that best approximates
likely intention.
349. Id. § 22.21.
350. Id.
351. Id. § 22.27.
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Reform

1. Judicial or Legislative
One might contend that the body that first created the Rule in
Wild's Case, the judiciary, ought to be responsible for reforming it. In
view of the blind acceptance of Wild's Case, despite distinguishing
features, and in view of continued adherence to Wild's Case by the

North Carolina courts, as a practical matter reform is unlikely to come
from the judiciary. Courts often declare that, in view of the supposed
reliance upon property law in the disposition of land and other valua-

bles, judicial reform should proceed slowly in the property field.83 2
Notwithstanding these obstacles, courts in some other states have, in
effect, overruled Wild's Case,353 so it may be useful to consider whether
a North Carolina court could, if so disposed, set a new course for
dispositions to "A and his children."
One obstacle to judicial reformation may be the North Carolina
reception statute, General Statutes section 4-1,'54 which adopts the

common law of England 55 as of the date of the signing of the Declaration of Independence.- 56 Numerous cases have stated that "[s]o
much of the common law as has not been repealed or abrogated by
statute is in full force and effect in this jurisdiction. '3 57 Section 4-1 has

been applied in the property field to find that North Carolina follows the

rule that there can be no limitation over in personal property after
reservation of a life estate 58 and that future interests in personal property can be created by will but not by deed. 59 Curiously, section 4-1
does not seem to have been widely noted; for example, the landmark
352. J. CRIBBET, W. FRITZ & C. JOHNSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 63
(3d ed. 1972).
353. See cases cited in 5 ALP, supra note 7, § 22.23; 2 SIMES & SMiTH, Supra
note 7, §§ 696, 698; and Annot., 161 A.L.R. 612, 629 (1946).
354. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1969) provides:
All such parts of the common law as were heretofore in force and use within this State, or so much of the common law as is not destructive of, or repugnant to, or inconsistent with the freedom and independence of this State and
the form of government therein established, and which has not been otherwise
provided for in whole or in part, not abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete
are hereby declared to be in full force within this State.
355. State v. Lackey, 271 N.C. 171, 173, 135 S.E.2d 465, 467 (1967).
356. Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 592, 184 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1971).
357. E.g., Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N.C. 332, 334, 38 S.E.2d 105,
107 (1946).
358. Speight v. Speight, 208 N.C. 132, 179 S.E. 461 (1935) (altered by N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 39-6.2 (1976)).
359. Woodard v. Clark, 236 N.C. 190, 72 S.E.2d 433 (1952) (altered by N.C. GEN,
STAT. § 39-6.2 (1976).
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Rule in Shelley's Case decision, Starnes v. Hill,3 60 did not cite the
statute. As a practical matter, it may be that the statute is not taken
very seriously. The North Carolina version of the Rule in Wild's Case
has never been based on the reception statute; no decision even refers to
section 4-1. Indeed, four early cases involving language that raised as
an issue the Rule in Wild's Case did not even notice the Rule; 36 ' Justice
Battle did not discover it until 1850. If the Rule were part of our
received law, those four early cases would seem to have been bound by
it.
Even if section 4-1 does apply, it would not seem to bar judicial
change of Wild's Case. It has been argued that the power of a court to
overrule its decisions is also a fundamental part of the common law
enacted by section 4-1.362 This theory is somewhat difficult if one
assumes that section 4-1 impliedly enacts the Rule in Wild's Case,
because the court would then be overruling not a judicial decision but a
statute. The statute does appear to give another ground for refusing to
give effect to the common law-if that part of the common law has
"become obsolete." No case has been found in which a common law
rule has been refused effect due to its becoming obsolete, but to do so
would be consistent with the court's understanding of the common
law.3 63 Although the statute's reference to obsolescence appears to
relate to laws that were obsolete as of enactment, it would not be
surprising if the possibility of obsolescence were regarded as a continuing one, 364 especially since the statute has been reenacted from time to
time. The North Carolina courts could very well rule that the statute
that converted the estate tail into a fee simple (section 41-1 in 1784)
made obsolete the First Resolution in Wild's Case. The rule was
adopted to effectuate the intent of the testator, and the application of the
statute defeats that intention.365 Of course, a court would have some
360. 112 N.C. 1, 16 S.E. 1011 (1893).
361. Doe ex rel. Stowe v. Davis, 32 N.C. 310, 10 Ired. 431 (1849); Johnson v.
Johnson, 38 N.C. 334, 3 Ired. Eq. 426 (1844); Skinner v. Lamb, 25 N.C. 111, 3 Ired.
155 (1842); Ponton v. McLemore, 22 N.C. 236, 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 285 (1839).
362. See Note, Municipal Corporations-MunicipalImmunity From Tort Liability:
JudicialAbrogation, 5 WAKx FoREsT INTRA. L. RFv.383, 387 (1969).
363. Cf. Starnes v. Hill, 112 N.C. 1, 14, 16 S.E. 1011, 1015 (1893) (whether Rule
in Shelley's Case was abrogated by statute depends on whether it is in accord with
contemporary policies).
364. In Wilson v. Leary, 120 N.C. 90, 94, 26 S.E. 630, 632 (1897), Justice Clark
said, "That which is termed 'the common law' is simply the 'right reason of the things'
in matters as to which there is no statutory enactment. When it is misconceived and
wrongly declared, the common rule is equally subject to be overruled, whether it is
an ancient or a recent decision."
365. See Carr v. Estill, 53 Ky. 245, 16 B. Mon. 309 (1855).
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difficulty in explaining why this obsolescence was not discovered for
nearly two centuries. It would be harder to find obsolescence for the
Second Resolution, although it could be argued to result from the
changes in presumption from joint tenancy to tenancy in common
(section 41-2 in 1784) and from life estates to fees (section 31-38 for
wills in 1784 and section 39-1 for deeds in 1879). Alternatively, a
court might simply find that modem testators prefer the life estateremainder to the cotenancy, perhaps because it avoids federal estate
taxes and probate in A's estate, matters that are much avoided by
twentieth century clients.
Aside from any legislative strictures against judicial change, is
there any reason why North Carolina courts could not change the Rule
in Wild's Case? The courts of North Carolina seem disposed to leave
the hard work of property law reform to the legislature. Witness Riegel
v. Lyerly, 60 an absurd 1965 decision applying the Rule in Shelley's
Case to personal property 0 7 and disingenuously remarking, "Unwilling
as we are to change the law of property by judicial fiat . . . [i]f public

policy requires a change, we think it should be made by the Legislature. '3 6 8 Why? A fiat is an order issued without legal authority. Does
a court lack the legal authority to change court-made rules? The lack of
legislative response to property decisions scarcely can be regarded as
legislative enactment of the cases; the legislature may lack the time or
background or interest continuously to scrutinize the North Carolina
Reports for technical points of property law. Furthermore, the response
of the legislature to archaic property rules has been spotty; Worthier
Title may have been abolished 0 9 but Shelley's Case has not. A court's
deference to legislative action may, in effect, close the door on reform.
Reform of the Rule would not seem to be a question on which accom366. 265 N.C. 204, 143 S.E.2d 65 (1965).
367. The court's suggestion that prior cases applied Shelley's Case to personalty is
questionable; the nearest prior cases involved slaves. See section I(E) Supra.
368. 265 N.C. at 209, 143 S.E.2d at 68.
369. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-1-2 (1976) provides, "The common-law doctrine of
worthier title, both the wills branch and the deeds branch, is hereby abolished." Section
41-6 earlier reduced the operation of the doctrine by creating a presumption that a
gift to "heirs" of a living person means "children." Whether § 28A-1-2 is effective
to abolish the doctrine in its modem form as a rule of construction, as opposed to
its original form as a rule of property, is to be hoped but is uncertain: does the phrase
"common-law" in the statute refer to the common law of England or to current case
law? In other words, the doctrine has appeared in two forms: an English common
law rule of property imposed regardless of intention and a modern (albeit misguided)
American rule of construction theoretically telling us the creator's intention. Does the
statute abolish the doctrine in both its forms? Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-1-2
(1976) with Law of April 17, 1959, ch. 122, § 1, [1959] Cal. Stats. 2005-06 (codified
at CAL. Civ. CODE § 1073 & CAL. PROB. CODE § 109 (West Cum. Supp. 1977)).
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modation of competing interest groups suggests a political solution.
Nor is it an area in which the presumably better information-gathering
skills of the legislature would be needed. Publicity and notice of a new
case would seem to be as wide as for a small statute. A legislative
solution could, however, be more comprehensive than a judicial one.
2.

Precedent and Retroactivity

The principal objections to judicial reform would seem to be stare
decisis and retroactivity. 3 70 The case against blind adherence to precedent has never been put better than by Chief Justice Vanderbilt in his
3 71
celebrated dissent in Fox v. Snow:
To hold, as the majority opinion implies, that the only way to
overcome the unfortunate rule of law that plagues us here [that
there can be no remainder over in personal property following a
life estate] is by legislation, is to put the common law in a selfimposed straight jacket. Such a theory, if followed consistently,
would inevitably lead to the ultimate codification of all of our law
for sheer lack of capacity in the courts to adapt the law to the needs
of the living present. The doctrine of stare decisis neither renders
the courts impotent to correct their past errors nor requires them
to adhere blindly to rules that have lost their reason for being. The
common law would be sapped of its life blood if stare decisis were
to become a god instead of a guide ...
Particularly in the realm of testamentary construction should
the courts feel free to depart from precedent when the dictates of
justice and reason demand it. Even Chancellor Kent was of this
opinion: "Though we are not to disregard the authority of decisions, even as to the interpretation of wills, yet it is certain that the
construction of them is so much governed by the language, arrangement, and circumstances of each particular instrument, which is
usually very unskillfully and very incoherently drawn, that adjudged
cases become of less authority, and are of more hazardous application, than decisions upon any other branch of the law." 4 Commentaries on American Law *535 .... 372
Even accepting Justice Vanderbilt's propositions, it may be objected that in the property field reversal of settled rules impairs vested rights
or defeats justifiable expectations of those who have relied on settled
rules in planning their affairs. It is unlikely, however, that the construction given a devise to "A and his children" by the Rule in Wild's Case
370. On these subjects, see the marvelous little book by the late Professor W. Barton
Leach, PROPERTY LAw INDICtED! (1967).
371. 6 N.J. 12, 76 A.2d 877 (1950). But see Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B.G. Corp.,
130 F.2d 290, 294-99 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., concurring).
372. 6 N.J. at 23-24, 27-28, 76 A.2d at 882-85 (dissent).
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has ever been relied upon by a testator because only an attorney would
even be aware of such a construction, and only a grossly incompetent
attorney would use the words "to A and his children" to effectuate the
desired disposition of a testator. The problem of vested rights is more
difficult. Vanderbilt dismissed it as follows:
There are three possible factual situations to be considered in
weighing the retroactive effect of overturning this rule. First,
where a will has already been the subject of legal proceedings,
property rights determined by a judgment entered therein are beyond the reach of any change in the law. Such a judgment is res
judicata. Second, where a will has been executed, but the testator
is still living, or if dead, the clause similar to the one in question
has not yet been construed by the courts, the "evil" caused by the
overthrow of the rule will be to carry out the testator's intent. No
existing will need be changed by a decision doing away with the
old rule, since its overturning merely permits the expressed intent
of the testator to be given effect. Third, where persons have not
now, but may in the future execute wills, no harm can result from
overthrowing the rule, for they have neither to forget an old rule
nor to learn a new one in order to insure the carrying out of their
testamentary plan. In the absence of the rule their intentions,
as
37 3
naturally though perhaps inexpertly expressed, will govern.
The rule involved in Fox v. Snow dealt with personalty. Many of the
37 4
Wild's Case decisions in North Carolina involve the title to realty.
Certainly the Rule must have been considered by lawyers and title
insurers in connection with many unlitigated titles. Retroactive changes
of the Rule would be unfair to purchasers who have relied on such title
opinions.175 The solution to this problem is simply to make the new
rule prospective. Leach surveyed the relevant authorities, among them
a number of recent United States Supreme Court cases, and concluded: "[lit is now clear that any court can change bad law into
373. Id. at 27, 76 A.2d at 884-85.
374. One wonders how many of the suits were friendly ones brought to resolve
a title question.
375. Cf. Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. at 21-22, 76 A.2d at 882 (Vanderbilt, C.J., dissenting):
Despite the deleterious effects of the rule and the lack of any sound principle
to support it, the majority maintains that it should not be overthrown, because
it has been the long established law of this state and because overruling it
"would be fraught with great danger in this type of case where titles to property, held by bequests and devises, are involved" by reason of the retroactive
effect of all judicial decisions. This view, if it had been consistently applied
in the past, would have prevented any change whatever in property law by judicial decisions. There would have been, e.g., no rule against perpetuities, no
restraints on the alienation of property, no right to redeem mortgaged premises,
no foreclosure of the equity of redemption, and so on endlessly. Every change
in the law by judicial decision necessarily creates rights in one party to the litigation and imposes corresponding duties on the other party. This is the process
by which the law grows and adjusts itself to the changing needs of the times.
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good without looking over its shoulder at the possible repercussions on
prior transactions, by the device of prospective-only overruling. That
block is gone, and good riddance. ' 376 It would seem that this technique
could be expanded to apply not only to future cases but also to past
situations in which there was no reliance.
There is a kind of precedent for prospective overruling in some
current North Carolina statutes. The new Administration of Decedents'
Estates Act3 77 applies to estates of decedents dying after the effective
date of the Act 378 apparently without regard to whether the decedent's
379
will was executed before that date. The life insurance trust statute
applies to all trusts created before or after the effective date of the law,
except those in pending litigation.38 0 The courts might apply these
principles by analogy.
C. Suggested Statute
While judicial reform of Wild's Case is desirable, change likely will
have to come from the legislature. Several statutory models are available. As is frequently the case in property law, the country that created
the Rule, England, has in effect altered it, although the end product is
not easily defined. The Law of Property Act of 1925381 laid down that
informal expressions in a will should no longer suffice to create an
entailed estate but that such expressions should create absolute, fee
simple or other interests corresponding to those which, if the property
had been personalty, would have been created by similar expressions
before the Act. 82 Thus a First Resolution fee tail is no longer possible
by treating "and his children" as informal words of limitation corresponding to "and the heirs of his body." Just what results after the Act
is a subject of some dispute in England,3" 3 with some support for a fee
simple in A and other support for a life estate in A with remainder to his
376. W. LEACH, supra note 370, at 24.

377. N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§§ 28A-1-1 to -26-9 (1976).

378. Law of February 27, 1975, ch. 19, § 12, [1975] N.C. Sess. Laws 13 (amending
Law of April 12, 1974, ch. 1329, § 5, [1973] N.C. Sess. Laws 674).
379. N.C. Gm. STAT. §§ 36-53 to -54 (1976).
380. Cf. In re Mitchell, 285 N.C. 77, 79-80, 203 S.E.2d 48, 50 (1974) ("A statute
will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless that intent is clearly expressed
or arises by necessary implication from its terms.") (dealing with N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 31-5.3 (1976)).
381. 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c.20.
382. Id. § 130.

383. See Bailey, 'To A and His Issue': The Law of Property Act, 1925, Section
130 (2), 9 CAMR. L.J. 185 (1946); Bailey, The Law of Property Act, 1925, S. 130 (2),

6 CAmB. L.J. 67 (1936); Megarry, 'To A and His Issue': The Law of Property Act,
1925, Section 130 (2), 9 CAmB. L.J. 46 (1945).
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children. 38 4 The Second Resolution has not been changed.'"' The
English approach does not seem to carry out the testator's likely intention.
In the United States the Uniform Law of Property Act, a product
of the American Law Institute in cooperation with the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, abolishes Wild's Case in favor of a life estate in
A and remainder in his descendants:
§ 13. EFFECT OF CONVEYANCE TO ONE AND HIS CHILDREN
DOCTRINE KNOWN AS RULE IN WILD'S CASE ABOLISHED.

-THE

When an otherwise effective conveyance of property is made in
favor of a person -and his "children," or in favor of a person
and his "issue," or by other words of similar import designating
the person and the descendants of the person, whether the conveyance is immediate or postponed, the conveyance creates a life interest in the person designated and a remainder in his designated
an intent to create other interests is effectively
descendants,8 unless
6
manifested.3

Kansas has passed a statute explicitly abrogating the Rule:
In the case of instruments disposing of property of which the
following is a type: "A to B and his children," the doctrine of the
common law known as the rule in Wild's Case shall not hereafter
apply, and the instrument shall create a life interest in B and a
remainder in his children. The rule here prescribed applies when
is "children," or "issue," or words of similar imthe expression
7
38

port.

This section has been applied to wills executed before the date of the act
384. 3 T. JARMAN, A TREATISE ON WILLS 1745-46 (8th ed. R. Jennings 1951);
R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, THE LAw OF REAL PRoPERTY 506-07 (4th ed. 1975).
385. R. MEGARRY &H. WADE, supra note 384, at 502.
386. UNIFORM PROPERTY AcT § 13 (Casner, Reporter); Note, The Uniform Property Act, 52 HARv. L. Rav. 993, 999-1000 (1939). The proposed Act differs somewhat
from § 283 of the Restatement, which theoretically stated what the law was in 1940,
not what it should be:
§ 283. LIMITATION "TO B AND HIS CHILDREN" OR BY OTHER
WORDS OF SIMILAR IMPORT.
When a conveyance limits property in favor of "B and his children" or
by other words of similar import, then, unless a contrary intent of the conveyor is found from additional language or circumstances,
(a) if B has a child or children at the time when this conveyance becomes
effective, the named parent is a member of one class composed of
himself and his children; and
(b) if B has no child at the time when this conveyance becomes effective,
the named parent is not a member of any class, but the conveyance is
construed to limit a life interest in favor of such named parent and
a class gift in favor of the children of such parent.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 283 (1940).

387. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-505 (1976). One may speculate as to why only one
state has enacted a statute on Wild's Case. The reason probably is that in some states
the Rule has been abolished by judicial decisions, in others the Rule never was accepted,
and in still others the phrase "to A and his children" has not been used persistently.
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by testators dying after the act,3 88 but has not been applied to deeds delivered before the act.389

Such an application seems compelled by the

language in the statute that it shall "hereafter apply." 390 Kentucky and
Pennsylvania have reached the same result as under the Kansas statute
by judicial decision, despite the fact that the common law of England is

in effect in both states. 391

The Kentucky court in Carr v. Estill 92 held

that the Kentucky statute converting estates tail to fees simple had

abrogated the First Resolution in Wild's Case, so that a devise "to A and
his children" resulted in a life estate in A with remainder to A's chil3 03
dren.

What statutory approach is best for North Carolina? The principal desiderata are to effectuate the likely intent of the creator and to

reduce litigation. While the matter is not clear, most people seem to
believe that the phrase "to A and his children" connotes successive

ownership by the parent and children.

The Uniform Acts94 and the

Kansas statute choose successive ownership. Note, too, that they draw
no distinction between the existence and non-existence of children.

From the standpoint of reducing litigation, the Kansas statute seems to
mandate the life estate-remainder (reducing litigation at the cost of

possible intention), while the Uniform Act follows contrary intent where
it is "effectively manifested" (leaving the door open to litigation).

Under the Kansas plan, if A died without having had children a partial
intestacy would result, while the Uniform Act would leave open the

possibility of a contrary intention. Neither statute covers a number of
troublesome questions: the effect of death of a child before A; the
388. Reetz v. Sims, 177 Kan. 143, 276 P.2d 368 (1954). It is not clear whether
the class remains open until the death of the life tenant. Id.; Waite v. Schmidt, 173
Kan. 353, 245 P.2d 975 (1952).
389. Schlemeyer v. Mellencamp, 159 Kan. 544, 156 P.2d 879 (1945).
390. The Uniform Property Act provides in § 26 that it shall not apply to conveyances effective before its enactment.
391. Davis v. Hardin, 80 Ky. 672 (1880) (Second Resolution); Carr v. Estill, 55
Ky. 245, 16 B. Mon. 309 (1855); Chambers v. Union Trust Co., 235 Pa. 610, 84 A.
512 (1912).
392. 55 Ky. 245, 16 B. Mon. 309 (1855).
393. The court noted that the construction adopted in Wild's Case had been adopted
to promote the intention of the testator. The court then said,
And our law having converted estates tail into absolute fee simple estates, it
is equally clear that if we adopt the same rule of construction, the acknowledged intention will be frustrated and defeated, as the children then could take
nothing under the devise. In order, therefore, to effectuate the acknowledged
and manifest intent of the testator, it is obvious that a different rule of construction must be resorted to in this State.
Id. at 249, 16 B. Mon. at 313.
394. Favored by Long. See Long, supra note 9, at 301.
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rights, if any, of adopted or illegitimate children; the shares of children;
the method of holding shares; the effect of a preceding life estate; the
disposition upon A's death if no children are then alive. It is submitted
that if the matter is worth legislation, it is worth comprehensive legislation.
With the caveat that it is easier to criticize others' drafts than to
formulate one's own, the writer humbly suggests the following statute:
AN ACT TO ABOLISH THE RULE IN WILD'S CASE

Section 1. Chapter 41, entitled "Estates" of the North Carolina
General Statutes, is hereby amended by adding the following section
at the end thereof:
§41 - -.
Rule in Wild's Case abolished; effect of estate to

one and his children.-(a) The rule known as the Rule in Wild's Case,
both the First and Second Resolutions thereof, is abolished.
(b) When an estate or interest in real or personal property is transferred to or for the benefit of a person and his "children" or other
words of similar import, whether the conveyance is immediate or postponed, the transfer is presumed to have the following attributes:
(1) The transfer creates a life estate in the person designated.
(2) Upon the death of the person designated, or upon the effective date of the transfer if the person designated does not survive the
effective date of the transfer, the estate or interest in property shall be
divided into separate shares of equal value, creating one share for each
child of the person designated then living and one share for the then
living descendants, collectively, of each deceased child of the person
designated. Each share created for a child of the person designated
shall go to the child, and each share created for the descendants of
a deceased child of the person designated shall go per stirpes to such
descendants.
(3) Upon the death of the person designated, or upon the effective
date of the transfer if the person designated does not survive the effective date of the transfer, if no child or other descendant of the person
designated is then living, the estate or interest in property shall go to
those persons who would have taken the transfer6r's property (real
or personal, as the case may be) if he had then died, intestate and
domiciled in North Carolina, and the proportions of taking shall be
determined by those laws.
(4) Except in cases governed by subsection (1), estates or interests shall be held in fee simple or absolutely.
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(5) Estates or interests shall be held between two or more persons as tenants in common and not as joint tenants.
(6) The words "child," "children," "descendant," and "descendants" or other words of similar import include adopted persons, illegitimate persons, and persons born within ten lunar months after the time
of distribution.
(7) If a life estate in the person designated is disclaimed, renounced or otherwise terminated before the death of the person designated, the income from the estate or interest in property shall go quarterly to the children and descendants from time to time living in accordance with the formula in subsection (2). If at any time there is no
child or descendant living, the income shall be accumulated and added
to principal. Upon the death of the person designated, the property
shall go according to subsection (2) or (3).
(8) The words "transfer" or "transferred" include conveyances,
gifts, devises and bequests.
(9) Where the transfer is made to two or more persons and their
"children," upon the effective date of the transfer the estate or interest
in property shall be divided into separate shares of equal value, creating
one share for each person designated then living and one share for the
then living descendants, collectively, of each person designated who is
then deceased. Each share created for a person designated shall go
according to the principles of subsections (1) through (9). Each
share created for the then living descendants, collectively, of each
person designated who is then deceased shall go per stirpes to such
descendants. If upon the effective date of the transfer no person
designated or descendant of a person designated is living, the estate or
interest shall go according to subsection (3).
(10) Where the transfer is postponed, the attributes of the
transfer shall be determined in accordance with the principles of subsections (1) through (9). For example, the time for determining the
shares of children and descendants under subsection (2) will be the
last to occur of: the death of the person designated; the termination
of the postponing interest; and the effective date of the transfer.
(11) Any one or more or all of the preceding presumptions of
this subsection may be rebutted by clear, strong and convincing evidence of intention to the contrary. In examining evidence of contrary
intention the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the following
questions: Whether the words "and his children' were intended as
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words of purchase or words of limitation; whether any gift to children
was intended to be substitutional, concurrent or successive; whether the
gift to the person designated was individual or class; and whether shares
of any individuals or class members were intended to be equal.
(c) The provisions of this section shall apply only to wills of
decedents dying after [effective date of statute] and to deeds, agreements, and other written instruments executed and delivered after
[effective date of statute].
Section 2. All laws and clauses of laws in conflict with this Act
are hereby repealed.
Section 3. This Act shall become effective on [effective date
of statute].
Some comments are in order to highlight features of the proposed
statute. It applies to realty and personalty and to transfers by deed,
will, trust or other instrument. In contrast to the Uniform and Kansas
acts, it does not expressly refer to "and his issue" as words of similar
import. This phrase, connoting as it does "bodily heirs" in North
Carolina,3 95 has not been as troublesome in North Carolina as elsewhere, so it seemed advisable not to court trouble. The identity of
"words of similar import" is deliberately left undefined to allow some
room for testamentary intention. The statute presumes the supposed
common desire, a life estate and remainder. This will avoid taxes,
claims of creditors and probate in A's estate. Since A is the parent, the
children may not have to wait long for their share. The statute makes
no special provisions for adjusting the conflicts between life tenant and
remainderman, a problem of much broader scope than Wild's Case. 00
Subsection (b)(2) answers questions of maximum and minimum membership. It is similar to the Phillips "open class plan"3 7 and probably
is the most common modem drafting approach. In order to take,
children must survive A, but if they do not a share is given to their
descendants, if any. This preserves equality among the stocks of chil395. Turpin v. Jarrett, 226 N.C. 135, 37 S.E.2d 124 (1946).
396. Life estates are permitted in personalty. For many years, the courts of North
Carolina held that life estates could be created in chattels only by will. An attempt
to make a gift inter vivos or to reserve by deed a life estate in chattels, resulted in
a gift or reservation of the entire interest. Woodard v. Clark, 236 N.C. 190, 72 S.E.2d
433 (1952); Speight v. Speight, 208 N.C. 132, 179 S.E. 461 (1935). The legislature
changed this rule in 1953 by enacting that "[any interest or estate in personal property
which may be created by last will and testament may also be created by a written
instrument of transfer." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-6.2 (1976); see Ridge v. Bright, 244
N.C. 345, 93 S.E.2d 607 (1956).
397. Phillips, supra note 10, at 41-48.
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dren but avoids taxes and administration in the estates of deceased

children. The maximum possible number of children take, since the
class is not closed until A's death. Distribution "per stirpes" is not
defined, as the concept is (one hopes) well-settled. Unlikely, but
possible, contingencies of A's death before that of the creator or of
failure of children and descendants at A's death are covered by subsec-

tions (b)(2) and (b)(3).

The gift over to the creator's next of kin

(subsection (b)(3)) in case there are no descendants at A's death is
novel but avoids troublesome reopening of the creator's estate to dispose

of an intestate or residuary share; the subsection should accord with
likely intent.898 The statutory plan ordinarily should not encounter any
1976 Tax Reform Act problems. a"9
Subsection (b)(4) may not be needed, since deeds and devises are

presume to be in fee, but is included to avoid any doubt over a matter
that historically caused dispute.

Subsection (b)(5) similarly avoids the

historical joint tenancy versus tenancy in common problem, although the
statute does not contemplate any cases of co-ownership. Both subsections are in line with current North Carolina law. Adopted illegitimates
and children in esse are presumed to take by subsection (b)(6). Treatment of adoptees is consistent with current North Carolina law and

phrasing is based on North Carolina General Statutes section 48-23.1 00

Illegitimates are given full rights, in contrast to current statutes which

allow them to take from the mother freely but from the father only
398. The form is adapted from W. LEACH & J. LOGAN, supra note 17, at 459.
399. The statutory scheme will not avoid the "generation-skipping trust" provisions
on the ground that the interests are legal. See I.R.C. § 2611(d)(2). Nevertheless,
the $250,000 exclusion from the new tax ordinarily will protect any Wild's Case transfers from tax upon the death of A. See id. § 2613(b) (6). It may reasonably be assumed that most Wild's Case transfers are lay-drawn and that in such cases the amount
of property transferred is worth less than $250,000.
400. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23 (1976). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-17, 315.5 (1976), and the following:
References in this instrument to "child," "children," "son," and "daughter" mean lawful blood descendants in the first degree of the parent designated,
and references to "issue" mean lawful blood descendants in the first, second or
any other degree of the ancestor designated, provided always, however, that
1. An adopted child and such adopted child's lawful blood descendants
shall be considered in this instrument as lawful blood descendants of
the adopting parent or parents and of anyone who is by blood or adoption an ancestor of the adopting parent or of either of the adopting
parents and shall not be considered descendants of the adopted child's
natural parents, except that where a child is adopted by a spouse of
one of his or her natural parents such child shall be considered a descendant of such natural parent as well as a descendant of the adopting
parent ....
A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 1254 (3d ed. 1961);

Halfbloods, adopted persons and persons born out of wedlock are included
in class gift terminology and terms of relationship in accordance with rules for
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under limited circumstances. 40 1 The provision for children in gestation
40 2
is taken from the Intestate Succession Act.
Subsection (b)(7) attempts to cover acceleration and destructibility. It provides in essence for distribution of income to persons from
time to time living, with ultimate distribution of principal on A's death.
The simpler solution is to accelerate immediately 40 3 but that would
exclude after-born children.
Subsection (b)(9) takes care of the two multiple parent problems
which have been litigated. It chooses a per stirpetal distribution among
parents and their children rather than per capita.40 4 In doing so it
disposes of the other case, namely what to do when some parents have
children and others do not. Here it is similar to Bridges v. Wilkins. °
Subsection (b)(10) attempts briefly to cover postponed gifts. It expressly provides against closing the class prematurely. Finally, subsection (b)(1 1) allows any or all of these presumptions to be rebutted, but
only by clear and convincing evidence. Several considerations are listed
to sensitize the courts to matters which often have been overlooked.
determining relationships for purposes of intestate succession, but a person
born out of wedlock is not treated as the child of the father unless the person
is openly and notoriously so treated by the father.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-611; "For all purposes of this will and the disposition
of my estate hereunder, the terms "children," "issue," or "descendants" shall be deemed
to include persons adopted prior to attaining 18 years of age." WACHOVIA BANK &
TRusT, Co., supra note 325, at XVI-21.
401. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19 (1976); Cf. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-611 (quoted
in note 400 supra); A. CASNER, supra note 400, at 1254:
A child born to persons who are openly living together as husband and wife
after the performance of a marriage ceremony between them and such child's
lawful blood descendants shall be considered in this instrument as lawful blood
descendants of such child's parents and of any ancestor of such child's parents,
regardless of the fact that a purported divorce of one or both of such persons
with reference to a prior marriage is invalid.
402. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-9 (1976).

403. A. CASNER, supra note 400, at 566 n.65:
In 1955, Illinois enacted a statute which provides that when a will is renounced by the testator's spouse, any future interest which is to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after the termination of an estate or other interest
given by the will to the surviving spouse shall take effect as though the surviving spouse had predeceased the testator, unless the will expressly provides that
in case of renunciation such a future interest shall not be accelerated. The
act by its express terms applies only to wills of decedents dying after it takes
effect. Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 3, § 168a (1959). Consideration should be given to
the desirability of including in a dispositive instrument a provision which would
require solution along the lines of the Illinois statute, in the event of a disclaimer or reunciation of a prior interest. Such a provision might be as follows: "In the event that a beneficiary hereunder disclaims or renounces the
interest limited in his favor, succeeding interests shall take effect as though
such beneficiary had died on the date of the disclaimer or renunciation."
404. Contrary to Wills v. Foltz, 61 W. Va. 262, 56 S.E. 433 (1907); see note
317 supra.
405. 56 N.C. 326, 3 Jones Eq. 342 (1857).

